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Abstract 
Half the people in the Planet Earth are now on internet, surfing the web, keeping connection 
with the outside world, using online services and interacting in social networks. However, the spread 
of internet is going hand in hand with the growing malicious use of it. Creating fake social network 
profiles, wide spreading fake news, posting fake reviews, identity theft to perpetuate online financial 
frauds are only few examples. To face these problems, all the big internet companies, like Google 
and Facebook, are now taking the direction towards the online lie detection research. The present 
work is a contribution to online deception detection through the study of computer-user interaction. 
After a brief review of the current lie detection methods, focusing on their advantages and disad-
vantages for online application, a series of proof of concept experiments are reported. Experiments 
were conducted measuring indices deriving from three different tools of human-computer interaction: 
reaction times on keyboard, keystroke dynamics and mouse dynamics. Two strategies were used to 
increase liars’ cognitive load and facilitate the observation of distinctive features of deception: unex-
pected questions and complex questions. Experiments focused on the deception about identity, as it 
is a very hot issue and represents a current challenge for companies that provide online services. 
Participants were asked to respond lying or truth telling to questions that appeared on the computer 
screen, typing the response, clicking on it with the mouse or pressing one of two alternative keys on 
keyboard. Data collected from liars and truth-tellers’ responses were analyzed and used to train ma-
chine learning classification models. Classification accuracies in distinguishing liars from truth-tell-
ers ranged from 80% to 95%, depending on the deceptive task. Results have proved that it is possible 
to spot liars analyzing their interaction with the computer during the act of lie. In particular, we 
demonstrated that keystroke dynamics is a very promising tool for covert lie detection and it is easily 
integrable with the online existing applications. Moreover, we confirmed that the cognitive complex-
ity of the deceptive task increases the possibility to detect deception.  
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 Introduction 
The International Telecommunications Union reports that on June 2017 the 51% of the 
world's population is on internet [1] that corresponds to 3,885,567,619 of users [2]. From 2010 to 
2017, the global internet usage has grown by 976.4% and, at the same time, the number of users in 
social networks has exponentially increased. In June 2017, Facebook counted 2.01 billion monthly 
active users, whereas in 2010 they just achieved the threshold of 500 million of active people [3]. 
Five new Facebook profiles are created each second and every 60 seconds 510,000 comments are 
posted, 293,000 statuses are updated and 136,000 photos are uploaded [4]. A similar increment has 
been reported also for other socials, such as Twitter, Instagram, Snapchat, YouTube, Pinterest [5], 
[6].  
But are all these activities related to real people and real experiences? The answer is no. 
In 2012, in a report for the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Facebook declared 
that about the 8.7% of the worldwide active users are actually duplicate or false accounts [7], [8]. 
During the last year Facebook, as well as Google, have intensified their actions against the fake online 
news [9]. To guarantee the economic interests of their millions of customers, companies like Amazon, 
TripAdvisor and Yelp are facing the problem of fake reviews [10]. Moreover, for a large number of 
others online services, such as e-commerce and online banking, the verification of the truthfulness of 
the information provided by the users is currently a key issue [11].  
In short, the problem of online deception and its detection seems to be real and all the big companies 
that provide online services are moving in this direction. In the next paragraphs, a review of the most 
relevant issue about online deception is presented alongside their consequences for society and econ-
omy. 
1.1 Fake Identities 
In the current historical and cultural framework, the identity verification is an increasingly urgent 
problem [12]. Faked identities are used for a wide range of criminal purposes, both in the real word 
and in the internet environment. Oversimplifying, a faked identity may be defined as an alteration of 
demographic information in legal documents. For example, terrorists use false passports to enter Eu-
ropean and US borders [13], [14], making this a big deal for physical security.  
Concerning online security, the scenario of the fake identities becomes more intricate. Three main 
specific issues can be identified: the identity alteration, the identity theft and the identity fraud. The 
first consists in the modification of one ore more user’s demographic information, which is really 
common in social networks profiles [15] and it is not clearly legally regulated. For example, a man 
who declared to be a woman, a boy who claims to be younger than he actually is or an underage girl 
who says to be adult. Identity alteration can be done for different reasons, but in most cases it has 
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social purposes, such as attracting the attention [16] or the sympathy of the other people (e.g., groom-
ing) [17] or avoiding the direct exposure to shameful situations [18]. To support the creation of fake 
accounts there are some online services, which automatically generate completely fake profiles, in-
cluding address, employment, tracking numbers and financial information [19]. Completely invented 
accounts, especially fake email accounts, are also commonly used for economic aims and scams, such 
as spamming and phishing.  
Conversely, the identity theft consists in the deliberate use of someone else’s identity [20] and in most 
States it is punished with compensation or prison [21]. Motivations are usually social (e.g., pranks, 
cyberbullying) or related to business (e.g., to increase the visibility of posts and fan pages, manipulate 
votes or the number of visits, junk emails or advertisement inducing customers to pay for clicks) [22]. 
Finally, identity fraud is a crime where one person uses another person’s personal data, without au-
thorization, to deceive or defraud someone else [23]. Identity fraud can occur with or without identity 
theft, such as in the case where the fraudster has been given someone's identity information for other 
reasons but uses it to commit fraud. Motivations for online identity frauds are mainly financial crimes, 
such as open a credit card account without permission or stolen online banking credentials. 
In the following, some statistics about the spread of the mentioned above phenomena are reported, 
describing their social and economic impact and quoting examples. 
1.1.1 Fake profiles 
As previously anticipated, in 2012 Mark Zuckerberg reported that around the 9% of Facebook ac-
counts are fake or duplicate [7], that means about 83 million profiles [8]. Similar percentages were 
reported for Instagram, with the 10% of false profiles, and Twitter that counts approximately the 8.5% 
of fake accounts [24]. 
There are a mixture of innocent and malicious reasons for fake profiles, including professionals doing 
testing and research, and people who want to segment their Facebook use more than is possible with 
one account. Facebook has classified the fake accounts into three categories: duplicate accounts, mis-
classified accounts and undesirable accounts [8]. In 2012, duplicate profiles covered up to 4.8% (45.8 
million) of Facebook’s total active members. According to the social network’s terms of service, 
users are not allowed to have more than one Facebook personal account or make profiles on behalf 
of other people (e.g., parents creating Facebook accounts for their young kids). Misclassified accounts 
are personal profiles that have been made for companies, groups or pets. Those types of profiles (22.9 
million in 2012) are allowed on Facebook, but they need to be created as pages. For this reason, the 
company provides the opportunity to convert these accounts into approved pages without losing in-
formation. In 2012, Facebook estimated that 2.4% of its active accounts belonged to non-humans. 
Some pets, such as Boo, the “world’s cutest dog”, are typically categorized as public figures. The 
third category, undesirable accounts, includes fewer (just the 1.5% of all active accounts), but it is the 
most troublesome. On 2012, there were 14.3 million of undesirable accounts that Facebook believes 
have been created to violate the companies terms, like spamming.  
Between malicious motivations of faked profiles, one of the most dangerous is the child grooming. 
A study conducted in Germany in 2011 on a sample of 518 students, aged between 10 and 16, reveals 
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that the 21.4% of participants, or rather two out of ten adolescents, had been cyber-grooming victims 
over the last year [25]. Most of the cyber-grooming victims report negative consequences, specially 
psychological, such as embarrassment, depression or self-harm [26]. They show difficulties in estab-
lishing new relationships, loss of trust in other people, afraid for ridicule and feeling of helplessness. 
Finally, they develop a sense of insecurity, given that the abuse has been perpetrated, through the 
network, within the home. 
1.1.2 Fake chatting 
The use of faked profiles to catch the attention of the other people is also spread amongst adults 
searching for other adults. This issue has been the focus of a very famous criminal case known as 
“tallhotblond” [27]. Tallhotblond is the story of Thomas Montgomery, a 46 years old man, and Mary 
Shieler a 45 years old woman, who met in a chatroom. He presented himself as a young 18 years old 
marine, whereas she stole the identity of her eighteen daughter. They had a chat-based love story for 
two years, until Mary discovered the real identity of Thomas and decided to break up with him and 
hang out another man.  Montogomery became jealous and, finally, he killed the new lover of Mary. 
After the crime, he realized that the woman for whom he murdered did not really exist. This is only 
an example to demonstrate that what happens in the web, including relationships, may not correspond 
to the reality, and could have dangerous consequences. 
Fake chatting refers to the phenomenon of have a chat conversation pretending to be a person with 
demographic characteristics different from the actual ones. Generally, it happens using a false chat 
account. But why people chat under false account? John Suler, professor of psychology at Rider Uni-
versity, speaks of “online disinhibition effect” [18]. In the virtual environment, we do not interface 
directly with other people but with accounts, that are usually usernames, sometimes associated with 
photos. The psychological distance, due the physical lack of the interlocutor, makes the user does not 
feel the restraints that he experiences when communicating in person. In the web-chat space, people 
say and do things that they would not say and would not do in face-to-face contexts. They relax and 
express themselves more openly. Anonymity, asynchronous communication, and empathy deficit 
contribute to online disinhibition. This disinhibition can be positive when it leads the user to display 
unusual kindness and generosity, whereas it become dangerous when it causes violent behaviors, such 
as foul language, demonstrations of hate, anger and threats.  
The online disinhibition effect facilitates the phenomenon of sexting as well [28]. The term is a port-
manteau of “sex” and “texting” and it consists in sending, receiving, or forwarding sexually explicit 
messages, photographs or images, via any digital device. A survey on 1,496 adolescents between 12 
and 18 has shown that about the 10% of them have received sexual messages or videos via mobile 
phone, while the 6.7% sent these kind of messages to friends and adults, including strangers [29]. 
Two more recent investigation, which have been conducted by an Italian organization for the chil-
dren’s rights and the American Academy of Pediatrics, reported that the 22% of the adolescent had 
sexting, also with strangers [30], in the last six months [31]. Moreover, it emerged that there is a 
positive correlation between sexting practice and risky sexual behaviors in real life, with a higher 
level of risk for those who shared photos in addition to text messages. Concerning photos, one of the 
most popular social networks based on photo sharing is Snapchat. The principal concepts of Snapchat 
is that pictures and messages are only available for a short time before they become inaccessible [32]. 
Introduction 
12 
As consequence, users become more involved in exchanging images of all kinds, including sexual 
photos. However, a screenshot is enough to keep the image from the recipient and share it with other 
users. In fact, in Instagram there is the “#snapchat” hashtag where all the images taken by Snapchat 
are posted unbeknownst to the victim [33]. These images are also sold, fueling the pornography and 
child pornography market. To partially solve this problem, companies such as Instagram and Twitter 
are developing specific algorithms to ban inappropriate content (e.g., photos containing female nip-
ples) [34]. 
1.1.3 Fake VISA 
Consequences related to the use of false identities that are different from those described above con-
cern VISA and passports. Numerous countries, including USA, provide travel VISA through elec-
tronic systems, such as the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) [35]. International 
travelers are asked to compile an online form entering their biographical information and, after some 
checks of the databases, the access to the country is approved or denied. However, most of the crim-
inals, including people working for terrorist organizations, are unknown and their information are not 
included in the databases [36].  
Faked personal identity is a major issue in security in Europe as well [12]. Especially in the last years, 
a large number of migrants from the Middle East are entering Europe without documents, and some-
times is enough to self-declare the identity information to obtain a European passport [37]. Among 
them, there are often Islamist militants involved in terror attacks, as occurred recently in Paris, Brus-
sels and Berlin [38], [39], [40], [41]. For example, the perpetrator of the Berlin attack on December 
19, 2016 was an undocumented immigrant from Tunisia who entered Germany from Greece and then 
Italy using several false identities [39]. One of the terrorists involved in the Brussels airport suicide 
bombing on March 22, 2016 was using the identity of a former Inter Milan football player [13] to 
travel around Europe. The security measures adopted by the border patrol include mainly biometric 
passports and the cross-checks of information contained in databases (e.g., wanted lists, fingerprints). 
But in cases as those mentioned above, biometric identification tools (e.g., fingerprints) could not be 
applied as most of the suspects were previously unknown. So, despite the attempts by governments 
to increase security measures [42], the issue remains open. 
1.1.4 Online banking and other financial services 
Finally, the identity fraud is an urgent problem for financial online services, such as online banking 
and e-commerce. Even if online banking is an easy way to access bank services, it is enough to steal 
the credentials of a user to access his bank account. 
As anticipated above, identity fraud is defined as the use of another person’s identity without author-
ization to deceive or defraud someone else (e.g., the bank) [23]. An example is the use another per-
son’s information to open a credit card account without permission, and then charge merchandise to 
that account. Identity fraud does not occur when a credit card is simply stolen; that may be consumer 
fraud, but is not identity fraud. Conversely, identity fraud is a synonym of unlawful identity change. 
It refers to the specific crime activity of use the identity of another person or of a non-existing person 
fraudulently. In fact, identity fraud does not necessarily involve colluding or theft of another’s person 
information; it can involve the use of a fake name as well. The false identity is generally created 
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combining faked and actual information (e.g., a real social security number along with a fake address) 
[43]. The fraudster can then use the fake identity, to create a credit card or other accounts with finan-
cial purposes. The generation of false financial accounts is often very simple, as sometimes it is 
enough to scan the documents and send them to the bank. The scan documents may be easily falsified. 
It is estimated that the economic losses due to this criminal activity in US are around billions each 
year [44]. Equifax reported that about the 80% of all credit card frauds are due to identity fraud 
accounts [45]. One famous case of identity fraud affected the PlayStation [46]. In 2011, the 
PlayStation Network was hacked into, and the information from everyone who had his credit card 
coordinates installed on the Network were stolen. The Sony needed three months to fix the problem. 
With approximately 77 million of compromised accounts, it was one of the largest data security 
breaches in history and cost hundreds of thousands of dollars to the Sony [47]. 
However, the losses are not just financial. Oftentimes, falsified or forged documents are used to pur-
chase tobacco or alcohol as a minor, to acquire driver’s licenses, as well as to continue playing on a 
certain sports team or organization when that person is really too old to compete [48]. Criminals can 
use the social security numbers of children to apply for government benefits, apply for loans or utility 
services, or rent a place to live. Children are targets of identity theft because the crime can go unde-
tected for years, often until the child applies for his or her first credit card or mobile phone account. 
This phenomenon is called “runway” and it is estimated that between 140,000 and 400,000 children 
become victims of identity theft every year [49]. 
1.2 Fake News 
Fake news are defined as articles drawn up with invented, misleading or distorted information, made 
public with the deliberate attempt to misinform or spread jokes through traditional media or via the 
internet, through the social media [50]. Fake news are often published with the intention of attracting 
the reader and finally to obtain financial or political gains. A separate global study published by 
Edelman in 2016 found that for news and information people trusted the search engines (63%) more 
than the traditional media, such as newspapers and television (58%) [51]. 
On December 2016 the CNBC listed the biggest fake news stories of 2016 [52], most notably the title 
“Pope Francis shocks world, endorses Donald Trump for president, releases statement”. In few weeks 
the fake news reached 960,000 Facebook engagements. When, on November 8, 2016 Donald Trump 
became the new US president, Facebook was accused of have influenced the election outcome 
through the propagation of the fake news. To defend his Social, on November 10, 2016 Mark Zuck-
erberg released a declaration: “Personally I think the idea that fake news on Facebook ... influenced 
the election in any way — I think is a pretty crazy idea. Voters make decisions based on their lived 
experience”. He also stated that more than 99% of what people see in his Social Network is authentic 
[53], 
Other fake news titles of 2016 included “Trump offering free one-way tickets to Africa & Mexico for 
those who wanna leave America”, “ISIS leader calls for American Muslim voters to support Hillary 
Clinton” and “FBI agent suspected in Hillary email leaks found dead in apparent murder-suicide” 
[52]. According to Buzzfeed [54], these stories boasted nearly two million Facebook engagements, 
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while in the same period the top performing Facebook story from the New York Times racked up just 
over 370,000. An investigation traced some of these fake publishers to Veles, a small town in Mace-
donia, where it has been discovered that over 140 fake news sites are based. In January 2017, Google 
and Facebook took the first concrete steps to curb the number of false news articles propagated across 
their sites [9]. 
1.3 Fake Reviews 
Lust but not least, another serious problem related to online deception concern fake reviews [55], an 
issue that companies like Amazon, TripAdvisor and Yelp are now facing to guarantee the economic 
interests of their millions of customers [10]. Fake reviews refer to contents created by users and posted 
in internet where they express a false opinion about a product or a service. A 2013 European Con-
sumer Centres’ Network web survey showed that the 82% of respondents read consumer reviews 
before shopping [56].  
An yearlong investigation has discovered different companies, which were located in Bangladesh, 
Philippines or Eastern Europe, where fake-review operators produced, for as little as a dollar, amazing 
comments for places that they had never seen in countries where they had never been [57]. The fraud-
ulent reviews were posted on sites like Google, Yelp, Citysearch and Yahoo. A fake review of a 
restaurant may lead to a bad meal, which is disappointing, but the investigation uncovered a wide 
range of services buying fake reviews that could do more permanent damage, such as dentists, law-
yers, even an ultrasound clinic. 
Reviews can be categorized in three groups: positive reviews, negative reviews and neutral reviews. 
All these three types of reviews can be faked, especially positive and negative. In fact, a company 
could create a positive review to increase the number of its costumers or a negative review to decrease 
the number of the competitor’s costumers. 
In a recent study, the authors investigated the economic and business incentives to commit review 
fraud on the popular review platform Yelp [58]. They found that a restaurant is more likely to commit 
review fraud writing false positive posts when its reputation is weak (e.g., when it has few reviews, 
or it has recently received bad reviews), whereas it is more likely to leave reviews for competitors 
and when it faces increased competition. Chain restaurants, which benefit less from Yelp, are gener-
ally less likely to commit review fraud. Moreover, they estimated that about the 16% of the restaurants 
reviews on Yelp are faked.  
The economic damage caused by faked reviews is huge, so much so that on October 2015 the Euro-
pean Parliament released a briefing on this specific issue, assuming some possible line of action to 
fight it [56]. The report stated that “the problem of fake online reviews not only concerns individual 
consumers; it can lead to an erosion of consumer confidence in the online market, which can reduce 
competition. To deal with this issue, some guidelines have already been adopted by consumer en-
forcement bodies, regulators and other stakeholders, in the EU and internationally. Enforcement 
actions have also been taken. Fake online reviews should be taken seriously, as more and more con-
sumers buy online, and the practice is becoming increasingly sophisticated”. 
Introduction 
15 
In conclusion, is it possible to prevent the fake news posting and block it before they are write? Is it 
possible to identify fake reviews and black it out? Is it possible to detect people subscribing a website 
or a social with a fake identity? At date, these are not still effective possibilities, but research on 
online lie detection is going in this direction. 
This work is a contribution to online lie detection. The main purpose is to investigate the possibility 
to detect deception analyzing the interaction between user and computer. In the next chapters, an 
exhaustive review of the current lie detection methods, focusing on their advantages and disad-
vantages for online application, is reported. Then, we present a series of proof of concept studies 
aimed to expand the scientific knowledge about human-computer interaction during the act of lie. 
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 Related works 
The psychology of lying is one of the topics that have interested the researchers in the last century 
[59]. According to Abe, deception is a “psychological process by which one individual deliberately 
attempts to convince another person to accept as true what the liar knows to be false, to gain some 
type of benefit or to avoid loss” [60]. 
The first scientist who attempted to create a lie detector was Vittorio Benussi. First professor of ex-
perimental psychology at University of Padova, Benussi proposed to identify deceptive responses 
based on the subject’s psychophysiological measures, especially the breathe [61]. The instrument that 
he used to record the breath was called pneumograph, which consisted in a thoracic band that allowed 
to record respiratory movements and therefore to calculate the duration of inspiration and expiration. 
The basic idea was that when a person is lying his expirations become longer, whereas inspirations 
are shorter. Conversely, a truth-teller show an inverse inspiration-expiration duration pattern. 
Lie detection techniques based on psychophysiological measures, like the pneumograph of Benussi, 
are known as emotion-based lie detection techniques [62]. Emotion-based lie detection highlights 
deception through the physiological reactions (arousal) that are induced by lying. These are the best 
known lie detection techniques and the most widely-used. In this category fall the famous polygraph 
[63], which is commonly associated with the Control Questions Technique (CTQ) [64] or the Guilty 
Knowledge Test (GKT) [65]. The emotion-based techniques are very diverse, according to the indices 
that are measured: heart rate analysis [66], eye tracking [67], thermography [68], voice stress analysis 
[69], facial expression analysis [70]. However, the link between deception and arousal has been ques-
tioned, in particular because an person’s physiological activation can be explained by many reasons 
and because not all the individuals are aroused when they produce deceptive responses [71]. More 
recently, researchers began to study the neural correlates of deception, using event-related potential 
(ERP) [72] or functional magnetic resonance imaging (fRMI) [73] as lie detectors. The basis of ERP 
techniques is the fact that recognition of infrequent and familiar events (e.g., crime scene details) 
modulates brain potentials such as the P300 or that the response conflict (e.g., the inhibition of an 
honest response while producing a deceptive one) modulates the amplitude of medial frontal nega-
tivities. The use of fRMI in the lie detection is aimed to obtain measurements of cerebral blood flow 
(a marker for neuronal activity) in individuals engaged in deception, showing differences in brain 
activity between deceptive and truthful responding.  
As we are interesting in the problem of online deception, here we not further discuss the psychophys-
iological lie detection techniques. In fact, they are not currently usable to spot online lying, as they 
require very specific instrumentation and are not easily accessible to the average user who navigates 
in internet (they are very expensive, require a very specific expertise and take a lot of time to be set 
up). 
Related works 
18 
Currently, the lie detection approaches that could be used to address the problem of online deception 
are essentially two: the linguistic approach and the behavioral approach. In the following paragraphs, 
a description of these approaches is reported, as well as the state of the art about their application to 
detect lies.  
2.1 Linguistic Approach 
Different studies have demonstrated that liars utilize language differently than truth-tellers and some 
linguistic cues can predict which speeches or texts may contain deception [74]. For example, Newman 
et al. [75] tried to distinguish true and false stories extracting linguistic features. They demonstrated 
that compared to truth-tellers liars showed lower cognitive complexity, used fewer self-references 
and other-references, and used more negative emotion words. According to these features, a com-
puter-based text analysis program correctly classified liars and truth-tellers with an accuracy around 
65%. 
The verbal approach is widespread in the forensic environment to distinguish true from false state-
ments made by crime victims [76]. One method, which falls under the verbal approach to lie detection, 
is the scientific content analysis (SCAN) [77]. The SCAN is the most frequently used verbal credi-
bility assessment method [78]. This technique analyses the words that people use to try to determine 
if what they said is accurate. The basic idea is that liars and truth-tellers differ in the type of language 
that they use. Following this hunch, the SCAN proposes a list of linguistic criteria that could assist 
the examiner in differentiating between true and false statements [79]. However, at date there are no 
scientific evidence that confirm the discriminative power of the SCAN [76], [80].  
Another linguistic technique to analyze the words that people say during their declarations is the 
statement validity assessment (SVA) [81]. It was originally designed to determine the credibility of 
child witness testimony in trials for sexual offences. The core of the SVA is the criteria-based content 
analysis (CBCA), which is aimed to distinguish true and false declarations [82]. The theory under the 
CBCA is that children’s statements about true events differ in content and quality from their state-
ments about fabricated events. Based on these differences, a list of criteria to evaluate the credibility 
of witness testimonies have been developed [83]. CBCA criteria are of two types: cognitive and mo-
tivational criteria. The first are likely to indicate true statements, as they are typically too difficult to 
fabricate (e.g., details about time and place). Conversely, motivational criteria refer to how the wit-
ness presents the statement: as liars focus on making a credible impression, they leave out from their 
stories the information that may cause damages (e.g., admitting lack of memory) [84]. However, 
numerous studies have shown that CBA is usefulness with adult victims and eyewitnesses [85], [76]. 
Vrij et al. [84] reported that the CBCA has an accuracy ranging from 55% to 90%, with an average 
accuracy of 70%. 
A third verbal lie detection technique is the reality monitoring technique (RM) [76]. The rationale 
behind the RM is that memories of true events will differ in quality and content from fabricated 
memories [86]. The criteria to difference true and false statements include different aspects, such as 
realism, details about space and time, sensory information and clarity or vividness [87]. Some studies 
demonstrated that the RM has a comparable accuracy to that of CBCA, with percentages of accuracy 
ranging from 61% to 83%, with an average of 69% [78]. 
Related works 
19 
More recently, the linguistic approach has been applied also to online texts, especially reviews. 
 
For example, Moilanen et al. [88] developed a software, named TheySay, which is able to measure 
the sincerity of a written text based on the textual sentiment analysis. Mihalcea and Strapparava [89] 
collected deceptive and truthful opinions on different issues, such as abortion and death penalty, from 
Mechanical Turk participants. In particular, for each topic, they solicited one truthful and one decep-
tive instance. Using a classifier based on psycholinguistic analysis, the authors classified true and 
false statements with an accuracy around 70%. Ott et al. [90] asked Mechanical Turk participants to 
generate a 400 positive faked reviews on a set of hotels. Then, fake reviews were combined with 400 
positive truthful reviews from TripAdvisor on the same hotels. The text of true and false reviews were 
used to train a machine learning classifier based on three different approaches: genre identification, 
psycholinguistic analysis and text categorization using n-gram features. Results indicated that decep-
tive and truthful reviews were identify with an accuracy of 90%. Comparing the fake reviews obtained 
by Ott et al. [90] with the reviews classified as faked by the Yelp’s filtering, Mukherjee et al. [91] 
observed hat the false statements produced by Turkers’ participants were not representative of the 
real-life fake reviews. For this reason, they concluded that the linguistic approach is not really effec-
tive in the real-life setting, which is what has been shown by studies where participants are instructed 
to lie. 
Some authors in literature have argued that lie detection would be most accurate if both verbal and 
nonverbal indicators of deception are taken into account [92]. Following this line of thought, several 
studies have focused on both linguistic and behavioral features, trying to improve the performance in 
classification of a text as genuine or faked. For example, Zhou [93] and Derrick et al. [94] investigated 
whether linguistic and behavioral indicators can be used for deception detection in instant messaging. 
Zohu [93] explored different nonverbal and verbal behaviors (participation level, discussion initia-
tion, cognitive complexity and non-immediacy of sentences, frequency of spontaneous corrections, 
lexical and content diversity) during a chat discussion between participants, showing that these indi-
ces could significantly differentiate deceivers from truth-tellers. Derrick et al. [94] submitted the par-
ticipants to a computer-mediated chat-based. They were instructed to be sincere or liars in response 
to each question according to a prompt given by the system. The system captured four kind of fea-
tures: response time, number of edits (basic keystrokes, such as backspace and delete keys), word 
count and lexical diversity. Results showed that deception was positively correlated with the response 
time and the number of edits and negatively correlated to the word count.  
The linguistic approach, combined with other behavioral elements, is now beginning to be used also 
from companies, like Google and Facebook to recognize the fake news [9]. One of the first online 
service that applied it to the detection of false online information was Yelp, which from 2005 use a 
filter to remove suspicious or fake reviews [95]. The Yelp’s algorithm is trade secret, but recently 
some authors tried to speculate about it functioning [91], [96]. Darnell Holloway, senior manager at 
Yelp, declared: “Yelp has software that evaluates every single review based on quality, reliability and 
user activity on Yelp” [97]. Quality refers to the fact that reviews must have new, helpful and pertinent 
information. Reliability is a feature that concerns the user. When a user sets up his account, he has 
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the opportunity to give Yelp personal information, such as date of birth and city. The more infor-
mation Yelp has about a user, the more “reliable” he is considered. Finally, the third parameter regards 
the activity performed by the user: users with less activity, fewer friends or fewer reviews are less 
likely to have their review recommended. 
This declaration seems to be coincide with the results of an exploratory study conducted by David 
Kamerer [96]. The author performed a content analysis of a subset of Yelp restaurant and religious 
organization reviews, unfiltered and filtered, exploring signals from the reviews or the reviewers that 
might explain the filtering process. The study found that factors intrinsic to the review itself are not 
related to filtering, but factors related to the reviewer are strong predictors. According to Kamerer, 
the Yelp system is much more likely to filter reviews from occasional, isolated reviewers than from 
prolific, socially connected reviewers. Mukherjee et al. [91] used a linguistic n-gram based approach 
to classify filtered and unfiltered Yelp’s reviews, discovering that it was not effective in detecting 
fake reviews. They observed that fake (filtered) and non-fake (unfiltered) reviews from the same user 
were linguistically similar, which explains why fake review detection using n-grams was not effec-
tive. However, they noticed that the spammers left behind some specific psycholinguistic footprints, 
which were indicators of deception. Then, authors have supposed that Yelp’s filtering algorithm is 
correlated with abnormal spamming behaviors, founding that the behavior analysis was highly effec-
tive in detecting fake reviews than the linguistic n-grams approach. 
2.2 Behavioral Approach 
The last emergent approach in the study of lie detection is the behavioral one. It consists in the ob-
servation of the nonverbal behavior of the suspect while he is producing a deceptive or truthful re-
sponse [92]. For example, in online context it would be possible to observe the interaction between 
the user and the computer or the user’s behavior in the navigation space while he is posting a faked 
post on a social network.  
One behavioral response feature, which is commonly used as lying index, is the reaction time (RT). 
RT-based lie detection techniques are based on the response latencies to a stimulus of interest [98]. 
In particular, it has been demonstrated that people manifest a lengthening of RT and an increase in 
error rate when they lie in response to questions [99]. This techniques find their roots on the cognitive 
load theory, according to which lying is cognitively more demanding than truth-telling and this higher 
cognitive complexity reflected itself in a number of indices of cognitive effort, including, for exam-
ple, reaction times [100].  
The deception production is a complex psychological process in which cognition plays an important 
role [101]. During the generation of a false response, the cognitive system does not simply elaborate 
a statement, but it carries out several executive tasks: it inhibits the true response and, subsequently, 
it produces a false response [102]. Moreover, the generation of a lie requires to monitor the reaction 
of the interlocutor and to adjust the behavior congruently to the lie [103]. All these mental operations 
cause an increase in cognitive load and, generally, a greater cognitive load produces a bad perfor-
mance in the task the participant is carrying out, in terms of timing and errors [104]. This phenomenon 
has been observed by studying the RTs in double choice tasks: the choice between two alternatives 
becomes slower in the deceptive response than the truthful one [105]. 
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According to the functioning of our cognitive system, behavioral-based lie detection tools have been 
proposed to identify liars, as the RT-based Concealed Information Test (CIT-RT) [106], the Timed 
Antagonistic Response Alethiometer (TARA) [107], the a Sheffield lie test [108], and the more recent 
autobiographical Implicit Association Test (aIAT) [109]. All these techniques are computerized task 
in which subjects are asked to respond to the stimuli, which are presented on the computer screen, 
pressing one of two alternative keys on keyboard. 
The autobiographical Implicit Association Test (aIAT) is a variant of the IAT by Greenwald, 
McGhee, and Schwartz [110]. It is used to detect autobiographical memories encoded in the respond-
ent’s mind. In particular, it determines which one of two alternative memories is true and, conse-
quently which one is false. During the task participants have to classify stimuli as quickly as possible 
in four different categories using two keys on keyboard:  
 two target concept categories (e.g., China vs. Tuscany, example of stimuli: “I went in China for 
Christmas” vs. “I went in Tuscany for Christmas”)  
 Two attribute categories (true vs. false, example of stimuli: “I am in front of computer” vs. “I am 
climbing a mountain”).  
Then, in one combined block, two categories (one from the target concept and one from the attribute 
dimension) are mapped on the same response key. In a reversed combined block, participants have to 
classify the same four categories reversely paired, so that both target concept categories are paired 
with both attribute categories. The IAT effect is expressed as the difference between the combined 
and reversed combined blocks. In the block where two associated concepts require the same motor 
response, RT will be faster than in the block where the same two concepts require different motor 
responses [111]. 
The Sheffield lie test consists in presenting autobiographical questions to which participants have to 
provide “yes” or “no” responses using one of two different response keys [112]. Questions can appear 
in two different colors: participants are instructed to lie if the sentence is presented in the one color 
(lie-trials) and to tell the truth if the sentence is presented in the other color (truth-trials). Experiments 
that applied this paradigm found that liars had slower RT and made more errors on lie-trials compared 
to truth-trials. 
The TARA requires subjects to classify a succession of mixed statements as true or false, as quickly 
and accurately as they can, by pressing one of two keys. Specifically, it requires to truth-tellers to 
complete two alternating tasks using the same strategy, but requires liars to complete them using 
contradictory strategies. The faster they do so, the more likely they are to be telling the truth; the 
slower they do so, the more likely they are to be lying. Experimental studies reached an accuracy rate 
around 85% in detecting liars [107]. 
Finally, the CIT-RT applies the theoretical framework of CIT (previously known as Guilty 
Knowledge Test) to reaction times. It consists in presenting the critical information within a series of 
very similar, noncritical sources of distractor information. For example, if the concealed knowledge 
about a murder weapon is under scrutiny, a gun (the known murder weapon) will be presented to-
gether with distractors that are also potential murder weapons (e.g., a knife, etc.). For the innocent 
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subjects, the response is expected to be similar to all stimuli. By contrast, for the guilty subject (with 
guilty knowledge for the weapon), longer responses for the critical item are expected (e.g., the gun) 
[113].  
To the best of our knowledge, there are not online applications of lie detection which are based on 
RT. The first researchers who have proposed the RT-based lie detection for the web are Bruno 
Verschuere and Bennett Kleinberg [114]. Through a web platform, the authors applied the CIT to the 
identity detection [115]. Participants were asked to compile a first online form with their personal 
information. Secondly, they were asked to learn a false identity and to perform the CIT task pretend-
ing that the learnt identity was their real one. Results showed that the CIT identified the true identities 
of the participants with an accuracy ranging from 86% to 94%. 
The efficiency of the behavioral lie detection techniques has been proved. However, there are some 
limits in the online practical application. First, all these methods require a prior knowledge about the 
information that has to be checked as true or false. In fact, they require that the true information (or 
the true memory) is available, while in most real applications this is unknown to the examiner. For 
example, if we want to check the truthfulness of the user identity, all these techniques require that the 
true identity is available. Nevertheless, in some cases, such as the Facebook’s users, the true identity 
is unknown. This means that given two alternative information these techniques can say which is true 
and which one is false, but they can’t say in absolute terms whether the reported information is true 
or false. Secondly, RT based techniques only study the response latency, therefore liars have just to 
check a unique parameter to fake the lie detector. Even though RT are implicit measures, during the 
aIAT or CIT examination the lie detection purpose is explicit (overt detection of deception). Both the 
science and the everyday practice, show that the best indices of lying are implicit behaviors that the 
subject puts into action automatically. For this reason, the ideal situation to detect deceits is realized 
when the examinee is not aware about the lie detection purpose and about the parameters that are 
collected (covert detection of deception). Finally, all the above mentioned RT-based lie detection 
techniques are conceived for the application in court or in other face-to-face situations. Thus, they do 
not follow the natural flow of the online activities. Finally, they administration is pretty long, and 
sometimes the instruction to complete the test, such as in the case of aIAT, are very complex. In other 
words, they are difficult to be integrated in the current online services.  
2.2.1 Mouse tracking 
Latency measures can be collected not only using two alternative (yes/no) response buttons, but can 
be embedded in more complex measures. It has been proposed that kinematic indices or keystroke 
characteristics provide a clue to recognize the deceit during human-computer interaction [116], [117]. 
In this and in the next paragraph, a description of these techniques and their application in detecting 
lies are reported. 
Recently, researchers found as a simple hand movement can be used to study the continuous evolution 
of the mind processes underlying a behavior [118]. Especially, the hand motor response has been 
tracked during computerized multiple-choice choice tasks to understand the dynamics of a broad 
range of psychological processes [119]. Results have shown that hand-tracking can provide an high-
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fidelity real-time motor trace of the mind [120]. Differently from RT, hand movement is not a static 
index resulting from a cognitive operation, but it is an online measure of the entire process. 
A very easy way to capture the hand movements during the subject’s response on computerized tasks 
is to track mouse dynamics [121]. Mouse dynamics refers to all the information that describe a mouse 
movement in terms of spatial and temporal features. This procedure has recently been applied to a 
large number of fields and has proved to be useful in highlighting the cognitive complexity of the 
subjects’ responses. Mouse tracking has been used to investigate the cognitive processes of negative 
sentence verification [122], racial attitudes [123], perceptions [124], prospective memory [125], and 
lexical decisions [126]. 
Applying this evidence to the study of lie, Duran, Dale & McNamara published the results of the first 
work in which hand movements were used to distinguish deceptive responses to the truthful ones 
[116]. During the task, participants were instruct to answer “yes” or “no” questions about autobio-
graphical information. Questions appeared on a screen and participant were asked to respond using 
the Nintendo Wii controller. For each participant, half of the trials required to response truthfully and 
the other half required a false response, according to a visual cue that appeared on the screen along 
with each question. Results interdicted that deceptive responses could be distinguished from truthful 
ones based on several dynamic indices, such as the overall response time, the motor onset time, the 
arm movement trajectory, the velocity and the acceleration of the motion.  
Hibbeln and colleagues studied the mouse movements in an insurance fraud online context [127]. 
During the task, participants were asked to claim damages to their car by compiling an online insur-
ance claim form. In particular, they had to indicate the repair costs and the locations of the damage. 
Some participants were advise to declare a higher number of car damages in order to obtain a greater 
compensation by the insurance. Results suggested that being deceptive increased the normalized dis-
tance of movement, the speed of movement, the response time, and resulted in a higher number of 
left clicks.  
Similar results have been obtained by Valacich et al. [128] who proposed a pilot study to identify 
guilty individuals involved in specific insider threat activities. They analyzed mouse movements 
while participants compiled an online survey similar to the CIT. Their preliminary observations 
showed that guilty insiders had a different mouse movement pattern when answering to key-item as 
compared to non-key-items. 
At date, these are the only studies that investigate the effect of deception on mouse dynamics. There 
are also several studies in literature that applied mouse movement analysis to the problem of the user 
authentication or identification. However, the main limitation of these methods is that they require 
necessarily a certain level of knowledge about the alleged user, and a specific training, in order to be 
able to recognize the intruder. In other words, they are not lie detection techniques, but biometrics 
techniques similar to finger print and face recognition. Once again, these methods cannot be used to 
spot fake identities in absence of a ground truth. 
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2.2.2 Keystroke dynamics 
Keystroke dynamics is the detailed timing information about human typing rhythm: it describes ex-
actly when each key is pressed and released, while a person is typing at a computer keyboard, a 
mobile phone or a touch screen panel [129], [130]. It has been widely used as a biometric measure 
for user authentication [131], [132] but, similar to mouse dynamics authentication, it requires a prior 
knowledge about an alleged user to recognize him. 
Concerning the application of keystroke dynamics to lie detection, only few studies focused on it, and 
the majority of these principally used a linguistic approach to deception detection or they considered 
only some simple features of the text rather than the rhythm of typing (see section 2.1). 
The first authors who proposed to apply keystroke dynamics to were Grimes, Jenkins and Valacich 
[117]. They conceived the Keystroke Dynamics Deception Detection model to explain the relation-
ship between deceptive behavior and keystroke dynamics. According to this model, the production 
of a falsehood may cause an increase both in emotional arousal and in cognitive load. These incre-
ments may result in a consequent change in the fine motor control, which in turn results in a deviation 
of the typing ability, affecting the keystroke dynamics personal baseline. The Keystroke Dynamics 
Deception Detection model was tested in a pilot study. Each subject shared three statements, two 
truthful and one falsehood, on a web page. Keystroke characteristics were captured by a JavaScript 
based web application. In this paper, the authors did not discuss the results, but they brought some 
limitations of the study that could be a good point for future developments. 
Banerjee et al. analyzed different keystroke parameters to improve the performance of a classifier in 
distinguishing truthful and deceptive writers of online reviews and essays collected via Amazon Me-
chanical Turk [133]. Each Turker wrote a truthful and a deceptive text about three topics (restaurant 
review, gay marriage and gun control); the order of the true/false texts was balanced between subjects. 
Mouse and keyboard events (KeyUp, KeyDown and MouseUp) for all texts were captured. Moreover, 
the authors considered the following features: editing patterns (e.g., number of deletion keystrokes, 
number of MouseUp events, number of arrow keystrokes), temporal aspects as writing speed and 
pauses (e.g.,. timespan of entire document, average timespan of word plus preceding keystroke, av-
erage keystroke timespan, average timespan of spaces, average timespan of non-white spaces key-
strokes, average interval between words) and writing speed variations over word categories (e.g., 
nouns, verbs, adjectives, function words,  content words). They implemented a binary SVM classifier, 
which achieved a baseline average accuracy of 83.62% on linguistic features. Introducing keystroke 
features, they obtained a statistically significant improvement of the deception detection classifier, 
ranging from 0.7% to 3.5%. 
To conclude, although keystroke dynamics are mouse dynamics are promising technique for online 
deception detection, the literature on these topics is not enough. For this reason, we have looked at 
the matter further through the experiments that are reported in Chapter 4. 
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2.3 Strategies to Increase Cognitive Load 
In sections 2.1 and 2.2, we analyzed different methodologies (RT, mouse dynamics and keystroke 
dynamics) to record the distinctive features of the deception. The present paragraph focuses on how 
it is possible to increase the liars’ identifiability. 
We argued that there is evidence that the process of inhibiting the truthful response and substituting 
it with a deceptive response may be a complex cognitive task, which results in an increase of response 
time. However, in some instances, responding with a lie may be faster than truthfully responding 
[112]. In fact, distinct types of lies may differ in their cognitive complexity and may require different 
levels of cognitive effort. For example, the cognitive effort may be minimal when the subject is simply 
denying a fact that actually happened [134] or when the lie has been overlearned [135]. In other 
words, when the response is automated the liar’s cognitive load remains intact and his response be-
comes indistinguishable from the response of a truth-teller. This evidence, anticipated by previous 
literature [135] [136], it was found also in our experiments (see paragraph 4.3.8). 
To overcome this issue, authors in literature have proposed different strategies, which are usually 
used in police interrogations, and which allow increasing cognitive load of liars, keeping unaltered 
the cognitive load of truth-tellers [101].  
A first strategy to increase the cognitive load during an interview consists in asking the subject to 
perform a second task at the same time as the interview. This allows minimizing the cognitive re-
sources of the subject, which are destined to the lie, rising clues of deceit. Liars, who are already 
partially committed to lying, should find the additional task as particularly exhausting [137]. 
Similar to dual task, is the introduction of task switching. Task switch can be can be understood as 
continuously move from a task (e.g., lying) to another (e.g., counting) or switch up from lying to truth 
telling [138]. In this second sense, some authors have proposed to manipulate the proportion of 
lie/truth-trials across participants, to investigate how the continuous change from truth to lie telling 
would affects the cognitive load and, consequently, the subject performance [136]. A research has 
shown that the cognitive cost of deception decreases when people frequently respond deceptively, 
while it increases when people rarely respond deceptively. People who often responded deceptively 
are faster and made fewer errors than people who only occasionally responded deceptively. 
Another efficient technique to increase the cognitive load is the time restriction of the response [139]. 
This strategy consists in ask the examinee to answer questions as quickly as possible. This limits 
opportunity for liars to self-monitor and control the response. The high cognitive load of rapid re-
sponding questions may increase the number of deception cues, such as voice pitch elevation, pupil 
dilation, reduced blinking, long response times, accidental blurting of the truth because of the and 
may increase. 
Soliciting surprise drawings is another efficient strategy to spot liars. In fact, Vrij et al. observed that 
truth tellers’ drawings of their workplaces contained more plausible details, especially those involv-
ing their coworkers, than liars doing the same [140]. 
Related works 
26 
Virij at al. proposed to impose cognitive load asking participants to keep the eye contact with the 
examiner during an interview. The half of participants were asked to maintain the eye contact during 
the entire interview, whereas the other half responded to the examiner’s questions without any spe-
cific instruction. Results showed that liars were more detectable when were obliged to keep eye con-
tact than in the control condition. 
Another technique used by Vrij and colleagues to improve cognitive load, is to ask subjects to recall 
their stories in an inverse order [141]. Asking interviewees to report their stories in reverse order is 
already practiced in police interviews in several countries. The basic principle under this strategy is 
that recalling an event starting from the end interrupts the prepared sequence of false events and 
requires activating the working memory to manipulate the recall and monitor its coherence. An ex-
periment confirmed that instructing interviewees to recall their stories in reverse order facilitated 
detecting deception. Half of participants were asked to reports their stories in reverse and the other 
half in chronological order. They were video recorded and observed by police officers, who identified 
the liars with an accuracy above the chance level. 
However, some authors tried to warn researchers against the possibility that in some situations these 
cognitive strategies could be challenging for truth-tellers as well. For example, recalling very distant 
memories or future intentions may be overloading in terms of cognitive effort. As consequence, the 
differences between liars and truth-tellers become minor [142]. 
In the following subsections, two more strategies to increase liars’ cognitive load are describe in more 
detail, since they have been included in the experiment presented in Chapter 4.  
2.3.1 Unexpected questions 
The strategy of asking unexpected questions was pioneered by Vrij and co-workers [143]. Unex-
pected questions are questions to which liars cannot prepared their response in advance. On the con-
trary, expected questions are those questions to which liars have fabricated the response previously. 
Imaging a person who decided to lie about his identity on a social network. An example of expected 
questions is “which is your date of birth?”, whereas an unexpected question could be “which is your 
zodiac?”. As liars are not prepared to answer unexpected questions, they are forced to generate new 
details that were not part of their original script. In the specific example, when a user subscribes a 
website he knows that the date of birth is one of the information commonly asked. Conversely, the 
zodiac sign is not frequently asked. Thus, the liar has to fabricate the false response in real time, 
checking the congruency of the response with the other faked information and maintaining his cred-
ibility and consistency [144]. Liars give their planned responses to expected questions easily and 
quickly, but they need to fabricate plausible responses in the case of unexpected questions, and this 
yields an increase in the cognitive load. By contrast, truthful responses are not plagued by the side 
effects of the cognitive load as they are quite automatic and effortless for both expected and unex-
pected questions. 
The technique of unexpected questions was originally applied to in investigative interviews [145]. 
The procedure commonly provides that the examiner initially ask anticipated questions and then he 
switch to unanticipated questions. Such questions may relate to particular spatial or temporal aspects 
of the recalled event. In a first experiment, Vrij et al. [143] interrogated couples of liars and truth-
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tellers about a lunch that they had together at the restaurant. The couples of truth-tellers really ate out 
together at the restaurant, whereas liars were instructed to pretend to had lunch together. During the 
interview the examiner asked questions about temporal and spatial features of the lunch-event (e.g., 
who finished to eat first? Where was your table located?). Comparing the responses to unexpected 
questions of the two member of each couple, liars were identified with an accuracy of 80%. The 
classification was based on the discrepancies reported by the two persons at the same questions. Then, 
a second experiment was run by Lancaster et al. [146], investigating the power of unexpected ques-
tions in a between subjects experimental design. This time participants were not paired, but the single 
subject was asked to lie or tell the truth. Results showed a good classification rate for both truth-
tellers (78%) and liars (83%). The authors observed that liars, with respect to truth-tellers, reported 
many more details to the expected questions versus the unexpected questions, and the lie detection 
could be based on this difference. 
2.3.2 Complex questions 
Unexpected questions are a powerful tool for uncovering deception, but they cannot be used in every 
condition. When responding to unexpected questions, liars have to process the information in the 
questions in real time as quickly as possible so that cognitive processing load is combined with time 
stress in the performance of the task. Within the cognitive load approach to lie detection, one unsolved 
problem is the identification of a liar when unexpected questions are not available. Typical conditions 
when unexpected questions cannot be used are in the so-called “lies of omission” [147], which consist 
in denying something that did happen (“I did not do it” type of lies). For example, if a guilty subject 
is denying any wrongdoing (in a “Did you do it?” type of question), it is difficult to create an unex-
pected question that efficiently uncovers his deception. 
In this work, we present a new technique for detecting lies when unexpected questions cannot be 
crafted. The technique consists of presenting complex sentences. We have named “complex ques-
tions” the sentences that contain more than one information in the same phrase. For example, to in-
vestigate the identity one could ask a question about the name (e.g., Is Alice your name?) and a 
question about the place of birth (e.g., Were you born in Montréal?). A complex question encom-
passes both this information in the same sentence (e.g., Are you Alice born in April?).  
Asking complex questions is very closed to increasing the number of response alternatives among 
which the liar has to choose. Williams et al. [148] stated that when questions involved more than one 
possible lie response, liars reveal a greater response latency. By contrast, the authors found that the 
number of alternatives did not significantly affect response times when individuals told the truth. In 
fact, in real life situations, the subject has to choose one lie in a range of endless possibilities, deciding 
which the better one is according to the context. The greater number of alternatives requires more 
cognitive effort by liars who need to monitor the plausibility of more than one information. 
Our hypothesis is that complex questions require greater cognitive resources compared to simple 
questions, because they require subjects to analyze each information one by one and labelling it as 
true or false. In other words, the subject has to monitor the plausibility of more than one information 
and retain it in working memory to, finally, decide if the entire sentence is true or false. While truth-
tellers can speedily carry out this sequence of mental operations, liars need more time to match the 
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plausibility of each information with the lie they told [102]. As result, we expected that liars have a 
bad performance, compared with truth-tellers, when they are involved in a decision task, making a 
greater number of errors and showing slower reaction times. This hypothesis is investigated in the 
experiments reported in sections 4.4, 4.5 and 4.
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 Materials and Methods 
In this chapter, a general description of methods and materials is reported. These were sim-
ilar for all the experiments that are presented in next chapter, except when specified.  
The general experimental procedure was approved by the Ethics Committee for psychological re-
search – Padova University Psychology Department, and it was in accordance with the relevant guide-
lines and regulations [149]. 
3.1 Participants 
A total number of 640 healthy participants took part to the experiments. They were volunteers, mostly 
recruited among students of Padova University. All participants were over 18 and provided the in-
formed consent before the experiment. Subjects did not receive any compensation for participation. 
Exclusion criteria have not been applied, except for language. In fact, it was required that the subject’s 
mother tongue was the same of the experiment. It was to avoid an influence in response times due to 
comprehension difficulties. Moreover, each subject participated to just one experiment, to avoid that 
his performance could be compromised by a previous knowledge of the experimental procedure. Data 
of subjects who did not understand the task were removed before the analysis. 
3.2 Experimental Design and Procedures 
All the experiment were built according to a between subject experimental design. Participants were 
always randomly assigned to one of two experimental groups: liars or truth-tellers. Liars were partic-
ipants instructed to lie about a topic (e.g., their identity), whereas truth-tellers were subjects who 
where asked to respond truthfully. Every experiment counted at least 40 participants, 20 for each 
experimental condition. The sample size is similar to other lie detection researches based on response 
latencies [111]. It has been calculated that a sample size = 40 is enough to have a statistical power (1-
β) = 0.8, given a significance level (α) = 0.05 and a medium effect size (d) = 0.5 [150]. Moreover, for 
each experiment we confirmed that the two experimental groups were similar in terms of age, gender 
and schooling (p>.05 both for age, gender and schooling). 
3.3 Data Collection 
All the experiments took place in the laboratories of the Department of General Psychology – Uni-
versity of Padova.  
Experiments were conducted measuring indices deriving from three different tools of human-com-
puter interaction: reaction times (RT) on keyboard, keystroke dynamics and mouse dynamics. In the 
following, the materials used to collect data are summarized and all the indices derived from key-
stroke and mouse dynamics are described in detail. 
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3.3.1 Reaction times 
Experiment measuring RT were programmed in E-Prime® 2.0 [151]. All the experiments were run 
on a single laptop ASUS K56C with a LCD 15.6″ diagonal screen. 
Stimuli appeared in the center of the computer screen and the two response labels were placed in the 
right and left upper corners.   
To give their response, subjects were instructed to press the key “A” or “L” on the computer keyboard 
that corresponded respectively to the left and right response label. In Figure 3.1, an example of user-
computer interaction during the experimental task is represented. All stimuli were presented ran-
domly. 
 
Figure 3.1: an example of user-computer interaction during the experimental task. 
Each stimulus appeared automatically after the response to the previous one, so no actions were re-
quired to subjects to bring each new question. No temporal response limits were fixed and no feed-
backs were provided for wrong responses.  
During the task, we recorded RT to each stimulus and errors. For errors, we mean the wrong responses 
given by the subject according to the information that he reported, independently to the fact that he 
was a liar or a truth-teller. Then, for each participant, we averaged the RT and errors of all stimuli. 
We also calculated the Inverse Efficiency Score (IES), an index that combines speed and accuracy 
[152]. In fact, it is possible to increase the response speed but it usually leads to a higher percentage 
of error (PE). The IES takes into account the number of errors and increases proportionally the aver-
age RT of the subject according to the following formula: 
IES =
RT
(1 − PE)
 
Equation 3.1: calculation of the Inverse Efficiency Score. 
YES NO 
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3.3.2 Mouse tracking 
All the experiments measuring mouse dynamics were programmed using MouseTracker software 
[121]. Each experiment was run using the same laptop. For some experiments, we used an ASUS 
K56C with a 15.6″ diagonal screen, for other experiments an ASUS UX303L with a 13.3″ diagonal 
screen. 
Stimuli appeared in the upper-central part of the computer screen and the two virtual response buttons 
were placed in the right and left upper corners. Each question appeared when participant clicked on 
the “START” virtual button that was located in the lower-central part of the screen. Then, subjects 
were asked to respond clicking with the mouse on one of the two alternative response buttons. Figure 
3.2 reports an example of computer screen as appeared to the subject during the task. Questions were 
presented randomly. 
 
Figure 3.2: an example of computer screen as appeared to the subjects during the task. 
No temporal limits were fixed to complete the response and no feedbacks were provided for wrong 
responses. However, it was important to ensure that participants were responding on-line (during the 
actual processing of lying) rather than off-line (once the lie had already been made). For this reason, 
we alerted participants when they were initiating mouse movement too late, setting up the threshold 
of initiation time to 2000 ms. When initiation time exceeded this threshold, a message appeared alert-
ing participants that they initiated movement too late and encouraging to initiate future responses 
earlier. After each response, the software automatically relocated the mouse to the “START” button 
(origin). 
The experiments operate in a coordinate space, where x value ranges from -1 to 1 and y value ranges 
from 0 to 1.5 (see Figure 3.3). For each response, the software records the mouse position from the 
origin (X0,Y0), which corresponds to the START button, to the click on the response button. To deal 
with the different length of the recorded trajectories and to permit the averaging and comparison 
across multiple trials with different numbers of coordinate pairs, the x,y coordinates of each trajectory 
are time-normalized. By default, MouseTracker performs a time normalization in 101 time frames 
using linear interpolation. As result each trajectory is described by 101 time frames and each time 
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frame corresponds to a specific x,y coordinate. In other words, the pair (Xn, Yn) indicates the position 
of the mouse along the axis at the time n, where n ranges from 1 to 101. 
 
Figure 3.3: a representation of the coordinate space in which the experiments operates. 
The software also describes the motor response in terms of spatial and temporal features, such as the 
onset, the duration, the shape, the stability and the direction of the trajectory. The space-time features 
recorded by MouseTracker are described in detail in Table 3.1, and graphically represented in Figure 
3.3.  
 Feature Description 
Temporal 
features 
Initiation time (IT) 
The time between the appearance of the question and the beginning 
of the mouse movement. 
 
Reaction time (RT) 
The time from the appearance of the question to the click on the re-
sponse box. 
Maximum deviation time 
(MD-time) 
The time to reach the point of maximum deviation. 
Spatial  
features 
Maximum deviation (MD) 
The largest perpendicular distance between the actual trajectory and 
the ideal trajectory. 
Area under the curve (AUC) 
The geometric area between the actual trajectory and the ideal trajec-
tory. 
x-flip The number changes in direction along the x-axis. 
y-flip The number changes in of direction along the y-axis. 
Table 3.1: Description of spatial and temporal features recorded by MouseTracker software. 
In addition, we calculated the average velocity (v) and acceleration (a) of the mouse movement be-
tween two time frames, respectively on x-axis and y-axis: 
𝑣𝑥 = X𝑛 − X𝑛−1 and 𝑣𝑦 = Y𝑛 − Y𝑛−1, 0 < 𝑛 < 101 
𝑎𝑥 = v𝑥 𝑛 − v𝑥 𝑛−1 and 𝑎𝑦 = v𝑦 𝑛 − v𝑦 𝑛−1, 0 < 𝑛 < 101 
Equation 3.2: calculation of velocity and acceleration between two time frames on x and y-axis. 
Finally, for every feature mentioned above, we computed the average value of the responses for each 
participant. We also calculated the average number of errors made by each subject in responding to 
questions as the ratio between the number of errors and the number of stimuli. For errors, we mean 
Material and Methods 
33 
the number of wrong responses given by the subject according to the information that he reported, 
independently to the fact that he was a liar or a truth-teller. 
3.3.3 Keystroke dynamics 
Experiments collecting keystroke dynamics were implemented in an online platform that we ex-
pressly designed using PHP, HTML and JavaScript. In particular, the recording of keystrokes dynam-
ics and time intervals was programmed using JavaScript. All the experimental tasks are online acces-
sible through this link: https://truthorlie.math.unipd.it/ . Data was stored via MySQL Ver 14:14 Da-
tabase. 
During the task, stimuli were displayed in the central area of the screen. Participants were asked to 
response each question typing the answer in an edit box. Figure 3.4 shows an example of the presen-
tation screen and the location of the edit box filled by the participants. Stimuli appeared in random 
order. 
After responding, participants were instructed to press ENTER to confirm the response and pass to 
the next question. There were no temporal limits to digit the response and no feedbacks were provided 
for wrong responses. A bar in the lower part of the computer screen indicated the percentage of task 
completion. 
 
Figure 3.4: an example of the presentation screen as appeared to participants during the task. 
During the presentation of each stimulus and the subject response, the website recorded the following 
time events: the onset of question, each key down, each key up and the push of ENTER. Starting from 
these events, the following features were collected for each trial: 
 Prompted-firstdigit: it is the interval between the onset of the question on the computer screen 
and the first key pressed. In some experiments, this index was adjusted using a readability index 
for the Italian language (GULPEASE index). In other words, we refined the reaction time by 
weighting the latency of the response to the question for the difficulty of reading the latter. The 
GULPEASE is an index which takes into account two linguistic features to estimate the readabil-
ity of a sentence: the length of the word and the length of the sentence in terms of number of 
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letters [153]. The index value ranges from 0 to 100, where 0 is low readability and 100 high 
readability.  
 Prompted-enter: it is the total time from the stimulus onset to ENTER (pressed at the end of the 
response). 
 Firstdigit-enter: it is the time between the first key press and ENTER. 
 Time before enter key: it is the time between the first key press and ENTER. 
 Answer length: it is the number of characters in the response. 
 Writing time: average typing speed (firstgidit-enter /number of characters). 
 Down time: it is the time stamp for each key pressing. 
 Up time: it is the time stamp for each key releasing. 
 Up and down time: it is the sum of down time and up time for each key. 
 Press time: it is the time duration between each key down and key up. 
 Flight time: it is the interleaving time between each key up and the next key down. 
 Di-graphs: these are the sum of up time, down time or up and down time for two consecutive 
keys. 
 Tri-graphs: these are the sum of up time, down time or up and down time for three consecutive 
keys. 
 Frequency of use for special characters: it is the total number of key pressing for Shift, Del and 
Canc, Space and Arrows characters. 
Moreover, for each feature, average, maximum, minimum, median, standard deviation and variance 
were computed. The final list of predictors counted 62 features, which are reported in Annex 1. 
Finally, we calculated the total number of errors committed by each participant in responding ques-
tions. In detail, errors mean the number of box filled by entering the wrong information according to 
what the subject reported, independently to the fact that he was a liar or a truth-teller. Errors were 
calculated checking each response given by the subject with the conceptually correct information. An 
example of conceptual error was the response “Capricorn” to the question “Which is your zodiac?” 
when the participant’s date of birth was 20 April. We only considered conceptual errors for three 
reasons. Primarily, other types of errors such as typing errors were rarely detected because of the low 
number of words required by the responses; secondly, when found, such errors were minimal, not 
affecting the conceptual correctness of the answer. Finally, an indirect measure of typing errors was 
already given by the frequency of special characters, such as Del and Canc keys. 
Material and Methods 
35 
3.4 Data Analysis 
To analyze data, we have followed the same workflow in all experiments. First, we performed a 
features selection to reduce the number of predictors and to select those to enter in machine learning 
(ML) models. Secondly, we ran some descriptive and statistical analysis on the features selected, to 
highlight the differences between the experimental groups. Then, the features selected were used to 
train different machine learning algorithms and build classification models that are able to predict 
whether a subject is a liar or a truth-teller. Finally, each model was tested on a new sample of partic-
ipants to test the model generalization. 
3.4.1 Feature selection 
Features selection is a widely used procedure in machine learning models construction [154]. As we 
are interesting in elaborating a classification model that is able to detect liars as accurately as possible, 
the feature selection process is a very powerful mean. In fact, it permits to remove redundant and 
irrelevant features and to increase the model generalization by reducing overfitting [155] and noise 
in the data.  
Citing Mark Hall, “empirical evidence from the feature selection literature shows that, along with 
irrelevant features, redundant information should be eliminated as well. […] A good feature subset 
is one that contains features highly correlated with (predictive of) the class, yet uncorrelated with 
(not predictive of) each other” [154]. Following this methodology, in all experiments the non-redun-
dant features have been extracted on the basis of their correlation with the dependent variable and 
their intercorrelation. In other words, we picked out the features that are more correlated with the 
class to predict (liar vs truth-teller) and less correlated one to each other.  
This procedure has been performed manually or using a correlation based feature selector (CFS) 
[154], as implemented in WEKA 3.9 [156]. The CFS algorithm evaluates the worth of a subset of 
features by considering the individual predictive ability of each feature along with the degree of re-
dundancy with the other predictors. Subsets of features that are highly correlated with the class (the 
dependent variable) while having low intercorrelation are preferred. There are different methods that 
the algorithm can use to search the subset of predictors through the spaces of features. Here, a Greedy 
Stepwise search method has been chosen. It performs a greedy forward or backward search (in this 
case, a forward search has been used) through the space of predictors subsets. It may start with no/all 
attributes or from an arbitrary point in the space (we decided to start with no attributes). It stops when 
the addition/deletion of any remaining attributes results in a decrease in evaluation. Through running 
this algorithm, the best predictors were identified.  
For each selected predictor, we have usually reported the point biserial correlation coefficient (rpb), 
which relates to the correlation with the dependent variable, and the correlation matrix with the other 
selected features. 
3.4.2 Descriptive and statistical analysis 
Descriptive statistics and statistics on the difference between the experimental groups were run using 
R software version 3.2.2 [157]. Welch's t-test was run using ‘lsr’ package, which adjusts the number 
of degrees of freedom when the variances are thought not to be equal to each other [158]. The 
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ANOVA was calculated using ‘ez’ package [159]. Cohen’s d effect size was estimated using the 
‘effsize’ package [160], which assess the d magnitude according to the thresholds provided by Cohen 
[161]: d < 0.2 is considered negligible, d < 0.5 is small, d < 0.8 is medium and d > 0.8 is large. For 
Bayes Factor calculation, the ‘BayesFactor’ package was used [162]. According to Kass and Raftery 
interpretation, Bayes Factor values from 1 to 3 are not worth more than a bare mention, a value be-
tween 3 to 20 is considered positive, values from 20 to 150 are strong and values greater that 150 are 
very strong [163]. 
3.4.3 Machine learning models 
The predictors resulting from the feature selection were fed as input to a number of ML models in 
order to evaluate the accuracy in the subjects’ classification as liars or truth-tellers. Machine learning 
models were implemented using the data mining software WEKA 3.9 [156].  
ML models were evaluated following a 10-fold cross-validation procedure [164]. The k-fold cross-
validation is a technique used to evaluate predictive models by repeatedly partitioning the original 
sample (e.g., 40 participants) into a training set to train the model, and a validation set to evaluate it.  
Specifically, in 10-fold cross-validation the original sample is randomly partitioned into 10 equal-
size subsamples, the folds (e.g., 10 subsamples of 4 participants each one). Of the 10 subsamples, a 
single subsample is retained as validation data for testing the model, and the remaining 10-1=9 sub-
samples were used as training data. Such process is repeated 10 times, with each of the 10 folds used 
exactly once as validation data. The results from the 10 folds were then averaged to produce a single 
estimation of prediction accuracy.  
Once the models were tuned, in most experiments we adopted a new set of participants to test the 
generalization of the performance on completely new data. This procedure allows us to estimate the 
generalization performances of the selected ML model in an unbiased way [165]. Precisely because 
the models are built to fit the data, it is important to know how an existing model fits new unseen 
data. The new group of participants (test set), was usually collected after the models were built, so 
the new subjects had never been seen from the ML classifiers. Data were collected by a different 
experimenter with respect to the one who built the models and subjects were randomly assigned to 
the experimental conditions, so there was not any a priori knowledge about how classifier work during 
the collection of the test set. In all the experiments, the sample size of the test group ranged from 10 
to 20 subjects and it corresponded at least to the 25% of the training sample, a percentage that is 
usually regarded as satisfactory [166]. 
For each model, we report accuracy, recall (sensitivity or true positive rate) and precision. Accuracy 
corresponds to the percentage of subjects correctly classify as liars or truth-tellers. As we are inter-
ested in detecting lies, the recall is expressed as the percentage of liars who are correctly identified, 
whereas precision represents the fraction of correct liars among those identified as liars.  
As stated above, we evaluated the classification accuracy of different ML models. This was to inves-
tigate whether the results were stable across classifiers and did not depend on the specific model 
assumptions. In fact, the algorithms that we have chosen are representative of different underlying 
classification strategies. These are the following: 
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 Logistic regression: it measures the relationship between the categorical dependent variable and 
the independent variables by estimating probabilities using a logistic function [167].  
 Support Vector Machine (SVM): it is a binary linear classifier, which maps the space and divide 
the examples of the separate categories by a margin that is as large as possible [168], [169].  
 Naïve Bayes: it is a probabilistic classifier based on Bayes’ theorem that assumes the independ-
ence between the features [170]. 
 Random Forest: it is an ensemble learning method that operates by constructing a multitude of 
decision trees and combining their results [171].  
 Logistic Model Tree (LMT): it combines logistic regression and decision tree learning [172].  
ML models, such as some of those reported above, are difficult to interpret. Often, the mechanics that 
yield the algorithm to identify the single participant as a liar or truth teller is unclear. For this reason 
in some cases, to better understand the decision rules on which the classifications results are based 
on, we ran a tree model called J48 [173]. It is one of the simplest – if not the simplest – classifier in 
terms of transparency of the operations computed by the algorithm and it permits to easily highlight-
ing the classification logic (even if not the most efficient) [174]. In other words, it was helpful to 
explain the operations performed by the algorithm on the data to obtain the classification output. 
Another tree model that we used with the same purposes is CART tree [175]. The CART tree is a 
binary decision tree that is constructed by splitting a node into two child nodes repeatedly, beginning 
with the root node that contains the whole learning sample. 
In all experiments, the parameters of the algorithms are those set by default in WEKA 3.9 [156].  For 
all the details on ML classifiers parameters, see Annex 2. 
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 Experiments 
In this chapter a series of proof of concept experiments are presented. They investigate the 
human-computer interaction behavior during the production of lie. In particular, as anticipated in 
chapter 3, RT, keystroke dynamics and mouse dynamics are recorded. Then, these measures are used 
as input for predictive models, which are aimed to recognized the user as liar or truth-teller. To bring 
out the distinctive signs of deception, we employed two strategies to increase liars’ cognitive load: 
the unexpected questions and the complex questions.  
In order to compare the different methodologies (RT vs keystroke dynamics vs mouse dynamics, and 
unexpected questions vs complex questions), we have chosen to focus most of the experiments on the 
same topic, which is the deception about identity. As argued in the first chapter, it is a very hot issue 
and represents a current challenge for companies that provide online services. 
4.1 The Detection of Faked Identity with Unexpected Questions and 
Mouse Dynamics 
The general aim of the following experiments is to validate a computerized technique to spot people 
who declare false identity information asking unexpected questions and analyzing mouse dynamics. 
Methods and results that are reported in this section have been partially published by Monaro, Gam-
berini and Sartori in PlosOne Journal [134] and conference proceedings [176], [177]. 
4.1.1 Participants 
A first sample of forty participants was recruited and data were used as training set to build ML 
models. Twenty participants were assigned to the liars’ group and the other twenty to the truth-teller 
condition. The demographic characteristics of the sample are reported in Table 4.1.  
Then, a second sample of 20 participants (ten liars and ten truth-tellers) was collected and used as test 
set to assess the model generalization. Demographic information about participants are in Table 4.1.  
Sample N Gender Age Education 
Training set 40 M = 17, F= 23 M = 25, SD = 4.6 M = 17, SD = 1.8 
Test set 20 M = 9, F= 11 M = 23, SD = 1.5 M = 17, SD = 0.8 
Table 4.1: demographic information about training and test set. In the second column (N) the number of participants for 
each sample is reported. The third column shows the number of male and female in each sample. The fourth and the 
fifth columns report mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) of participants’ age and education. 
4.1.2 Experimental procedure 
Participants assigned to liars’ group were asked to learn a faked identity from a false Italian identity 
card (ID card). The ID card contained a photo of the subject, aside from the basic faked information 
about identity (name, surname, date of birth, place of birth, residence address, occupation and marital 
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status). An example of faked ID card is reported in Figure 4.1. There were not time restrictions to 
learn the new ID information, as the subjects were invited to take all the time they needed. When 
participants thought to be ready, they was asked to recall the faked identity twice. The examiner 
verified the correctness of the learned information and rectified any errors. All participants have re-
called the identity information correctly within the second recall. Between the two recalls, they were 
required to perform some mental arithmetic as distracting task. Finally, participants were instructed 
to complete the experimental task, responding to any questions according to the faked profile previ-
ously learned. 
On the other hand, truth-tellers were asked to provide their identity information compiling an ID card 
on which their photo was attached (see Figure 4.1). After performing the distracting task, they com-
pleted the experimental task responding truthfully to all questions.  
 
Figure 4.1: an example of faked ID card. The document reproduced an Italian standard identity card. It contains the 
following information: last name, first name, date of birth, city of birth, citizenship, city of residence, residence 
address, marital status, occupation, height, hair color, eye color. The photo posted on the ID card corresponds 
to the real face of the participant. 
The experimental task was computerized and consisted in responding yes/no questions clicking with 
the mouse on one of the two alternative response labels. For more details about the modalities of 
presentation of the stimuli, see paragraph 3.3.2. 
4.1.3 Stimuli 
A total number of 32 questions were presented to each subject. Sixteen sentences required a “yes” 
response, and 16 required to respond “no”, for both liars and truth-tellers. The 32 experimental ques-
tions were preceded by 6 training questions (3 requiring a “yes” response and 3 requiring a “no” 
response) on issues related to the identity but not included in the experiment (e.g., “Is your weight 51 
kg?”). Questions belonged to the following categories: 
 12 expected questions. Expected questions concerned information that was explicitly rehearsed 
before the experiment by both truth-tellers and liars. Liars responded to questions according to 
the fake identity profiles that the experimenter had assigned to them. Truth-tellers responded ac-
cording to their true identities. Expected questions were about name, surname, year of birth, 
month of birth, town of residence and street of residence. 
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 12 unexpected questions. The unexpected questions included information closely related to the 
false identities but not explicitly rehearsed before the experiment by either the truth-tellers or the 
liars. In this case, the liars responded according to the information related to the fake identities 
assigned to them, while the truth-tellers responded according to their true identities. Unexpected 
questions were about age, zodiac, region of birth, province of birth, region of residence and capital 
town of the region of residence. 
 8 control questions. Control questions included personal information that could not be hidden to 
the examiner supervising the test (e.g., the gender). For this reason, both liars and truth-tellers had 
to respond truthfully to these questions. Control questions were about gender, skin color, hair 
color and citizenship. For example, “Are you male?” (for a male subject) required a “yes” re-
sponse, whereas “Are you a female?” (for a male subject) required a “no” response.  
To sum up, both liars and truth-tellers responded to 16 expected, unexpected, and control questions 
that required to respond “yes” and to 16 expected, unexpected, and control questions that required 
“no” responses. Expected, unexpected and control questions were presented randomly and inter-
mixed. An example of questions is reported in Table 4.2. 
Type of question 
Question that requires “yes” response by 
both liars and truth-tellers 
Question that requires “no” response by 
both liars and truth-tellers 
Expected Is Alice your name? Is Maria your name? 
 Is Rossi your last name? Is Bianchi your last name? 
 Were you born in 1989? Were you born in 1986? 
 Were you born in April?  Were you born in August?  
 Do you live in Limena? Do you live in Caserta? 
 Do you live at Vespucci street? Do you live at Marconi street? 
Unexpected Are you 27 years old? Are you 23 years old? 
 Is Aries your zodiac sign? Is Leo your zodiac sign? 
 Were you born in Veneto? Were you born in Campania? 
 Were you born in the province of Padova? Were you born in the province of Caserta? 
 Do you live in Veneto? Do you live in Campania? 
 
Is Venezia the capital of the region where you 
live? 
Is Napoli the capital of the region where you 
live? 
Control Are you female? Are you male? 
 Is your skin white? Is your skin brown? 
 Do you have blond hair? Do you have black hair? 
 Are you an Italian? Are you a French? 
Table 4.2: the table reports an example of the 32 expected, unexpected and control questions presented to participants 
and related to a truth or faked identity.  
It should be noted that liars told lies only in the expected and unexpected “yes” responses. In fact, for 
the liars, the expected and unexpected questions regarding their faked identities were actually “no” 
responses that, because they were lying, required “yes” responses. In other words, only the questions 
with expected and unexpected “yes” responses differentiated the two experimental groups because 
the truth-tellers responded sincerely, while the liars cheated. For all of the other questions (control 
“yes”, control “no”, expected “no”, unexpected “no”), both liars and truth-tellers responded truthfully. 
4.1.4 Collected measures 
During the subjects’ response, mouse dynamics were recorded by MouseTracker software. For more 
details about data collection, see section 3.3.2.  
Experiments 
42 
In addition to the errors and the spatial-temporal features extracted by default by the MouseTracker 
software (IT, RT, MD, AUC, MD-time, x-flip, y-flip, see paragraph 3.3.2), we analyzed the position 
of the mouse along the x and y-axis in search of points of maximum difference between the trajectories 
of liars and truth-tellers. The two groups had a maximum difference in the first half of the trajectory 
along the y-axis (see Figure 4.2). The points of maximum difference were Y18, Y29 and Y30, with 
maximum separation located at time frame Y29. Then, we calculated the velocity between these time 
frames: (Y30-Y29) and (Y29-Y18). 
The final set of predictors included 13 independent variables, which mapped the various dimensions 
of the response: number of errors, initiation time (IT), reaction time (RT), maximum deviation (MD), 
area under the curve (AUC), maximum deviation time (MD-time), x-flip, y-flip, Y30, Y29, Y18, 
Y30–Y29, and Y29–Y18. For each variable, we computed the average value of the 32 responses for 
each participant. 
 
Figure 4.2: the figure reports the points of maximum difference between trajectories of truth-tellers and 
liars on y-axis over the time. 
4.1.5 Analysis of trajectories 
First, we visually compared the mouse trajectories of liars and truth-tellers. Figure 4.3 reports an 
example of the prototypical trajectory of a truth-teller and Figure 4.4 shows the prototypical trajectory 
of a liar. Each trajectory corresponds to a single question response. As can be noticed, the truth-
teller’s responses resulted in a more direct trajectory connecting the starting point with the correct 
response. By contrast, the liar showed trajectories that were more erratic. He initially deviated toward 
his default correct response and later changed his trajectory to press the false response button. Fur-
thermore, the liar spent more time moving on the y-axis in the initial phase of the response than the 
truth-teller.  
 
Figure 4.3: the prototypical trajectory of a truth-teller. In red the response trajectories to control questions 
and in green the trajectories of unexpected questions. 
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Figure 4.4: the prototypical trajectory of a liar. In red the response trajectories to control questions and in 
green the trajectories of unexpected questions. Note that this liar is responding truthfully to control ques-
tions. Nonetheless, his response diverges from the direct trajectory that ideally characterizes a truthful 
response (see Fig 4.3). This generalization of the liar mindset when the liar is responding to questions that 
require truthful responses is discussed in the following paragraphs. 
These observations have been confirmed at the group level. Figure 4.5 reports the average trajectories 
for liars and truth-tellers responding “yes” to expected and unexpected questions (the only questions 
to which the liars responded deceitfully). As is clear from the figure, the two experimental groups 
differed in both the AUC and MD parameters. 
 
Figure 4.5: the figure represents the average trajectories between the subjects, respectively for liars (in red) and for 
truth-tellers (in green), to the expected “yes” and unexpected “yes” questions. Expected and unexpected questions that 
require a “yes” response are those to which the liars lied. The values of the MD and AUC for the two groups are re-
ported. The grey area represents the difference in the AUC parameter between the liars and truth-tellers. 
Finally, we plotted the mouse trajectories separately for control, expected, and unexpected questions 
(see Figure 4.6). Trajectory of liars and truth-tellers in control questions are almost overlapping. The 
maximum difference in trajectory is observed, again, in response to unexpected questions. 
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Figure 4.6: mouse trajectories for control questions (left figure), expected questions (central figure), and unexpected 
questions (right figure) comparing liars (red line) and truth-tellers (green line). 
4.1.6 Feature selection 
A feature selection was performed in order to remove redundant and irrelevant features and to select 
those that improved the models accuracy and generalization. In particular, as reported in paragraph 
3.3.2, a correlation based feature selection was run to highlight the independent variables that had the 
maximum correlation with the dependent variable (truth-tellers vs. liars) and the minimum correlation 
across them.  
From the 13 independent variables that were entered into the correlation analysis, the following fea-
tures were selected: number of errors (rpb = 0.69), AUC (rpb = 0.54), MD-time (rpb = 0.46), and Y29 
(rpb = 0.43). In Table 4.3, the correlation matrix between features is reported, as well as the correlation 
value between the dependent and independent variables (rpb). 
 Errors AUC MD-time Y29 Condition 
Errors 1.00 0.26 0.11 0.18 0.69 
AUC 0.26 1.00 0.22 0.67 0.54 
MD-time 0.11 0.22 1.00 0.39 0.46 
Y-29 0.18 0.67 0.39 1.00 0.43 
Condition 0.69 0.54 0.46 0.43 1.00 
Table 4.3: the table reports the correlation matrix for the four features that were selected and their correlation 
value with the dependent variable.  
4.1.7 Descriptive statistics 
Feature selection isolated, from the original set of 13 predictors, four independent variables: errors, 
AUC, MD-time, and Y29. Table 4.4 reports the descriptive statistics for these features, as well as the 
analysis of the difference between truth-tellers and liars (t-test, Cohen’s d and Bayes Factor). 
Seeing as number of errors is the most correlated feature with the dependent variable (liars vs truth-
tellers), we investigated the errors distribution in more detail (see Table 4.5). Both liars and truth-
tellers did not make errors to control questions and only 2/240 errors to expected questions. The 
difference between the two groups arises from unexpected questions, where truth-tellers made a total 
5/240 errors and liars 82/240. In other words, in responding to unexpected questions the average liar 
makes 16 times the number of errors with respect to the average truth-teller. It is worth noting that 
liars make more errors to unexpected “yes” (60/120), which are the questions where they lie, rather 
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than unexpected “no” (22/120), where they respond truthfully (t = - 4.59, p < .01; Cohen’s d = 1.60; 
BF = 16.42). 
Feature Group M (SD) t-test (t, p-value) Cohen’s d BF 
Errors Liars 0.13 (0.09) 
5.83, < .01 1.84 > 150 
 Truth-tellers 0.01 (0.02) 
AUC Liars 0.60 (0.38) 
3.09, < .01 1.23 70.41 
 Truth-tellers 0.22 (0.21) 
MD-time Liars 1264.33 (377.78) 
3.19, < .01 1.01 13.52 
 Truth-tellers 951.92 (219.62) 
Y29 Liars 0.27 (0.23) 
2.93, < .01 0.92 7.66 
 Truth-tellers 0.11 (0.08) 
Table 4.4: descriptive statistics for errors, AUC, MD-time and Y29. Mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) 
are reported for the two experimental groups (liars and truth-tellers). The last three columns report statistics 
about the difference between the two groups. In particular, the table shows the results of the independent t-test (t-
value and p-value are reported), effect-size (Cohen’s d) and Bayes Factor (BF). For the interpretation of Cohen’s 
d and Bayes Factor, see paragraph 3.4.2. 
Type of question  Liars (N = 20) Truth-tellers (N = 20) 
Control 
n = 320 
Total number of errors / 160 stimuli 0 / 160 0 / 160 
Errors mean 0.000 0.000 
Errors SD 0.000 0.000 
Expected 
n = 480 
Total number of errors / 240 stimuli 2 / 240 2 / 240 
Errors mean 0.008 0.008 
Errors SD 0.091 0.091 
Unexpected all 
n = 480 
Total number of errors / 240 stimuli 82 / 240 5 / 240 
Errors mean 0.341 0.020 
Errors SD 0.475 0.143 
Unexpected “yes” 
n = 240 
Total number of errors / 120 stimuli 60 / 120 5 / 120 
Errors mean 0.500 0.042 
Errors SD 0.502 0.201 
Unexpected “no” 
n = 240 
Total number of errors / 120 stimuli 22 / 120 0 / 120 
Errors mean 0.183 0.000 
Errors SD 0.389 0.000 
Table 4.5: number of errors in control, expected and unexpected questions that were committed by liars and 
truth-tellers. Errors in unexpected questions were also explored separately for “yes” and “no” questions. 
Concerning the other three selected features, we investigated whether there is a difference between 
the questions to which subjects responded by moving the mouse to the right (questions requiring a 
“no” response) and questions to which subjects responded moving a mouse to the left (questions 
requiring a “yes” response). A t-test on the whole sample was carried out in order to compare left and 
right responses. Results showed that the trajectories in the two types of responses did not differ. In 
fact, we did not find any statistically significant difference both for MD-time (t = 1.63; p = 0.1; Co-
hen’s d = 0.2; BF = 0.57) and Y29 (t = 0.1; p = 0.9; Cohen’s d = 0.01; BF = 0.17). For AUC, we 
obtained the following results: t = -2.09 and p = 0.04, but the Cohen’s d value showed a small effect 
size (d = -0.33), and the Bayes Factor approached (BF = 1.2). In Figure 4.7, trajectories of the left 
and right responses are reported. It can be noted that the two curves follow a very similar, albeit 
specular, trajectory. 
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Figure 4.7: the figure reports the trajectories to the left response button (in green) and to the right re-
sponse button (in red). 
4.1.8 Machine learning models 
The four selected features (errors, AUC, MD-time, Y29) were entered in different ML algorithms: 
logistic regression, SVM, LMT, random forest. Models were evaluated following a 10-fold cross-
validation procedure, as described in paragraph 3.4.3. Results obtained by 10-fold cross-validation 
are reported in Table 4.6. All models reached an accuracy around 90% (36/40 subjects correctly clas-
sified) or higher in classifying subjects as liars and truth-tellers. Logistic classifier reached an accu-
racy of 95% (38/40 participants correctly classified).  
ML classifier 
Training set  
(10-fold cross-validation) 
Test set 
 Average accuracy (SD) Precision Recall Accuracy Precision Recall 
Logistic 95% (15.8) 0.950 0.950 95% 0.909 1.000 
SVM 90% (17.5) 1.000 0.800 95% 1.000 0.900 
Naïve Bayes 90% (17.5) 0.944 0.850 85% 0.769 1.000 
Random forest 92.5% (12.1) 0.947 0.900 95% 0.909 1.000 
LMT 92.5% (12.1) 1.000 0.850 95% 0.909 1.000 
Table 4.6: the table reports the accuracy obtained by five classifiers in correctly identify liars and truth-tell-
ers, in training and test set. The accuracy in training set, using a 10-fold cross-validation, is the average accuracy 
resulting from the 10 folds. The standard deviation (SD) of the 10 folds is also reported. Recall is the percentage 
of liars who are correctly identified and precision represents the fraction of correct liars among those identified 
as liars. 
Then, we tested the generalization of the models performance on the new set of 20 participants (see 
section 4.1.1). Results, in Table 4.6, confirmed that all the models generalized very well on unseen 
data, reaching accuracies ranging from 85% to 95%. 
About the rate of false positive and false negative, the confusion matrix showed that the number of 
liars and truth-tellers misclassified is not equal for all the algorithms. Logistic regression failed in 
detecting one liar and one truth-teller in the training set, whereas it misclassified a liar in the test set. 
The SVM was completely unbalanced towards the false negatives, misclassifying four liars in training 
set and one liar in test set. Naïve Bayes failed in classifying one truth-teller and three liars in cross-
validation and three truth-tellers in the test set. Random forest misclassified two liars and one truth-
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teller in training set and only one truth-teller in the test set. Finally, LMT failed in recognizing three 
liars in cross-validation and one truth-teller in the test set. 
To have an insight on how the ML models distinguish between liars and truth-tellers we have run a 
tree model. It can help in the interpretation by providing an easy way to understand classification 
rules. The model used is CART and its output is reported in Figure 4.8. In words, the decision tree 
may be interpreted as follows: 
 if the mean number of errors per subject is below 0.0469 
and AUC<0.78 then the subject is a truth-teller (subjects in this condition were 20/23 
are classified correctly) 
or AUC >0.78 the subject is a liar (3 subjects are in this condition and all correctly 
classified) 
 if errors are > 0.0469 the subject is a liar (14 participants fall in this leaf and all are classified 
correctly) 
This tree model indicates that errors are the most important basis in classification and AUC (mouse 
trajectory) contributed to fine tune the classification. 
 
Figure 4.8: output of the CART tree from the 10-fold cross-validation. The output describes the model on 
which is based the decision about the subject’s classification as liar or truth-teller. 
In order to study more in depth the relative weight of the predictors, we re-run the classifiers elimi-
nating the four predictors one by one. Results (see Table 4.7) revealed that the major contribution in 
prediction accuracy comes from errors to unexpected questions with mouse dynamic features fine 
tuning an already good classification. In fact, eliminating the number of errors from the predictors, 
the classification accuracy dropped around to 75% in cross-validation and 70% in the test set. On the 
other hand, the prediction based solely on errors yielded an average accuracy of 82% in the cross-
validation and around 99% in test set. After dropping AUC from the predictors, the classification 
accuracy remained stable in the test set and fell to 90% during cross-validation. Similar results were 
obtained removing MD-time from predictors (on average, 88.5% of accuracy in cross-validation and 
91% in test set). Finally, after discharging Y29 from predictors, the accuracy both in the training 
(around 92.5%) and the test sets (around 95%) decreased slightly. Briefly, the relative importance of 
the independent variables indicated that the total number of errors gave the major contribution in 
correctly distinguishing liars from truth-tellers, followed by the MD-time, the AUC, and the position 
of the mouse along the y-axis on the 29th time frame. 
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Predictors ML classifier 
Training set  
(10-fold cross-validation) 
Test set 
  Average accuracy (SD) Precision Recall Accuracy Precision Recall 
Errors Logistic 82.5% (20.6) 0.933 0.700 100% 1.000 1.000 
 SVM 80% (19.7) 1.000 0.600 95% 1.000 0.900 
 Naïve Bayes 85% (21.1) 1.000 0.700 100% 1.000 1.000 
 Random forest 77.5% (21.9) 0.789 0.750 100% 1.000 1.000 
 LMT 85% (21.1) 1.000 0.700 100% 1.000 1.000 
        
AUC, MD-
time, Y29 
Logistic 77.5% (21.9) 0.789 0.750 70% 0.667 0.800 
 SVM 75% (20.4) 0.813 0.650 65% 0.667 0.600 
 Naïve Bayes 75% (20.4) 0.778 0.700 55% 0.571 0.400 
 Random forest 67.5% (31.3) 0.667 0.700 65% 0.615 0.800 
 LMT 75% (20.4) 0.778 0.700 70% 0.700 0.700 
        
Errors, MD-
time, Y29 
Logistic 95% (10.5) 0.950 0.950 95% 0.909 1.000 
 SVM 85% (21.1) 1.000 0.700 95% 1.000 0.900 
 Naïve Bayes 87.5% (21.2) 0.941 0.800 95% 0.909 1.000 
 Random forest 90% (13.0) 0.900 0.900 95% 0.909 1.000 
 LMT 90% (17.5) 1.000 0.800 100% 1.000 1.000 
        
Errors, 
AUC, Y29 
Logistic 90% (17.5) 0.944 0.850 95% 0.909 1.000 
 SVM 87.5% (21.2) 1.000 0.750 85% 0.818 0.900 
 Naïve Bayes 85% (24.1) 0.850 0.850 85% 0.769 1.000 
 Random forest 90% (17.5) 0.944 0.850 95% 0.909 1.000 
 LMT 90% (17.5) 0.944 0.850 95% 0.909 1.000 
        
Errors, 
AUC, MD-
time 
Logistic 95% (11.0) 1.000 0.900 95% 0.909 1.000 
 SVM 92.5% (12.0) 1.000 0.850 85% 0.818 0.900 
 Naïve Bayes 92.5% (12.0) 0.947 0.900 90% 0.833 1.000 
 Random forest 87.5% (17.7) 0.895 0.850 95% 0.909 1.000 
 LMT 92.5% (12.0) 1.000 0.850 95% 0.909 1.000 
Table 4.7: the table reports the accuracy obtained by five classifiers in correctly identify liars and truth-tell-
ers, in training and test set, using different set of predictors. The accuracy in training set, using a 10-fold cross-
validation, is the average accuracy resulting from the 10 folds. The standard deviation (SD) of the 10 folds is 
also reported. Recall is the percentage of liars who are correctly identified and precision represents the fraction 
of correct liars among those identified as liars. 
Finally, we were interested investigating the contribution of control, expected, and unexpected ques-
tions in the classification. For this reason we run three separate models. Table 4.8 reports classifica-
tion results obtained by training and testing the models separately for each type of question. It is 
confirmed that it is not possible to efficiently distinguish liars from truth-tellers solely based on con-
trol questions. The same is true also for expected questions although, in this case, the trajectories of 
the two groups seem to be more separated (see Figure 4.6). The major contribution derives from 
unexpected questions. In fact, using only unexpected questions, classification accuracy reaches 90%, 
both in cross-validation and test set. This result confirms that the cognitive load of liars, due to unex-
pected questions, is at the origin of the difference between the two groups. 
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Type of 
question 
ML classifier 
Training set  
(10-fold cross-validation) 
Test set 
  Average accuracy (SD) Precision Recall Accuracy Precision Recall 
Control Logistic 60% (31.6) 0.611 0.550 60% 0.667 0.400 
 SVM 55% (25.8) 0.667 0.200 55% 0.600 0.300 
 Naïve Bayes 62.5% (31.7) 0.727 0.400 55% 0.600 0.300 
 Random forest 57.5% (20.6) 0.579 0.550 50% 0.500 0.700 
 LMT 50% (31.2) 0.500 0.500 60% 0.625 0.500 
        
Expected Logistic 67.5% (29.0) 0.684 0.650 50% 0.500 0.500 
 SVM 65% (21.1) 0.875 0.350 55% 0.571 0.400 
 Naïve Bayes 60% (24.2) 0.667 0.400 65% 0.667 0.600 
 Random forest 62.5% (35.9) 0.632 0.600 55% 0.545 0.600 
 LMT 65% (26.9) 0.688 0.550 55% 0.556 0.500 
        
Unexpected Logistic 95% (10.6) 0.909 1.000 95% 0.909 1.000 
 SVM 92.5% (12.1) 1.000 0.850 90% 0.900 0.900 
 Naïve Bayes 92.5% (12.1) 0.947 0.900 85% 0.818 0.900 
 Random forest 87.5% (17.7) 0.875 0.900 90% 0.900 0.900 
 LMT 95% (10.6) 1.000 0.900 90% 0.900 0.900 
Table 4.8: the table reports the accuracy obtained by five classifiers in correctly identify liars and truth-tell-
ers, in training and test set, separately for control, expected and unexpected questions. The accuracy in training 
set, using a 10-fold cross-validation, is the average accuracy resulting from the 10 folds. The standard deviation 
(SD) of the 10 folds is also reported. Recall is the percentage of liars who are correctly identified and precision 
represents the fraction of correct liars among those identified as liars. 
4.1.9 Can we detect liars also when they respond truthfully? 
As mentioned above, liars lied only when they responded “yes” to expected and unexpected ques-
tions. In all the other questions (expected “no”, unexpected “no”, control “yes”, control “no”), they 
responded truthfully (see paragraph 4.1.3). An interesting question is whether the liars could also be 
spotted from their truthful responses. In section 4.1.5, we compared the trajectories of the two groups 
to expected and unexpected questions that required a “yes” response (see Figure 4.5).  
In Figure 4.9 we have compared the trajectories of the two groups when they responded truthfully 
(expected and unexpected questions that required a “no” response and control questions). Although 
the difference between liars and truth-tellers is reduced in comparison with the trajectories of ques-
tions where the liars were lying (Figure 4.5), a difference in MD and AUC is still detectable. 
In order to evaluate whether this difference is statistically significant, we have run an independent t-
test on the four predictors, showing that the liars’ response styles may be identified even when they 
responded truthfully. Results are reported in Table 4.9. 
The accuracy rates in identifying liars and truth-tellers on the sole basis of responses to questions to 
which the liars responded truthfully are reported in Table 4.10. It should be noticed that using ex-
pected “no”, unexpected “no” and control questions, accuracy is around 80% in cross-validation and 
around 75% in the test set, whereas classification accuracy based only on “yes” responses to expected 
and unexpected questions ranges from 85% to 95% both in training and test set. 
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Figure 4.9: the figure represents the average trajectories between the subjects, respectively for liars (in red) and for 
truth-tellers (in green), to the expected “no”, unexpected “no” and control questions. Expected “no”, unexpected “no” 
and control questions are those to which the liars responded truthfully. The values of the MD and AUC for the two 
groups are reported. The grey area represents the difference in the AUC parameter between the liars and truth-tellers. 
Feature 
Expected and unexpected “yes” 
questions 
Expected and unexpected “no” 
questions and control questions 
Errors t = 6.06, p < 0.01, d = 1.91, BF > 150 t = 3.44, p < 0.01, d = 1.09, BF = 23.11 
AUC t = 3.46, p < 0.01, d = 1.09, BF = 24.46 t = 3.36, p < 0.01, d = 1.06, BF = 19.63 
MD-time t = 3.42, p < 0.01, d = 1.08, BF = 22.03 t = 2.65, p < 0.02, d = 0.83, BF = 4.37 
Y29 t = 2.63, p < 0.02, d = 0.83, BF = 4.26 t = 2.98, p < 0.01, d = 0.94, BF = 8.51 
Table 4.9: comparison between liars and truth-tellers in questions where liars responded truthfully (third col-
umn) and questions where liars responded lying (second column). In particular, the table shows the results of the 
independent t-test (t-value and p-value are reported), effect-size (Cohen’s d) and Bayes Factor (BF) for errors, 
AUC, MD-time and Y29. For the interpretation of Cohen’s d and Bayes Factor (see paragraph 3.4.2)  
Predictors ML classifier 
Training set  
(10-fold cross-validation) 
Test set 
  Average accuracy (SD) Precision Recall Accuracy Precision Recall 
Expected 
and unex-
pected “yes” 
questions 
Logistic 92.5% (12.1) 0.947 0.900 85% 0.769 1.000 
SVM 90% (17.5) 1.000 0.800 95% 1.000 0.900 
Naïve Bayes 87.5% (13.2) 0.895 0.850 85% 0.818 0.900 
Random forest 85% (12.9) 0.889 0.800 95% 0.909 1.000 
LMT 92.5% (12.1) 0.947 0.900 85% 0.769 1.000 
        
Expected 
and unex-
pected “no” 
and control 
questions 
Logistic 80% (19.8) 0.800 0.800 75% 0.629 0.900 
SVM 80% (23.0) 0.929 0.650 70% 0.833 0.500 
Naïve Bayes 80% (23.0) 0.833 0.750 75% 0.692 0.900 
Random forest 70% (25.9) 0.722 0.650 75% 0.692 0.900 
LMT 77.5% (18.4) 0.824 0.700 75% 0.778 0.700 
Table 4.10: the table reports the accuracy obtained by five classifiers in correctly identify liars and truth-tellers, in train-
ing and test set, separately for questions to which liars responded truthfully and questions to which they lie. The accu-
racy in training set, using a 10-fold cross-validation, is the average accuracy resulting from the 10 folds. The standard 
deviation (SD) of the 10 folds is reported as well. Recall is the percentage of liars who are correctly identified and pre-
cision. 
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To sum up, both statistical analysis and ML analysis have shown that liars could be identified even 
when they are responding truthfully, but with lower accuracy. What is interesting here from a cogni-
tive point of view is that, in the experimental design, the mind-set of the liars extended its effects to 
questions to which they responded truthfully. To our knowledge, this pattern of results has never been 
reported before and could be an indication of the level of sensitivity of the mouse-movement analysis. 
4.1.10 Generalization to different cultures 
To address the effects of culture on the results generalization, we tested a new sample of 20 German 
native speakers. Participants were recruited at University of Düsseldorf. The sample included 10 
truth-tellers and 10 liars. Demographic information about participants are in Table 4.11. The experi-
mental procedure was identical to that followed for the Italian sample (see section 4.1.2), but the ID 
card on which the false identity was presented was a German ID Card. Moreover, stimuli (see section 
4.1.3) have been adapted to German culture (e.g., Italian regions have been replaced with German 
Länder) and translated in German language.  
Sample N Gender Age Education 
Training set 
(40 Italian participants) 
40 M = 17, F= 23 M = 25, SD = 4.6 M = 17, SD = 1.8 
Test set 
(20 German participants) 
20 M = 9, F= 11 M = 29, SD = 8.9 M = 16, SD = 2.2 
Table 4.11: demographic information about training set and test set. Training set included 40 Italian participants, 
whereas 20 German subjects compose the test set. In the second column (N) the number of participants for each sample 
is reported. The third column shows the number of male and female in each sample. The fourth and the fifth columns 
report mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) of participants’ age and education. 
Results from this group were evaluated using the models originally trained on the 40 Italian partici-
pants. Classification accuracies are reported in Table 4.12. It is remarkable that accuracies are very 
similar to those obtained from the Italian test set (see Table 4.6), confirming that the models can 
efficiently classify participants from different cultures. 
ML classifier 
Training set  
(10-fold cross-validation) 
40 Italian participants 
Test set 
20 German participants 
 Average accuracy (SD) Precision Recall Accuracy Precision Recall 
Logistic 95% (15.8) 0.950 0.950 100% 1.000 1.000 
SVM 90% (17.5) 1.000 0.800 90% 0.900 0.900 
Naïve Bayes 90% (17.5) 0.944 0.850 85% 0.769 1.000 
Random forest 92.5% (12.1) 0.947 0.900 95% 0.909 1.000 
LMT 92.5% (12.1) 1.000 0.850 95% 0.909 1.000 
Table 4.12: the table reports the accuracy obtained by five classifiers in correctly identify liars and truth-tell-
ers, in a training set of 40 Italian participants and in a test set of 20 German subjects. The accuracy in training 
set, using a 10-fold cross-validation, is the average accuracy resulting from the 10 folds. The standard deviation 
(SD) of the 10 folds is also reported. Recall is the percentage of liars who are correctly identified and precision 
represents the fraction of correct liars among those identified as liars. 
An analysis of the errors indicated that Italian and German participants made an equal number of 
errors, with statistical results for liars of t = -1.4, p = 0.17 (Cohen’s d = -0.49, BF = 0.64) and statistical 
results for truth-tellers of t = 0.66, p = 0.52 (Cohen’s d = 0.28, BF = 0.43). Table 4.13 reports the 
proportion of errors for the training sample (40 Italian participants) and the test set (20 German par-
ticipants). 
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Sample Condition Average number of errors Total number of errors 
Training set 
(40 Italian participants) 
Liars 0.13 / 32 84 / 640 
Truth-tellers 0.01 / 32 7 / 640 
Test set 
(20 German participants) 
Liars 0.17 / 32 5 / 320 
Truth-tellers 0.006 / 32 2 / 320 
Table 4.13: number of errors for the training sample of 40 Italian participants and for the test sample of 20 
German participants. The average number of errors and the total number of errors are reported, respectively in 
the third and fourth column. 
4.1.11 The resistance to countermeasures 
Resistance to countermeasures is a central issue in lie detection for all currently available techniques. 
In fact, if the subject is aware about the indices that are measured by the lie detector, he could apply 
some strategies to beat it [178]. For example, simple countermeasures, such as silently counting back-
ward or pinching a finger, are effective in altering the results in detection of deception via fRMI [179]. 
In the RT-based techniques, such as CIT and aIAT, the intentional alteration of RT is enough to drop 
their efficiency [180]. 
In this paragraph, we have tested the resistance to countermeasure of the paradigm reported above, 
which combines unexpected questions and mouse dynamics. Our hypothesis was that this technique 
is promising also as regards resistance to countermeasures, for the following reasons: 
 Errors to unexpected questions are diagnostic of lying and the subjects should respond errorless 
in order to cheat the test, and this seems impossible. 
 The parameters used to encode mouse dynamics are high in number. It is unlikely that the re-
sponder succeeds in implementing countermeasures that simultaneously keep under voluntary 
control all the possible efficient predictors. 
 There are a number of different set of predictors, which are roughly equivalent in terms of classi-
fication accuracy. Again, it is unlikely that the faker may keep under control voluntarily all these 
set of parameters. 
We firstly observed that there are no possible countermeasures to the number of errors. In fact, the 
only way to avoid errors is to know all the questions in advance. Countermeasures, therefore, are 
limited to the mouse dynamics. As the number of mouse movement parameters is very high, it is 
possible to create different subset of predictors that efficiently classify the participants. To highlight 
this point, we tested an alternative classification model, which is based on a new set of predictors: 
errors, MD, RT, y-flip and (Y29-18). It should be remembered that the predictors entered in the orig-
inal model included errors, AUC, MD-time and Y29. The correlation matrix of the new predictors 
and their correlation with the dependent variable are reported in table 4.14.  
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 Errors RT MD y-flip Y29-Y18 Condition 
Errors 1.00 0.02 0.18 0.20 0.27 0.69 
RT 0.02 1.00 0.38 0.31 0.22 0.40 
MD 0.18 0.38 1.00 0.38 0.83 0.46 
y-flip 0.20 0.31 0.38 1.00 0.30 0.31 
Y29-Y18 0.27 0.22 0.83 0.30 1.00 0.41 
Condition 0.69 0.40 0.46 0.31 0.41 1.00 
Table 4.14: the table reports the correlation matrix for the four new features plus errors and their correlation 
value with the dependent variable.  
Results from ML models indicate that the new set of predictors efficiently classify participants. Clas-
sification accuracies are reported in Table 4.15.  
ML classifier 
Training set  
(10-fold cross-validation) 
Test set 
 Average accuracy (SD) Precision Recall Accuracy Precision Recall 
Logistic 90% (12.9) 0.900 0.900 85% 0.769 1.000 
SVM 90% (17.5) 1.000 0.800 90% 1.000 0.800 
Naïve Bayes 87.5% (24.3) 0.895 0.850 95% 0.909 1.000 
Random forest 87.5% (17.7) 0.895 0.850 95% 0.909 1.000 
LMT 92.5% (12.1) 0.947 0.900 100% 1.000 1.000 
Table 4.15: the table reports the accuracy obtained by five classifiers in correctly identify liars and truth-tell-
ers, in training and test set using an alternative set of predictors. The features included in the models were errors, 
MD, RT, y-flip and (Y29-18). The accuracy in training set, using a 10-fold cross-validation, is the average accu-
racy resulting from the 10 folds. The standard deviation (SD) of the 10 folds is also reported. Recall is the per-
centage of liars who are correctly identified and precision represents the fraction of correct liars among those 
identified as liars. 
To verify whether it is possible to keep under control the mouse dynamics during the task, and in 
order to evaluate the resistance of the method to countermeasures, we ran a further experiment in-
structing participants to cheat the test. We identified three different strategies that can be apply to 
beat the lie detector, according to the original set of predictors entered in ML models (errors, AUC, 
MD-time and Y29) and that were used to classify subjects as liars or truth-tellers. The countermeasure 
strategies that we identified were the following: 
 Velocity strategy: it consisted in responding to questions as quick as possible, to avoid to be 
identify as liar on the basis of the MD-time and Y29 parameters. 
 Straightness strategy: it consisted in thinking to the answer and then, moving the mouse to the 
response button as straight as possible. This strategy was thought to prevent the identification as 
liar based on the AUC parameter. 
 Slowness strategy:  this strategy consisted in slowing down the response time to easy questions 
(expected and control questions) to harmonies the response times of control and expected ques-
tions to those of unexpected questions. Once again, having more time to respond to critical ques-
tions, the mouse movement should result in a more direct trajectory connecting the starting point 
with the correct response. 
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Sixty coached liars (called also fakers) took part to the experiment, twenty for each countermeasure 
strategy. To balance the number truth-tellers participants with the number of fakers, we also collected 
thirty additional truth-tellers. The demographic features of the final sample are reported in Table 4.16. 
Sample N Age Education 
Fakers velocity strategy 20 M = 22, SD = 1.6 M = 16, SD = 1.4 
Fakers straightness strategy 20 M = 23 SD = 2.1 M = 17, SD = 2.1 
Fakers slowness strategy 20 M = 22 SD = 2.2 M = 16, SD = 1.6 
Truth-tellers 60 M = 23 SD = 3.1 M = 16, SD = 1.7 
Table 4.16: demographic information about training set and test set. Training set included 40 Italian participants, 
whereas 20 German subjects compose the test set. In the second column (N) the number of participants for each sample 
is reported. The third column and the fourth columns report mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) of participants’ age 
and education. 
The experimental procedure was the same described in paragraph 4.1.2, except for the instruction 
given to fakers participants in order to cheat the lie detector. Firstly, all faker participants were in-
structed to reduce the number of errors as much as possible and were advised about the possibility of 
unexpected questions. For this reason, they were given five minutes to think to possible unanticipated 
questions and were permitted to search information on internet. Then, they were explicitly informed 
about the classification logic of the lie detector and instructed to beat it with one of the three strategies 
mentioned above. 
An analysis was run training the ML models on the sixty fakers and the sixty truth-tellers. Predictors 
were the same of the original experiment (errors, AUC, MD-time, Y29). Classification accuracies are 
reported in Table 4.17. Results indicate that liars using a variety of countermeasures are identified 
with an accuracy of about 80% by the same classifiers used in the original experiment. 
ML classifier 10-fold cross-validation 
 Average accuracy (SD) Precision Recall 
Logistic 80.8% (14.2) 0.825 0.783 
SVM 82.5% (8.3) 0.855 0.783 
Naïve Bayes 75.8% (11.4) 0.804 0.683 
Random forest 82.5% (13.3) 0.810 0.850 
LMT 78.3% (14.8) 0.804 0.750 
Table 4.17: the table reports the accuracy obtained by five classifiers in correctly identify fakers and truth-
tellers, in 10-fold cross-validation. The accuracy obtained by the 10-fold cross-validation is the average accuracy 
resulting from the 10 folds. The standard deviation (SD) of the 10 folds is also reported. Recall is the percentage 
of liars who are correctly identified and precision represents the fraction of correct liars among those identified 
as liars. 
To investigate which is the most efficient countermeasure, we re-run the classifications separately for 
the three strategies. Thus, we trained the classifiers on three different sample as follows: 20 fakers 
velocity strategy vs 20 truth-tellers, 20 fakers straightness strategy vs 20 truth-tellers, 20 fakers slow-
ness strategy vs truth-tellers. Truth-tellers were always the same participants, that is the twenty par-
ticipants used as training set in the original experiment (see section 4.1.1). Classification accuracies 
for the three samples are reported in Table 4.18. 
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Sample ML classifier  10-fold cross-validation 
  Average accuracy (SD) Precision Recall 
Fakers velocity 
strategy vs 
truth-tellers 
Logistic 72.5% (21.8) 0.696 0.800 
SVM 72.5% (24.9) 0.765 0.650 
Naïve Bayes 77.5% (14.2) 0.824 0.700 
Random forest 77.5% (21.8) 0.789 0.750 
LMT 75% (11.8) 0.727 0.800 
     
Fakers straight-
ness strategy vs 
truth-tellers 
Logistic 80% (15.8) 0.800 0.800 
SVM 75% (23.6) 0.708 0.850 
Naïve Bayes 70% (15.9) 0.643 0.900 
Random forest 82.5% (12.1) 0.810 0.850 
LMT 77.5% (21.8) 0.789 0.750 
     
Fakers slowness 
strategy vs 
truth-tellers 
Logistic 80% (19.7) 0.833 0.750 
SVM 80% (19.8) 0.833 0.750 
Naïve Bayes 80% (15.9) 0.833 0.750 
Random forest 87.5% (13.2) 0.895 0.850 
LMT 82.5% (16.9) 0.842 0.800 
Table 4.18: the table reports the accuracy obtained by five classifiers in correctly identify fakers and truth-tellers, in 10-
fold cross-validation, separately for the three different faking strategies. The accuracy obtained by the 10-fold cross-
validation is the average accuracy resulting from the 10 folds. The standard deviation (SD) of the 10 folds is also re-
ported. Recall is the percentage of liars who are correctly identified and precision represents the fraction 
It can be noticed that the weaker faking strategy is slowing down the response time to easy ques-
tions. In fact, these fakes are detect with an accuracy ranging from 80% to 87.5%. Conversely, the 
most efficient countermeasure is to increase response speed. In fact, fakers using the velocity strat-
egy are detectable with an accuracy ranging from 72.5% to 77.5%. Intermediate results have been 
obtained for the straightness strategy (moving the mouse to the response button as straight as possi-
ble), as these fakers are correctly classified with an accuracy ranging from 70% to 82.5%. 
4.1.12 The use of changing labels 
In the previous experiment, participants were asked to respond questions about identity choosing 
between two response labels, one containing the response “yes” and the other one containing the 
response “no”. A third experiment was run to investigate the effect of changing these two response 
labels.  
Forty participants took part to the experiment, 20 male and 20 female, with average age = 24 (SD = 
5.4) and average education = 17 (SD = 1.7). 
The experimental procedure was identical to that describe above (see section 4.1.2).  
The stimuli presented to subjects were the same of the previous experiment (see paragraph 4.1.3), but 
questions that required a yes/no response were intermixed with questions requiring to choose between 
two different alternative responses (e.g., question: how old are you?, response labels: 27 or 31). We 
refer to this kind of stimuli as questions with changing response labels. 
The experimental task consisted of 100 double-choice questions, 20 control questions, 32 expected 
questions and 48 unexpected questions. Between them, the half of the questions requested a “yes” or 
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“no” response, while the other required a response according to changing response labels (e.g., to the 
question “Which is your gender?”, the possible response labels were “male” or “female”). Within the 
entire task, the correct responses, which are the answers congruent with the participant ID card, were 
presented on right position in the 50% of trials and on the left in the other 50%. Some examples of 
the 100 questions included in the experimental task are reported in Table 4.19. 
Type of question Question Correct response Incorrect response 
Expected Were you born in April? Yes No 
 Were you born in October? No Yes 
 What is your year of birth? 1987 1984 
 What is your city of birth? Verona Milano 
Unexpected Is your residence city near Abano Terme? Yes No 
 Is your residence city near Saturnia Terme? No Yes 
 Which is your zodiac sign? Aries Capricorn 
 What is your zip code? 35142 36125 
Control Are you female? Yes No 
 Are you male? No Yes 
 How tall are you? 160 cm 190 cm 
 What is your skin color? White Black 
Table 4.19: the table reports some example of the expected, unexpected and control questions presented to participants 
and related to a truth or faked identity. The third and fourth columns report respectively the correct and the incorrect 
response to the question. It should be noticed that half of responses were in form of yes/no, and the other half had 
changing response labels. 
The features collected were those extracted by default by the MouseTracker software (IT, RT, MD, 
AUC, MD-time, x-flip, y-flip, see paragraph 3.3.2). In addition, we computed the average velocity 
(v) and acceleration (a) along the x and y-axis (v(x), v(y), a(x), a(y)). 
The Figure 4.10 represents the mouse trajectories of liars and truth-tellers for control, expected and 
unexpected questions. The trajectories of the two groups are totally superimposed in control questions 
and mostly overlapping in expected questions. Thus, liars and truth-tellers seems differ only in unex-
pected questions. 
 
Figure 4.10: mouse trajectories for control questions (left figure), expected questions (central figure), and unexpected 
questions (right figure) comparing liars (red line) and truth-tellers (green line). 
In order to confirm whether the difference between liars and truth-tellers trajectories in unexpected 
questions is statistically significant, we run an independent t-test. Results showed that liars’ responses 
significantly differ from truth-tellers’ ones in AUC (t = 3.13, p < .0042), RT (t = 3.61, p < 0.0042), 
and average velocity along x-axis (t = -7.62, p < 0.0042). Finally, liars make a higher number of errors 
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compared to truth-tellers (t = 9.70, p < 0.0042) (to avoid the multiple testing problem the correction 
of Bonferroni has been apply and the p-value has been set to 0.0042). Finally, we tested the difference 
between liars and truth-tellers also for expected and control questions, confirming that none of the 
measures considered reached the statistical significance in the independent t-test. 
According to graphical observations and statistical analysis, we used only unexpected questions data 
to train different machine learning classifiers. The CFS algorithm selected the following features: 
number of errors (rpb = 0.84) and v(x) (rpb = 0.78). Given the limited number of features, to increase 
the number of predictors and thus, the resistance to countermeasure, we chose to enter in ML model 
RT (rpb = 0.51) and AUC (rpb = 0.45), MD (rpb = 0.41) and MD-time (rpb = 0.40) as well. 
Machine learning models, trained with a 10-fold cross-validation, gave results comparable to those 
of the previous experiment (see Table 4.6), with accuracies ranging from 87.5% to 95%. Therefore, 
in the first instance, it seems that changing labels do not contribute to improve the classification ac-
curacy.  
To dig deeper this point, we re-run the ML models considering only questions with changing response 
labels. These new results are reported in Table 4.20. It should be noticed that the classification accu-
racy improved from 2.5% to 12.5% when we considered only questions requiring a response with 
changing labels. 
ML classifier 
10-fold cross-validation considering all 
questions  
10-fold cross-validation considering only 
questions with changing response labels 
 Accuracy (SD) Precision Recall Accuracy (SD) Precision Recall 
Logistic 87.5% (13.2) 0.895 0.850 92.5% (12.1) 0.947 0.900 
SVM 95% (10.5) 1.000 0.900 97.5% (7.9) 1.000 0.950 
Naïve Bayes 95% (10.5) 0.950 0.950 97.5% (7.9) 0.952 1.000 
Random forest 87.5% (17.7) 0.941 0.800 100% (0.00) 1.000 1.000 
LMT 90% (12.9) 0.944 0.850 100% (0.00) 1.000 1.000 
Table 4.20: the table reports the accuracy obtained by five classifiers in correctly identify liars and truth-tell-
ers, in 10-fold cross-validation. The second column reports the accuracy obtained considering both questions 
requiring a yes/no response and questions with changing response labels, whereas the third column reports the 
accuracy using only questions with changing response labels. It should be remembered that we entered in the 
models only the unexpected questions. The 10-fold cross-validation accuracy is the average accuracy resulting 
from the 10 folds. The standard deviation (SD) of the 10 folds is also reported. Recall is the percentage of liars 
who are correctly identified and precision represents the fraction of correct liars among those identified as liars. 
In other words, we reached a better classification performance in distinguishing liars from truth-tellers 
when participants respond to questions according to changing response labels. Our hypothesis is that 
the continuous change of the response categories results in an increment of liars’ cognitive load. In 
fact, it is possible that using only “yes” or “no” fixed labels, after some trials the label processing 
becomes partially automated and does not require any mental effort. Conversely, in a task where label 
change away, the true label is familiar to truth-tellers, whereas both the true and the false labels are 
unfamiliar to liars, especially in the case of unexpected questions. For this reason, liars may require 
more cognitive effort to process labels and implement the correct response. As consequence, they 
have a poorer performance and the discrimination between the two experimental groups becomes 
more accurate.  
Experiments 
58 
4.1.13 The use of negative questions 
Another issue in lie detection regards the need, in some situations, to introduce negative sentences to 
test the suspect. For example, imagine that one wants to test deception about recent drug use. There 
are only two way to formulate the question: “did you take drugs?” or “did you not take drugs?”. 
Recent experiments demonstrated that the RT-based based lie detectors (e.g., the aIAT), lose their 
accuracy when using stimuli in negative form [181]. For example, it has been shown that the use of 
negative sentences leads to a detrimental effects in the accuracy of the autobiographical Implicit As-
sociation Test (aIAT), which drops from 90% to 60% [182]. 
A large number of linguistic studies demonstrated that a negative sentence have a more complex 
syntax structure than an affirmative one [183] and, as consequence the human brain activate different 
area and take more time to process it [184]. Given this evidence, here we propose an experiment 
aimed to investigate the effect of negation on the detection of faked identities using complex questions 
and mouse dynamics. 
Forty participants were recruited, 28 female and 12 male, with average age = 23 (SD = 1.8) and 
average education level = 17 (SD = 1.5). 
The experimental procedure was identical to that describe above (see section 4.1.2).  
The stimuli presented to subjects were similar to those in the original experiment (see paragraph 
4.1.3), but affirmative sentences were intermixed with negative sentences. 
The experimental task consisted of 72 yes/no questions, 36 affirmative and 36 negative. Between 
these 36 questions, eight were control questions, 14 expected and 14 unexpected. Half of the 72 ques-
tions requested a “yes” response and the other half a “no” response. An example of questions for each 
typology is reported in Table 4.21. 
Type of question Sentence form Question Required response Truth-tellers Liars 
Expected Affirmative I was born in April Yes True Lie 
 Negative I was not born in April No True Lie 
 Affirmative I was born in October No True True 
 Negative I was not born in October Yes True True 
Unexpected Affirmative 34074 is my zip code Yes True Lie 
 Negative 34074 is not my zip code No True Lie 
 Affirmative 6893 is my zip code No True True 
 Negative 6893 is not my zip code Yes True True 
Control Affirmative I am female Yes True True 
 Negative I am not female No True True 
 Affirmative I am male No True True 
 Negative I am not female Yes True True 
Table 4.21: the table reports some example of the expected, unexpected and control questions, affirmative and negative, 
presented to participants and related to a truth or faked identity. The fourth column reports the required response ac-
cording to the true or false ID card. It should be noticed that the required response for liars and truth-tellers is the same. 
The sixth column contain the information about where liars effectively lied and where they told he truth. Truth-tellers 
told the truth in all questions (fifth column).  
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It should be noted that liars told lies only in the expected and unexpected questions, both in form of 
affirmation and in form of negation, that correspond to the data in the ID card. Table 4.21 reports a 
simplification where liars lied and where they told the truth. 
During the task, the features collected were those extracted by default by the MouseTracker software 
(IT, RT, MD, AUC, MD-time, x-flip, y-flip, see paragraph 3.3.2). In addition, we computed the max-
imum velocity and acceleration along the x and y-axis (max v(x), max v(y), max a(x), max a(y)). 
The Figure 4.11 represents the mouse trajectories of liars and truth-tellers for control, expected and 
unexpected questions. Visually, the trajectories of the two groups differ in terms of MD and AUC in 
all type of questions (control, expected, unexpected). This could mean that for liars the presence of 
negations affects the complexity of the entire task.  
 
Figure 4.11: mouse trajectories for control questions (left figure), expected questions (central figure), and unexpected 
questions (right figure) comparing liars (red line) and truth-tellers (green line). 
To deepen the effect of negative sentence, we plotted separately the trajectories related the responses 
to affirmative questions and to negative questions, respectively for liars and truth-tellers (see Figure 
4.12). The figures show that both liars and truth-tellers had larger trajectories in response to negative 
questions respect to affirmative questions. In other words, the visual analysis confirm the evidence in 
literature that negations are more difficult to process than affirmations.  
 
Figure 4.12: the left figure reports the average mouse trajectory of truth-tellers in response to positive questions (light 
green curve) and negative questions (dark green line). The right figure represents the average mouse trajectory of liars 
in response to positive questions (light red line) and negative questions (dark red curve). 
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Statistical analysis have corroborated this result as well. In fact, a factorial mixed ANOVA indicated 
that: 
 Liars made a greater number of errors than truth-tellers [F(1,38)=41.91, p<0.01]. Overall, both 
liars and truth-tellers made more errors in unexpected questions than expected and control ques-
tions [F(2,76)=85.99, p<0.01], and in negative questions than affirmative [F(1,38)=35.57, 
p<0.01]. The interactions condition (liars vs truth-tellers) X type of question (control, expected, 
unexpected) showed statistically significant results [F(2,76)=49.74, p<0.01], as well as the inter-
action type of question X questions formulation (affirmation vs negation) [F(2,76)=6.17, p<0.01]. 
 Liars had greater MD and AUC than truth-tellers, respectively [F(1,38)=7.71, p<0.01] for MD 
and [F(1,38)=5.84, p<0.01] for AUC. Both liars and truth-tellers had larger MD and AUC in 
unexpected questions than expected and control questions, respectively [F(2,76)=5.65, p<0.01] 
for MD and [F(2,76)=5.44, p<0.01] for AUC. Moreover, both liars and truth-tellers showed wider 
MD and AUC in negative questions than affirmative questions, respectively [F(1,38)=74.37, 
p<0.01] for MD and [F(1,38)=58.86, p<0.01] for AUC. 
 Liars had slower IT, RT and MD-time than truth-tellers, respectively [F(1,38)=6.68, p<0.01] for 
IT,  [F(1,38)=8.86, p<0.01] for RT and [F(1,38)=5.12, p<0.01] for MD-time. Both liars and truth-
tellers had increased IT, RT and MD-time in unexpected questions compared to expected and 
control questions, respectively [F(2,76)=11.83, p<0.01] for IT, [F(2,76)=61.42, p<0.01] for RT 
and [F(2,76)=56.82, p<0.01] for MD-time. Moreover, both liars and truth-tellers showed slower 
IT, RT and MD-time in negative questions than affirmative questions, respectively 
[F(1,38)=18.71, p<0.01] for IT, [F(1,38)=35.13, p<0.01] for RT, and [F(1,38)=59.46, p<0.01] for 
MD-time. Moreover, in RT and MD-time, the interactions condition (liars vs truth-tellers) X type 
of question (control, expected, unexpected) showed statistically significant results, respectively 
[F(2,76)=21.36, p<0.01] for RT and [F(2,76)=15.06, p<0.01] for MD-time. 
 Finally, liars and truth-tellers differ for the number of x-flip and y-flip, respectively 
[F(1,38)=7.88, p<0.01] for x-flip and [F(1,38)=11.27, p<0.01] for y-flip. 
To sum up, the effect of negation is obvious for both liars and truth-tellers. Moreover, concerning the 
number of errors liars made more errors than truth-tellers in negative sentences. 
Last but not least question that we wanted to answer with this experiment is whether the introduction 
of negation in the task stimuli drops the classification accuracy.  
Considering the responses both to affirmative and negative questions, the CFS algorithm selected the 
following features: number of errors (rpb = 0.74), max a(x) (rpb = 0.38), max a(y) (rpb = 0.46) and x-flip 
(rpb = 0.41). Taking onto account only the response to negative questions, the CFS algorithm selected 
the following features: number of errors (rpb = 0.65), max a(x) (rpb = 0.30), max a(y) (rpb = 0.38) and 
RT (rpb = 0.39).  
Machine learning models, trained with a 10-fold cross-validation, gave results ranging from 77.5% 
to 87.5% of accuracy considering responses both to affirmative and negative questions, whereas the 
accuracies decreased (they ranged from 75% to 82.5%) entering in the classifiers only responses to 
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negative questions (see Table 4.22). To conclude, the introduction of negation influences the accuracy 
of the lie detector, which drops by 7.5% to 12.5%. In fact, the classification accuracies in cross-
validation in the original experiment ranged from 90% to 95% (see section 4.1.8), whereas in the 
present experiment accuracies range from 77.5% to 87.5%.  
ML classifier 
10-fold cross-validation 
affirmative and negative questions  
10-fold cross-validation 
only negative questions 
 Average accuracy (SD) Precision Recall Average accuracy (SD) Precision Recall 
Logistic 85% (17.4) 0.818 0.900 82.5% (16.9) 0.810 0.850 
SVM 85% (17.5) 0.889 0.800 80% (19.7) 0.875 0.700 
Naïve Bayes 87.5% (13.2) 0.895 0.850 77.5% (18.4) 0.824 0.700 
Random forest 77.5% (21.9) 0.789 0.750 75 % (23.6) 0.778 0.700 
LMT 77.5% (24.9) 0.789 0.750 80% (19.7) 0.883 0.750 
Table 4.22: the table reports the accuracy obtained by five classifiers in correctly identify liars and truth-tell-
ers, in 10-fold cross-validation considering the response to either affirmative and negative questions or only to 
negative questions. The accuracy in 10-fold cross-validation, is the average accuracy resulting from the 10 folds. 
The standard deviation (SD) of the 10 folds is also reported. Recall is the percentage of liars who are correctly 
identified and precision represents the fraction of correct liars among those identified as liars. 
4.1.14 Discussion 
To conclude, the use of unexpected questions and mouse dynamics recording is an accurate paradigm 
to detect people declaring faked identities. In particular, we demonstrated that: 
 The mouse trajectories of liars differ from those of truth-tellers, especially for responses to unex-
pected questions. Liars take more time than truth-tellers to compute their response and they make 
a greater number of errors.  
 The difference between the two experimental groups is more evident for unexpected questions 
than expected and control questions. 
 The classification accuracy of a subject as liar or truth-teller is around 90-95%. 
 The number of errors is the predictor that gives the major contribution in correctly distinguishing 
liars from truth-tellers, with the other mouse tracking parameters fine-tuning the classification. 
 Liars can be identified even when they are responding truthfully, but with lower accuracy (around 
75%). In other words, liars show a kind of expansion of their mind-set to questions to which they 
respond truthfully. 
 The accuracy of the classification models remain stable when the paradigm is apply in different 
cultures.  
 The paradigm is relatively resistant to countermeasures. In fact, liars that are trained to beat the 
lie detectors with different strategies are detected with the 80% of accuracy. A different number 
of efficient alternative classification models can be trained, and subjects are in trouble to concur-
rently monitor all the response parameters. 
 The use of changing response labels slightly improves the efficacy of the paradigm (2.5%-5% of 
increment in the classification accuracy). 
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 The introduction of stimuli in form of negation slightly affects the accuracy of the technique 
(7.5%-12.5% of decrease in the classification accuracy). 
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4.2 The Detection of Faked Identity with Unexpected Questions and 
Choice Reaction Time 
In this experiment, we replicated the paradigm proposed in chapter 4.1, but recording RT instead of 
mouse dynamics. The general aim is to verify whether RT, along with the technique of unexpected 
questions, are enough to efficiently spot people who declare false identity information. 
4.2.1 Participants 
Fourty subjects participated in the experiment, and their data were used as training set to build ML 
models. Twenty participants were assigned to the liars’ group and the other twenty to the truth-teller 
condition. The demographic characteristics of the sample are reported in Table 4.23.  
Then, a second sample of 10 participants (five liars and five truth-tellers) was collected and used as 
test set to assess the model generalization. Demographic information about participants are in Table 
4.23.  
Sample N Gender Age Education 
Training set 40 M = 17, F= 23 M = 22, SD = 1.4 M = 16, SD = 1.1 
Test set 10 M = 4, F= 6 M = 24, SD = 3.3 M = 17, SD = 1.6 
Table 4.23: demographic information about training and test set. In the second column (N) the number of participants 
for each sample is reported. The third column shows the number of male and female in each sample. The fourth and the 
fifth columns report mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) of participants’ age and education. 
4.2.2 Experimental procedure 
The experimental procedure is the same reported in paragraph 4.1.2. 
4.2.3 Stimuli 
Each participant responded to 78 questions, 18 control, 20 expected and 40 unexpected (for an expla-
nation about the type of questions see section 4.1.3). Half questions required a “yes” response, and 
the other half required to respond “no”, for both liars and truth-tellers. Questions were presented in 
form of affirmation. Questions are reported in Table 4.24. For more details about the modalities of 
presentation of the stimuli, see paragraph 3.3.1. 
4.2.4 Collected measures 
During the task, RT and errors are collected. Then, for each participant we computed the average RT 
and the average number of errors, separately for control, expected and unexpected questions. More-
over, we calculated the average RT for questions where participants made errors (in other words, RT 
to wrong responses) and questions where participants did not make errors (RT in right responses). 
The Inverse Efficiency Score (IES) was also calculated for control, expected and unexpected ques-
tions. The final list of predictors is the following: RT control, RT expected, RT unexpected, RT con-
trol right responses, RT expected right responses, RT unexpected right responses, RT control wrong 
responses, RT expected wrong responses, RT unexpected wrong responses, errors control, errors ex-
pected, errors unexpected, IES control, IES expected, IES unexpected. 
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Type of question 
Question that requires “yes” response by 
both liars and truth-tellers 
Question that requires “no” response by 
both liars and truth-tellers 
Expected My name is Alice My name is Maria 
 My last name is Rossi My last name is Bianchi 
 I was born in 1989 I was born in 1986 
 I was born in April I was born in August 
 I was born on 20th I was born on 13th 
 I was born in Mestre I was born in Capri 
 I live in Limena I live in Caserta 
 I live at Vespucci street I live at Marconi street 
 I am single I am married 
 I am a student I am a professor 
Unexpected I am 27 years old I am 23 years old 
 My zodiac is Aries My zodiac is Leo 
 I was born in Veneto I was born in Campania 
 I was born in the province of Venice I was born in the province of Napoli 
 I live in Veneto I live in Campania 
 I live in the province of Padova I live in the province of Caserta 
 Venezia is the capital of the region where I live Napoli is the capital of the region where I live 
 
Venezia is the capital of the region where I was 
born 
Napoli is the capital of the region where I was 
born 
 My first name contains double letters My first name is without double letters 
 The initials of my name are A.R. The initials of my name are M.B. 
 I already celebrated the birthday this year I have yet to celebrate the birthday this year 
 My last name contains double letters My last name is without double letters 
 My age minus one year is 26 My age minus one year is 25 
 
The city where I was born is just north of Bo-
logna  
The city where I was born is just south of 
Roma 
 My zip code is 35142 My zip code is 7863 
 My telephone are code is 049 My telephone are code is 062 
 I live near the sea I live near the mountains 
 
I live in the same region where I was born I live in a different region than where I was 
born 
 I live between Treviso and Rovigo I live between Lucca and Arezzo 
 I was born near Venice I was born near Torino 
Control I am female I am male 
 My skin is white My skin is brown 
 I have a ring on my finger My fingers are without rings 
 I have light eyes I have dark eyes 
 I wear glasses I am without glasses 
 I am wearing a green t-shirt I am wearing a blu t-shirt 
 I am 160 cm high I am 190 cm high 
 I am attending the university I am attending the high school 
 I am wearing pants I am wearing a skirt 
Table 4.24: the table reports an example of the 78 expected, unexpected and control questions presented to participants 
and related to a truth or faked identity.  
4.2.5 Features selection 
Feature selection was performed using the CFS algorithm, as reported in section 3.4.1. The CFS al-
gorithm gave the following output: RT wrong expected (rpb = 0.51), RT wrong unexpected (rpb = 
0.19), IES expected (rpb = 0.54), IES unexpected (rpb = 0.77). Table 4.25 reports the correlation matrix 
of the four selected features and their correlation with the dependent variable (liar vs truth-teller). 
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RT wrong  
expected  
RT wrong  
unexpected  
IES  
expected 
IES  
unexpected Condition 
RT wrong expected 1.00 0.23 0.62 0.55 0.51 
RT wrong unexpected 0.23 1.00 0.44 0.53 0.19 
IES expected 0.62 0.44 1.00 0.70 0.54 
IES unexpected 0.55 0.53 0.70 1.00 0.77 
Condition 0.51 0.19 0.54 0.77 1.00 
Table 4.125: the table reports the correlation matrix for the four selected features and their correlation value 
with the dependent variable.  
4.2.6 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.26 reports the descriptive statistics for the four selected features. 
Feature Group M (SD) 
RT wrong expected Liars 1236.62 (1134.05) 
 Truth-tellers 195.9 (481.10) 
RT wrong unexpected Liars 3134.65 (1103.06) 
 Truth-tellers 2613.94 (1609.95) 
IES expected Liars 1896.42 (392.57) 
 Truth-tellers 1451.06 (288.54) 
IES unexpected Liars 4463.56 (1325.12) 
 Truth-tellers 2195.06 (332.37) 
Table 4.26: descriptive statistics for errors, AUC, MD-time and Y29. Mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) 
are reported for the two experimental groups (liars and truth-tellers). The last three columns report statistics 
about the difference between the two groups. In particular, the table shows the results of the independent t-test (t-
value and p-value are reported), effect-size (Cohen’s d) and Bayes Factor (BF). For the interpretation of Cohen’s 
d and Bayes Factor, see paragraph 3.4.2. 
An ANOVA indicated that overall, the wrong responses of liars were longer than those of truth tellers 
[F(1,38) = 7.80, p < .01]. In addition, both liars and truth-tellers had longer RT in responding to 
unexpected questions compared to expected questions [F(1,38) = 77.31, p < .01]. It should be noticed 
that truth-tellers had very short RT in giving wrong responses to expected questions. It means that 
when a truth-tellers fails in responding to expected questions, this is probably to the impulsivity in 
the response. On the other hand, the errors of the liars are probably due to the incapacity to retrieve 
the correct information. 
Concerning IES, the ANOVA suggested that liars had a greater IES than truth-tellers [F(1,38) = 51.06, 
p < .01]. Moreover, both liars and truth-tellers had greater IES in responses to unexpected questions 
compared to expected questions [F(1,38) = 151.60, p < .01]. Finally, the interaction condition X type 
of question (expected vs unexpected) was statistically significant [F(1,38) = 47.04, p < .01]. 
4.2.7 Machine learning models 
The four selected features (RT wrong expected, RT wrong unexpected, IES expected, IES unex-
pected) were entered in five different ML algorithms. Models were evaluated following a 10-fold 
cross-validation procedure, as described in paragraph 3.4.3. Results obtained by 10-fold cross-vali-
dation are reported in Table 4.27.  
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ML classifier 
Training set  
(10-fold cross-validation) 
Test set 
 Average accuracy (SD) Precision Recall Accuracy Precision Recall 
Logistic 90% (12.9) 0.900 0.900 80% 0.800 0.800 
SVM 87.5% (17.7) 0.826 0.950 90% 0.833 1.000 
Naïve Bayes 90% (17.5) 1.000 0.800 90% 1.000 0.800 
Random forest 97.5% (7.9) 0.952 1.000 90% 1.000 0.800 
LMT 95% (10.5) 0.909 1.000 90% 1.000 0.800 
Table 4.27: the table reports the accuracy obtained by five classifiers in correctly identify liars and truth-tell-
ers, in training and test set. The accuracy in training set, using a 10-fold cross-validation, is the average accuracy 
resulting from the 10 folds. The standard deviation (SD) of the 10 folds is also reported. Recall is the percentage 
of liars who are correctly identified and precision represents the fraction of correct liars among those identified 
as liars. 
Then, we tested the generalization of the models performance on the new set of 10 participants (see 
section 4.2.1). Results, in Table 4.27, confirmed that all the models reached an accuracy around 90% 
in classifying subjects as liars or truth-tellers, both in training and test. Random forest and LMT 
showed a better performance in 10-fold cross-validation respect to the other classifiers. However, this 
improvement does not generalize to the unseen data of the test set. 
About the rate of false positive and false negative, the confusion matrix showed that the number of 
liars and truth-tellers misclassified is not equal for all the algorithms. Logistic regression produced a 
balanced number of false positive and false negative, failing in detecting two liars and two truth-teller 
in the training set and one liar and one truth-teller in the test set. The SVM was completely unbalanced 
towards the false negatives, misclassifying four liars and one truth-teller in training set and one liar 
in the test set. Naïve Bayes had an opposite performance, failing the classification of four truth-tellers 
in the cross-validation and one truth-teller in the test set. Random forest misclassified one liar in 
training set and only one truth-teller in the test set. Finally, LMT failed in recognizing two truth-
tellers in cross-validation and one truth-teller in the test set. 
4.2.8 Discussion 
To conclude, it is possible spot liars declaring faked identities asking unexpected questions and meas-
uring RT with similar accuracy of mouse dynamics recording. However, it is reasonable to think that 
RT are less resistant to countermeasure, as the subject has to monitor just one predictor. 
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4.3 The Detection of Faked Identity with Unexpected Questions and Key-
stroke Dynamics 
In the previous experiments, we demonstrated that the technique of unexpected questions together 
with the mouse dynamics or reaction times recording is efficient in detecting liars about identity. 
However, the paradigm that we have proposed has a yes/no structure, and it requires a preliminary 
crafting of the questions by the experimenter. For this reason, the online application of this technique 
may be problematic. In order to overcome such caveats, here we report an experiment in which par-
ticipants will respond to similar questions entering their response in an edit box using the keyboard. 
In the present work, we asked unexpected questions to participants but, differently from the previous 
studies, we recorded the subjects’ typing pattern on the keyboard (keystroke dynamics). The main 
advantage of keystroke dynamics is that, differently from mouse tracking and reaction times, it can 
be adopted also in the situations in which is not possible to formulate ended “yes or no” questions, 
such as in some online contexts (e.g., a website subscription form). 
The goal of these experiments is to validate a computerized technique to spot people who declare 
false identity information asking unexpected questions and analyzing keystroke dynamics. 
Parts of methods and results that are reported in this section are now under review for publication. 
4.3.1 Participants 
A first sample of forty participants was recruited and data were used as training set to build ML 
models. Twenty participants were assigned to the liars’ group and the other twenty to the truth-teller 
condition. The demographic characteristics of the sample are reported in Table 4.28.  
Then, a second sample of 20 participants (ten liars and ten truth-tellers) was collected and used as test 
set to assess the model generalization. Demographic information about participants are in Table 4.28.  
Sample N Gender Age Education 
Training set 40 M = 12, F= 28 M = 23, SD = 1.9 M = 17, SD = 1.8 
Test set 20 M = 6, F= 14 M = 22, SD = 1.7 M = 16, SD = 1.6 
Table 4.28: demographic information about training and test set. In the second column (N) the number of participants 
for each sample is reported. The third column shows the number of male and female in each sample. The fourth and the 
fifth columns report mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) of participants’ age and education. 
4.3.2 Experimental procedure 
The experimental procedure was the same reported in section 4.1.2. 
4.3.3 Stimuli 
The task required to answer 18 open-ended questions relating to identity. Both liars and truth-tellers 
were instructed to response each question typing the answer in an edit box (see Figure 3.4). For more 
details about the modalities of presentation of the stimuli, see paragraph 3.3.3. Before starting the 
experiment, participants completed three training questions (data from training questions were not 
further analyzed). The 18 experimental questions, randomly presented to subjects, belonged to the 
following categories: four control questions, eight expected questions, eight unexpected questions 
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(for an explanation about the type of questions see section 4.1.3). The complete list of questions is 
reported in Table 4.29. 
It should be noted that liars told lies in both expected and unexpected questions, whereas they re-
sponded truthfully in control questions.  
4.3.4 Collected measures 
During the subjects’ response, keystroke dynamics were recorded. For more details about data col-
lection, see section 3.3.3. A total of 62 attributes were calculated, averaging each variable over the 
18 responses given by each subject.   
Type of question Question text 
Expected What is your name? 
 What is your last name? 
 In which year were you born? 
 In which month were you born? 
 In which city were you born? 
 In which city do you live? 
 What is your home address? 
 What is your e-mail address? 
Unexpected How old are you? (in letters) 
 Which is your zodiac? 
 In which region were you born? 
 In which province were you born? 
 In which region do you live? 
 
Which is the capital town of your residence re-
gion? 
Control What is your gender? 
 What is the color of your skin? 
 What is the color of your hair? 
 What is your nationality? 
Table 4.29: the table reports the entire list of 18 questions (expected, unexpected and control) presented to participants 
and related to a truth or faked identity.  
4.3.5 Feature selection 
Feature selection was performed as reported in paragraph 3.3.2, that is selecting the subset of predic-
tors which had maximum correlation with the dependent variable and minimal intercorrelation be-
tween features. Firstly, we selected the predictors that showed the maximum correlation with the 
experimental condition (liar vs truth-teller): number of errors (rpb = 0.85), prompted-firstdigit adjusted 
for the GULPEASE index (rpb = 0.71) (for an explanation of the GULPEASE index see section 3.3.3), 
prompted-firstdigit (rpb = 0.70), prompted-enter (rpb = 0.65), firstdigit-enter (rpb = 0.46), writing time 
(rpb = 0.50), time before enter key down (rpb = 0.43). The, we looked at the intercorrelation between 
these seven features. Two of the seven predictors (prompted-firstdigit and prompted-enter) showed a 
very high correlation value, respectively with prompted-firstdigit adjusted GULPEASE (rpb = 0.99) 
and with firstdigit-enter (rpb = 0.89). Thus, these features have been excluded, in order to avoid re-
dundancy. In Table 4.30, the correlation matrix between features is reported, as well as the correlation 
value between the five final attributes and the dependent variable (rpb).  
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Errors 
Prompted-
firstdigit 
GULPEASE 
Firstdigit-
enter 
Writing 
time 
Time key 
before enter 
down Condition 
Errors 1.00 0.51 0.25 0.46 0.44 0.85 
Prompted-firstdigit 
GULPEASE 
0.51 1.00 0.66 0.6 0.54 0.71 
Firstdigit-enter 0.25 0.66 1.00 0.67 0.52 0.46 
Writing time 0.46 0.6 0.67 1.00 0.67 0.5 
Time key before 
enter down 
0.44 0.54 0.52 0.67 1.00 0.43 
Condition 0.85 0.71 0.46 0.50 0.43 1.00 
Table 4.30:  the table reports the correlation matrix for the four features that were selected and their correla-
tion value with the dependent variable.  
4.3.6 Descriptive statistics 
Feature selection isolated, from the original set of 62 predictors, five independent variables: errors, 
prompted-firstdigit adjusted for the GULPEASE index, firstdigit-enter, writing time and time before 
enter key down. Table 4.31 reports the descriptive statistics for these features, as well as the analysis 
of the difference between truth-tellers and liars (t-test, Cohen’s d). 
Feature Group M (SD) t-test (t, p-value) Cohen’s d 
Errors Liars 0.22 (0.08) 10.57, < .01 
3.34 
 Truth-tellers 0.01 (0.02) 
Prompted-firstdigit GULPEASE Liars 4932.43 (1466.47) 6.48, < .01 
2.05 
 Truth-tellers 2406.06 (843.70) 
Firstdigit-enter 
Liars 4968.79 (1875.60) 3.33, < .01 
1.05 
Truth-tellers 3456.55 (564.41) 
Writing time 
Liars 543.20 (174.98) 3.07, < .01 
1.17 
Truth-tellers 376.06 (82.50) 
Time key before enter down 
Liars 1413.12 (703.11) 
3.04 , < .01 0.96 
Truth-tellers 880.10 (320.35) 
Table 4.31: descriptive statistics for errors, prompted-firstdigit adjusted for the GULPEASE index, firstdigit-
enter, writing time and time before enter key down. Mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) are reported for the 
two experimental groups (liars and truth-tellers). The last three columns report statistics about the difference be-
tween the two groups. In particular, the table shows the results of the independent t-test (t-value and p-value are 
reported) and effect-size (Cohen’s d). For the interpretation of Cohen’s d, see paragraph 3.4.2. 
As the number of errors is the feature most correlated with the dependent variable, we analyzed the 
error rate separately for control, expected and unexpected questions. Results are reported in Table 32. 
It should be noticed that the error rate of the two groups is similar when they respond to control and 
expected question. By contrast, when responding to unexpected questions liars produce 27 times more 
errors than truth-tellers. 
Type of question Liars (N = 20) Truth-tellers (N = 20) 
Control (n = 80) 0 / 80 0 / 80 
Expected (n = 160) 0 / 160 3 / 160 
Unexpected (n = 120) 3 / 120 81 / 120 
Table 4.32: number of errors in control, expected and unexpected questions that were committed by liars and 
truth-tellers.  
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4.3.7 Machine learning models 
Five different classifiers (logistic, SVM, Naïve Bayes, random forest and LMT) were trained via 10-
fold cross-validation procedure, using data from the first 40 participants as training set (see section 
3.4.3). Then, in order to evaluate generalization of the results on completely new data, models were 
tested on the 20 new participants never used in the learning phase (see paragraph 4.2.1). Accuracies 
obtained by the classifiers during training and testing are reported in Table 4.33. All the classifiers 
reached at least 90% of accuracy in distinguishing liars from truth-tellers.  
About the rate of false positive and false negative, the confusion matrix showed that the number of 
liars and truth-tellers misclassified is not equal for all the algorithms. Logistic regression failed in 
detecting one truth-teller and three liars in the training set, whereas in the test set all subjects all 
correctly detected. False positive and false negative were balanced in SVM and Naïve Bayes classi-
fication on training set (it misclassifies one liar and one truth-teller), whereas in the test set SVM 
failed in classify two liars and Naïve Bayes misclassified one truth-teller. Random forest misclassified 
two liars and one truth-teller in training set and only one liar in the test set. Finally, LMT failed in 
recognizing one liar in cross-validation and two liars in the test set. 
ML classifier 
Training set  
(10-fold cross-validation) 
Test set 
 Average accuracy (SD) Precision Recall Accuracy Precision Recall 
Logistic 90% (12.9) 0.864 0.950 100% 1.000 1.000 
SVM 95% (10.5) 0.950 0.950 90% 0.833 1.000 
Naïve Bayes 95% (10.5) 0.950 0.950 95% 1.000 0.900 
Random forest 92.5% (12.1) 0.905 0.950 95% 0.909 1.000 
LMT 97.5% (7.9) 0.952 1.000 90% 0.833 1.000 
Table 4.33: the table reports the accuracy obtained by five classifiers in correctly identify fakers and truth-
tellers, in 10-fold cross-validation and test set. The accuracy in training set, using a 10-fold cross-validation, is 
the average accuracy resulting from the 10 folds. The standard deviation (SD) of the 10 folds is also reported. 
Recall is the percentage of liars who are correctly identified and precision represents the fraction of correct liars 
among those identified as liars. 
In order to highlight the relative importance of predictors, we eliminated one by one the features 
recalculating the classification accuracy. Results are reported in Table 4.34. To sum up, eliminating 
errors from predictors classification accuracy decreases around 80% in the cross-validation and 
around 65% in the test. When prompted-firstdigit adjusted GULPEASE is eliminated, the overall 
accuracy remains substantially high (around 92% for training and around 90% in the test). Eliminat-
ing the firstdigit-enter variable, the accuracy remains high (around 95% both in cross-validation and 
test set). The same occurs by removing the writing time and time key before enter down. In short, 
errors are the single most important predictor in identifying subjects as liars or truth-tellers. Further-
more, the variables related to the response latency (prompted-firstdigit adjusted GULPEASE), the 
writing time (firstdigit-enter and writing time) and the interval between the last key press and the 
confirmation of the response (time before enter key down) are also contributing significantly. 
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Removed 
predictor 
ML classifier 
Training set  
(10-fold cross-validation) 
Test set 
  Average accuracy (SD) Precision Recall Accuracy Precision Recall 
Errors Logistic 82.5% (16.9) 0.810 0.850 65% 0.600 0.900 
SVM 82.5% (16.9) 0.783 0.900 65% 0.600 0.900 
Naïve Bayes 80% (19.7) 0.750 0.900 60% 0.571 0.800 
Random forest 82.5% (16.9) 0.842 0.800 70% 0.643 0.900 
LMT 82.5% (12.1) 0.842 0.800 65% 0.600 0.900 
        
Prompted-
firstdigit ad-
justed for the 
GULPEASE 
index 
Logistic 92.5% (12.1) 0.905 0.950 90% 0.833 1.000 
SVM 92.5% (12.1) 0.870 1.000 90% 0.833 1.000 
Naïve Bayes 92.5% (12.1) 0.905 0.950 90% 1.000 0.800 
Random forest 95% (10.5) 0.950 0.950 100% 1.000 1.000 
LMT 92.5% (12.1) 0.870 1.000 90% 0.833 1.000 
       
Firstdigit-en-
ter 
Logistic 92.5% (12.1) 0.905 0.950 100% 1.000 1.000 
SVM 95% (10.5) 0.950 0.950 90% 0.833 1.000 
Naïve Bayes 95% (10.5) 0.950 0.950 95% 1.000 0.900 
Random forest 92.5% (12.1) 0.947 0.900 95% 0.909 1.000 
LMT 97.5% (7.9) 0.952 1.000 90% 0.833 1.000 
        
Writing time Logistic 92.5% (12.1) 0.905 0.950 100% 1.000 1.000 
SVM 95% (10.5) 0.950 0.950 90% 0.833 1.000 
Naïve Bayes 95% (10.5) 0.950 0.950 95% 1.000 0.900 
Random forest 90% (12.9) 0.900 0.900 95% 0.909 1.000 
LMT 97.5% (7.9) 0.952 1.000 90% 0.833 1.000 
        
Time before 
enter key 
down 
Logistic 90% (12.1) 0.900 0.900 85% 0.818 0.900 
SVM 95% (10.5) 0.950 0.950 90% 0.833 1.000 
Naïve Bayes 95% (10.5) 0.950 0.950 95% 1.000 0.900 
Random forest 90% (12.9) 0.900 0.900 95% 0.909 1.000 
LMT 97.5% (7.9) 0.952 1.000 90% 0.833 1.000 
Table 4.34: the table reports the accuracy obtained by five classifiers in correctly identify liars and truth-tell-
ers, in training and test set, using different set of predictors. The first column indicates the attribute that has been 
removed from the original set of five predictors (see paragraph 4.3.2). The accuracy in training set, using a 10-
fold cross-validation, is the average accuracy resulting from the 10 folds. The standard deviation (SD) of the 10 
folds is also reported. Recall is the percentage of liars who are correctly identified and precision represents the 
fraction of correct liars among those identified as liars. 
4.3.8 Can we detect liars also when they respond truthfully? 
All the analysis reported above, were run taking into account the responses to all three types of ques-
tions (control, expected and unexpected questions). We specifically analyzed control questions alone 
as both liars and truth-tellers are required to respond truthfully to control questions. All classifiers 
yielded a classification around chance level to this type of questions (47.5% as regards the cross-
validation and to 50% in the test (see Table 4.35). This result indicates that responses to control 
questions of the two groups are virtually indistinguishable. In other words, using this paradigm, liars 
and truth-tellers are not detectable also when liars responded truthfully. 
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ML classifier 
Training set  
(10-fold cross-validation) 
Test set 
 Average accuracy (SD) Precision Recall Accuracy Precision Recall 
Logistic 40% (24.1) 0.400 0.400 60% 0.571 0.800 
SVM 45% (15.9) 0.458 0.550 45% 0.471 0.800 
Naïve Bayes 47.5% (27.5) 0.481 0.650 45% 0.471 0.800 
Random forest 55% (35.0) 0.550 0.550 40% 0.417 0.500 
LMT 45% (15.8) 0.474 0.900 50% 0.500 1.000 
Table 4.35: the table reports the accuracy obtained by five classifiers in correctly identify fakers and truth-
tellers, in 10-fold cross-validation and test set using analyzing only control questions. The accuracy in training 
set, using a 10-fold cross-validation, is the average accuracy resulting from the 10 folds. The standard deviation 
(SD) of the 10 folds is also reported. Recall is the percentage of liars who are correctly identified and precision 
represents the fraction of correct liars among those identified as liars. 
4.3.9 Analysis on normalized predictors 
Normalized predictors are features that are less influenced by inter-individual and environmental var-
iables. In fact, the analysis reported above were conducted on raw data using two groups of subjects 
(liars and truth-tellers) similar in age, cultural level and typing skills. One could argue that keyboard 
dynamics are modulated by a number of different variables such as age, cultural level and typing 
skills. In order to render the results generalizable it would be interesting to see whether similar results 
hold not only for raw data but also for normalized predictors. To overcome this limitation, we run 
again the classification models using only normalized indexes. These indices were the following: 
 Average number of errors =  (number of errors / total number of questions) 
 Writing time = (firstdigit-enter / answer length) 
 Firstdigit time = (Prompted-firstdigit – prompted-enter) 
 ([Writing time / prompted-firstdigit] – prompted-enter)  
In addition to these four new normalized predictors, errors were included in the models, as errors do 
not depend on typing skills, age or cultural level. Results from the five classifiers using the normalized 
predictors are reported in Table 4.36. In short, it is confirmed also for normalized predictors the high 
accuracy in classifying truth-tellers and liars. 
ML classifier 
Training set  
(10-fold cross-validation) 
Test set 
 Average accuracy (SD) Precision Recall Accuracy Precision Recall 
Logistic 90% (12.9) 0.900 0.900 100% 1.000 1.000 
SVM 92.5% (12.1) 0.870 1.000 90% 0.833 1.000 
Naïve Bayes 90% (17.5) 0.900 0.900 95% 1.000 0.900 
Random forest 95% (10.5) 0.950 0.950 100% 1.000 1.000 
LMT 90% (12.9) 0.833 1.000 90% 0.833 1.000 
Table 4.36: the table reports the accuracy obtained by five classifiers in correctly identify fakers and truth-
tellers, in 10-fold cross-validation and test set using normalized predictors. The accuracy in training set, using a 
10-fold cross-validation, is the average accuracy resulting from the 10 folds. The standard deviation (SD) of the 
10 folds is also reported. Recall is the percentage of liars who are correctly identified and precision represents 
the fraction of correct liars among those identified as liars. 
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4.3.10 Countermeasures and alternative efficient models 
We did not directly tested resistance to countermeasures of this technique, but a number of reasons 
indicate that coaching subjects could be difficult, and specifically: 
1) Errors to unexpected questions are diagnostic of lying and the subjects should respond without 
errors in order to cheat the test. There are no easy countermeasures to the number of errors. In fact, 
the only way to beat the test avoiding errors is to know the unexpected questions in advance. Coun-
termeasures, therefore, are limited to the keystroke dynamics. 
2) Parameters used to encode keystroke dynamics are high in number and only some of them have 
been used in building the original model. It is unlikely that the cheater succeeds in implementing 
countermeasures that simultaneously keep under voluntary control all possible efficient predictors. 
To highlight this points, we have tested a new model that uses as predictors errors (rpb = 0.85), 
prompted-firstdigit (rpb = 0.70), prompted-enter (rpb = 0.65), time before enter key flight (rpb = 0.43), 
and di-graph down time average (rpb = 0.38). For an explanation about these predictors, see paragraph 
3.3.3. Note that the predictors used in the original analysis were errors, prompted-firstdigit adjusted 
GULPEASE, firstdigit-enter, writing time and time before enter key down.  
Classification accuracies using the new set of predictors are reported in Table 4.37. These results 
clearly show that there are other sets of predictors (different from those originally used) that can be 
used to efficiently classify the participants, making it hard to apply countermeasures. 
ML classifier 
Training set  
(10-fold cross-validation) 
Test set 
 Average accuracy (SD) Precision Recall Accuracy Precision Recall 
Logistic 92.5% (12.1) 0.905 0.950 100% 1.000 1.000 
SVM 95% (10.5) 0.950 0.950 90% 0.833 1.000 
Naïve Bayes 97.5% (7.9) 1.000 0.950 90% 1.000 0.800 
Random forest 90% (12.9) 0.864 0.950 90% 0.833 1.000 
LMT 97.5% (7.9) 0.952 1.000 90% 0.833 1.000 
Table 4.37: the table reports the accuracy obtained by five classifiers in correctly identify fakers and truth-
tellers, in 10-fold cross-validation and test set using a new set of five predictors. The new set of predictors, dif-
ferent from those originally used, included errors, prompted-firstdigit, prompted-enter, time before enter key 
flight and di-graph down time average. The accuracy in training set, using a 10-fold cross-validation, is the aver-
age accuracy resulting from the 10 folds. The standard deviation (SD) of the 10 folds is also reported. Recall is 
the percentage of liars who are correctly identified and precision represents the fraction of correct liars among 
those identified as liars. 
4.3.11 Classification of liars using only data from truth-tellers 
While liars are instructed to lie about their identity, truth-tellers are required to respond freely without 
no specific instructions. Under this view, liars are responding in an anomalous way with respect to 
truth-tellers. Normally, in a real situation, the majority of the subjects report true identities and only 
few of them provide false information and show an anomalous pattern of response. In order to eval-
uate whether liars may still be identified based on their anomalous response style we have applied a 
machine learning technique called anomaly detection [185]. Anomalies are data that have different 
patterns from normal instances. The detection of anomalies provides significant information and finds 
application in many fields. For example, detection of anomalies in credit card transaction, anomalies 
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in an astronomy image or in a nuclear plant functioning. Anomaly detection techniques classify sub-
jects after a training limited to the most frequent group, in our experiment the truth-tellers [186]. At 
prediction, new instances with unknown class labels can either belong to the target class (the class 
learned during training, truth-tellers ) or to a new class that was not available during training (in our 
case the liars). This type of learning problem is known as one-class classification. Following this 
logic, we tested whether a one-class classifier [185] may classify liars satisfactorily even if the model 
is trained only using data from truth-tellers. This ML algorithm has been trained using logistic on the 
20 original truth-tellers’ data and tested on the test set of 20 participants (10 liars and 10 truth tellers). 
The one-class algorithm classified correctly the 85% of instances (precision = 1.000, recall = 0.700); 
specifically it classified correctly the 70% of the truth-tellers as target and the 100% of the liars as 
outliers. If we run the test on a group of 30 liars and 10 truth-tellers results are 29/30 liars correctly 
classified and 7/10 truth tellers correctly classified. This result indicated that the classifier trained 
only on truth-tellers might identify the liars with high accuracy. 
4.3.12 Application of the paradigm to online form 
As anticipated above, lie detection via keystroke dynamics is more suitable than mouse tracking for 
the application in online contexts (e.g., to verify the authenticity of information typed by the user 
during and online subscription). Moreover, this setting permits a covert lie detection (a lie detection 
procedure that the respondent is unaware of it) preserving the usability and the user experience of the 
web surfing. 
To argue this point, we have adapted the experiment to the situation of online subscription. An online 
form has been presented to subjects, asking them to compile it with the goal to subscribe for a new 
chat system. The subscription form, as appeared to the subject, is shown by Figure 4.13.   
 
Figure 4.13: the figure reports the online form that the subjects were asked to compile in order to sub-
scribe a new chat website. 
After they successfully compiled the form, four unexpected questions appeared rapidly. Subjects were 
asked to answer these questions to confirmed their registration. An example of the screen containing 
unexpected questions to which subjects were asked to respond after filling the form, is reported in 
Figure 4.14. Unexpected questions were about age (“How old are you?”), ZIP code (“Which is your 
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ZIP code? ”), zodiac (“Which is your zodiac?”), and the capital town of the residence region (“Which 
is the capital town of your residence region?”). 
 
Figure 4.14: an example of unexpected question as appeared to the participants during the task. 
One-hundred participants took part to the experiment, 50 liars and 50 truth-tellers. The sample con-
sisted in 43 male and 57 female, with average age = 23 (SD = 2.4), and average education = 15 (SD 
= 1.5). The experimental procedure that was followed to instruct liars to respond according to a 
learned faked identity is the same reported in section 4.1.2.  
The keystroke dynamics features were collected only for responses to the four unexpected questions. 
The features were the same reported in paragraph 4.2.4.  
Feature selection was performed using the CFS algorithm, as reported in section 3.4.1. The selected 
features were the following: number of errors (rpb = 0.52), prompted-firstdigit (rpb = 0.57), prompted-
enter (rpb = 0.62), writing time (rpb = 0.39) and the maximum value of di-graph up and down time (rpb 
= 0.62). For an explanation about these predictors, see paragraph 3.3.3.  
 
An independent t-test confirmed that liars and truth-tellers statistically differ in all the five selected 
variables (p < .01). 
 
Using five different ML classifiers, we run a 10-fold cross-validation on the entire sample of partici-
pants. Classification accuracies are reported in Table 4.38, and are around 85%. This means that the 
recording of keystroke dynamics during the response to only four unexpected questions is enough to 
detect liars with a high accuracy. This result also demonstrates that the identity detection system that 
we propose here is easy to integrate in the existing web application (e.g., registration or login form), 
without radically modifying the user experience. 
ML classifier 10-fold cross-validation 
 Average accuracy (SD) Precision Recall 
Logistic 84% (7.0) 0.886 0.780 
SVM 87% (8.2) 0.894 0.840 
Naïve Bayes 87% (6.8) 0.911 0.820 
Random forest 85% (10.9) 0.872 0.820 
LMT 86% (9.7) 0.891 0.820 
Table 4.38: the table reports the accuracy obtained by five classifiers in correctly identify fakers and truth-
tellers, in 10-fold cross-validation on the sole base of four unexpected questions. The accuracy in 10-fold cross-
validation, is the average accuracy resulting from the 10 folds. The standard deviation (SD) of the 10 folds is 
also reported. Recall is the percentage of liars who are correctly identified and precision represents the fraction 
of correct liars among those identified as liars. 
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4.3.13 Discussion  
Through the two last experiments, we demonstrated that keystroke dynamics, along with unexpected 
questions, is an accurate technique to spot faked identities. Results are similar to those obtained re-
cording mouse dynamics or RT. We also showed that this paradigm, compared to mouse dynamics 
and RT paradigms, is more suitable for online applications, as it is more promising in terms of inte-
gration with the existing online applications. 
The most interesting predictors are the number of errors, which are due to the presence of unexpected 
questions, and the response latencies, such as the prompted-firstdigit index, the firstdigit-enter, the 
writing time and the time before enter key down. In other words, the high classification accuracy 
seems based on the total time taken to elaborate and produce the response, rather than the writing 
pattern in terms of up and down of each key during the response typing. 
Although the results of the experiments hitherto presented are astonishing, the high classification 
accuracy is largely due to the effect of the unexpected questions. In the experiments that we presented 
in the previous sections, the subjects spent few minutes to learn a faked identity. It is true that in some 
real cases (e.g., terrorists traveling with a false passport) the subject have more time to learn more in 
detail the new false identity. However, it is also true that in other real cases (e.g., a user that try to 
subscribe a website with a faked identity) liars are not well prepared. Since the method is based on 
asking unexpected questions, the time taken to learn the information is not so crucial. Indeed, what is 
crucial to beat the test is to be prepared to respond with unexpected information. This imply that the 
subject should be aware in advance about the underlying logic of the task, and that he should know 
in advance the possible questions. Asking unexpected questions is a complex crafting process that 
requires identifying what are the unexpected questions for the examinee. If an unexpected question 
is not really unexpected (as the subject may prepare himself in advance) it becomes an expected 
question and looses its efficacy. Moreover, though unexpected questions can be varied in content 
(e.g., postal code could be included and so on), they are difficult to apply in all deception detection 
situations. For example, in crimes that consist on having or not put in place an action (e.g., I dealt /I 
didn’t deal drug in last few months), it is extremely difficult to fabricate unexpected questions. Such 
type of lies are known as lie of omission and substantially consist in deny an action [147]. Further-
more, in some cases, the crime details are unknown and the investigators have no elements to build 
unexpected questions. To overstep the limits of unexpected questions, we proposed an alternative 
strategy to increase the liars’ cognitive load: the use of complex questions. To guarantee comparable 
results with the previous experiments, we have followed the same experimental procedure focusing 
on the detection of faked identities through mouse dynamics and RT recording. 
 
 
Experiments 
77 
4.4 The Detection of Faked Identity with Complex Questions and Choice 
Reaction Time 
The general aim of this experiment is to validate a computerized technique to spot people who declare 
false identity information asking complex questions and analyzing RT. 
As anticipated in section 2.3.2, the use of complex questions is a technique to increase liars’ cognitive 
load, facilitating the detection of false responses. It consists in asking questions that are composed by 
more than one target information. For example, investigating the subject identity, a complex question 
may be composed by the information about the name and the date of birth (e.g., “Are you Mary born 
in April 1987?”). 
Methods and results that are reported in this section are under review for publication. 
4.4.1 Participants 
Data from a first sample of 40 participants were collected and used as training set to build ML models. 
Twenty participants were assigned to the liars’ group and the other twenty to the truth-teller condition. 
Then, ten new participants (five liars and five truth-tellers) were recruited and used as test set to assess 
the ML models generalization. Demographic information about participants are reported in Table 
4.39.  
Sample N Gender Age Education 
Training set 40 M = 15, F= 25 M = 22, SD = 1.5 M = 16, SD = 1.4 
Test set 10 M = 2, F= 8 M = 22, SD = 2.5 M = 16, SD = 1.4 
Table 4.39: demographic information about training and test set. In the second column (N) the number of participants 
for each sample is reported. The third column shows the number of male and female in each sample. The fourth and the 
fifth columns report mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) of participants’ age and education. 
4.4.2 Experimental procedure 
The experimental procedure was similar to that reported in section 4.1.2. In other words, liars were 
asked to learn a faked identity and to respond questions according to the information previously 
learned. On the contrary, no specific instruction were given to truth-tellers, who completed the task 
responding according to their actual identity. 
4.4.3 Stimuli 
Sixty questions were presented to participants in form of affirmation. Thirty sentences required a 
“yes” response, and 30 required to respond “no”, for both liars and truth-tellers. The experimental 
questions were preceded by 10 training questions (5 requiring a “yes” response and 5 requiring a “no” 
response) to allow the subject to familiarize with the task (data from training questions were not 
included in the analysis). Questions belonged to the following categories: 
 20 control questions. Control questions were sentences to which both truth-tellers and liars had 
to respond truthfully. These sentences were unrelated to identity and referred to the experimental 
condition. Half of the control sentences required a “yes” response (e.g., “I am sitting in front of a 
computer”) and half a “no” response (e.g., “I am climbing a mountain”). Both liars and truth 
tellers were required to respond truthfully to all control questions. 
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 20 simple questions. Simple questions were related to the identity. Truth-tellers responded were 
asked to respond according to their true identities, whereas liars responded according to the faked 
identity previously learned. Half of the simple sentences required to respond “yes” (e.g., “My 
name is John”) and the others required a “no” response (e.g., “My name is Antony”). For liars, a 
“yes” response corresponded to a lie.  
 20 complex questions. Complex questions were sentences that included two or three information 
about the identity (e.g., “I am Mary, a 29 years old girl from Venice”). Participants were instructed 
to respond “yes” when all of the information in the sentence was true, whereas they responded 
“no” when at least one of the information included in the sentence was false. In other words, 
participants had to respond “yes” when the entire sentence was true, and “no” when there was one 
or more pieces of false information in the sentence. Complex sentences that required to respond 
“yes” were composed as follows: five sentences contained two identity information and five sen-
tences contained three identity information. Complex sentences requiring a “no” response were 
organized as follows: five sentences were composed by two identity information (in this case the 
false information was always in the second place). The other five sentences had three identity 
information (three of them with only one false information in the last place of the sentence and 
two with two false information in the second and third places of the sentence). An example of 
questions is reported in Table 4.40. 
To sum up, both liars and truth-tellers responded to 30 control, simple and complex questions that 
required to respond “yes” and to 30 control, simple and complex questions that required “no” re-
sponses. Control, simple and complex questions were presented randomly and intermixed. For more 
details about the modalities of presentation of the stimuli, see paragraph 3.3.1. 
It should be noted that liars told lies only in the simple “yes” and complex “yes” responses. In fact, 
for the liars, the simple and complex questions regarding their faked identities were actually “no” 
responses that, because they were lying, required “yes” responses. In all of other questions (control 
“yes”, control “no”, simple “no”, complex “no”), both liars and truth-tellers responded truthfully. 
4.4.4 Collected measures 
For more details about data collection, see section 3.3.1. During the subjects’ response, RT and errors 
were recorded. For each participant, we averaged the RT and errors belonging to different type of 
questions (control, simple, complex, also separately for yes and no). Then, the Inverse Efficiency 
Score (IES) for control, simple and complex questions was computed. The final list of the 23 predic-
tors that have been taken into account for ML analysis is reported in Annex 3. 
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Type of question 
Question that requires “yes” response by 
both liars and truth-tellers 
Question that requires “no” response by 
both liars and truth-tellers 
Control I am in front of a computer I'm swimming in the sea 
 I am standing in front of a computer I'm climbing a mountain 
 I'm using a computer I'm traveling by airplane 
 I am responding with a keyboard I am aboard an airplane 
 Now, I'm sitting on a chair Now, I am on the beach 
 Right now, I'm sitting I'm taking in the sun at the beach 
 I'm doing an identity verification test I'm eating at the restaurant 
 I am participating in a test I'm having lunch at the restaurant 
 I'm reading sentences  I'm playing football 
 I am responding to phrases I'm watching a football match 
Simple My name is Merylin My last name is Zurri. 
 I was born in Trieste My name is Greta. 
 I live in Monfalcone I was born on 08.15.1990. 
 I am single My birthday is in August. 
 My last name is Monaro I'm married. 
 I am a student My city of birth is Ortona. 
 I was born in the province of Trieste  I live in Lanciano. 
 I live in Via Timavo 47 I am an engineer. 
 I was born on 20th April I was born in the province of Chieti 
 I was born in 1987 I live in via Postojna.  
Complex I am Merylin, born in Trieste. I am Merylin, and I live in Lanciano. 
 My name is Merylin Monaro. I was born on 20th April 1987 in Ortona. 
 I was born in Trieste, and I live in Monfalcone. I was born in Trieste, and I live in Lanciano. 
 I was born in April 1987 in Trieste. I am a student, and I am married. 
 I am a student, and I live in Via Timavo 47. I live in Monfalcone in via Postojna 65. 
 In the 1987, I was born in April in Trieste. I am Merylin, a single engineer. 
 I am Monaro, a single student. I am Merylin, a student born in August. 
 
My name is Merylin, I am single and I live in 
Monfalcone. 
Merylin Monaro was born in August 1990. 
 I am the student Merylin, born on 20.04.1987. I am Merylin Zurri, and I am married. 
 I am the student Merylin, born in April. I am Monaro, a married woman of Ortona. 
Table 4.40: the table reports an example of the 60 control, simple and complex questions presented to participants and 
related to a truth or faked identity. Information about the identity in complex questions are underlined. In bold the false 
identity information according to which participants had to respond “no”. 
4.4.5 Descriptive statistics 
Before the features selection, we run some descriptive analysis on RT and errors in control, simple 
and complex questions, to highlight the differences between the two experimental groups. In Tables 
4.41 and 4.42, average number of errors and average RT in control, simple and complex questions 
are reported, taking into account also the difference between “yes” and “no” responses. It can be 
noticed that liars, in responding “no” to complex sentences, are 30% slower than the average RT 
(second column), whereas truth tellers in the same stimuli are only 10% slower. It is worth noting 
that the number of errors that liars made, on average, was 5.6 times the number of errors of truth 
tellers. 
An ANOVA indicated that: 
 overall, the responses of liars were longer than those of truth tellers [F(1,38)=38.39 p<0.001]. 
 Complex questions were slower than simple questions for both liars and truth-tellers 
[F(2,76)=147.45 p<0.001], but complex sentences  were much slower, with respect to simple 
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sentences, in liars than in truth-tellers [F(2,76)=25.22, p<0.01]. In fact, the difference in RT be-
tween complex and simple sentences was 848 ms for liars and only 463 ms for truth-tellers. 
 There is not a main effect of the response type (yes/no) [F(1,38)=2.34, p>0.01]. The interactions 
group X response type, question type X response type and group X question type X response type 
do not show statistically significant results (respectively [F(1,38)=1.88, p>0.01], [F(2,76)=4.62, 
p>0.01] and [F(2,76)=2.91, p>0.01]). It means that generally, both liars and truth-tellers, have the 
same RTs when responding yes or no questions. It excludes the possibility that the effect observed 
in the complex sentences is due to the act of negating rather than the lie itself. 
Group Total M (SD) Control M (SD) Simple M (SD) Complex M (SD) 
  YES NO YES NO YES NO 
Liars 1974 (321.66) 1491 
(302.2) 
1570 
(353.14) 
1796 
(328.78) 
1748 
(292.41) 
2644 
(711.76) 
2596 
(580.58) 
   0.75 0.79 0.90 0.88 1.33 1.31 
Truth-tellers 1389 (273.36) 1283 
(266.74) 
1251 
(246.41) 
1201 
(337) 
1238 
(270.18) 
1842 
(396.82) 
1521 
(286.72) 
   0.92 0.90 0.86 0.89 1.32 1.10 
Table 4.41: descriptive statistics for RT related to control, simple and complex questions requiring a “yes” or 
“no” response. Mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) are reported for the two experimental groups (liars and 
truth-tellers). Under RT mean and sd, the ratio between the average RT for the specific type of question and the 
overall RT in all the task is reported. 
Group Total M (SD) Control M (SD) Simple M (SD) Complex M (SD) 
  YES NO YES NO YES NO 
Liars 0.093 
(0.092) 
0.05 
(0.20) 
0.065 
(0.22) 
0.1 
(0.10) 
0.1 
(0.10) 
0.08 
(0.13) 
0.165 
(0.19) 
   0.53 0.69 1.07 1.07 0.86 1.77 
Truth-tellers 0.014 
(0.013) 
0.015 
(0.05) 
0.005 
(0.02) 
0.005 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.025 
(0.05) 
0.025 
(0.04) 
   1.07 0.35 0.35 0.71 1.78 1.78 
Table 4.42: descriptive statistics for errors related to control, simple and complex questions requiring a “yes” 
or “no” response. Mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) are reported for the two experimental groups (liars and 
truth-tellers). Under errors mean and sd, the ratio between the average number of errors for the specific type of 
question and the overall number of errors in all the task is reported. 
4.4.6 Feature selection 
Data collection produced a set of 23 predictors. Feature selection have been performed using a cor-
relation based feature selector (CFS) (see section 3.4.1). Running this algorithm, the following pre-
dictors were selected: Simple Yes RT (rpb = 0.67), Complex Tot RT (rpb = 0.73), Complex No RT 
(rpb = 0.77), Mean Total errors (rpb = 0.55) and Mean Simple Tot errors (rpb = 0.66). For a detailed 
explanation of these variables see Annex 3. In Table 4.43, the correlation matrix between features is 
reported, as well as the correlation value between the five final attributes and the dependent variable 
(rpb).  
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Simple 
Yes RT  
Complex 
Tot RT  
Complex 
No RT  
Mean Total 
errors 
Mean Simple 
Tot errors Condition 
Simple Yes RT  1.00 0.85 0.84 0.47 0.51 0.68 
Complex Tot RT  0.85 1.00 0.93 0.42 0.43 0.73 
Complex No RT  0.84 0.93 1.00 0.48 0.51 0.77 
Mean Total errors 0.47 0.42 0.48 1.00 0.88 0.55 
Mean Simple Tot errors 0.51 0.43 0.51 0.88 1.00 0.66 
Condition 0.68 0.73 0.77 0.55 0.66 1.00 
Table 4.30:  the table reports the correlation matrix for the four features that were selected and their correlation value 
with the dependent variable 
4.4.7 Machine learning models 
Five ML classifiers (logistic, SVM, Naïve Bayes, random forest and LMT) were trained using the 
10-fold cross-validation on the data of the first 40 participants (see section 3.4.3). Then, in order to 
evaluate the capacity of generalization of the models, we tested 10 new participants never seen by the 
classifiers (see paragraph 4.4.1). Accuracies obtained by the classifiers during training and testing are 
reported in Table 5. All the classifiers reached at least 90% of accuracy in 10-fold cross-validation 
and 80% in test set.  
ML classifier 
Training set  
(10-fold cross-validation) 
Test set 
 Average accuracy (SD) Precision Recall Accuracy Precision Recall 
Logistic 90% (12.9) 0.944 0.850 80% 0.714 1.000 
SVM 95% (10.5) 0.909 1.000 80% 0.714 1.000 
Naïve Bayes 90% (12.9) 0.900 0.900 90% 0.833 1.000 
Random forest 90% (12.9) 0.864 0.950 80% 0.714 1.000 
LMT 95% (10.5) 0.900 1.000 80% 0.714 1.000 
Table 4.44: the table reports the accuracy obtained by five classifiers in correctly identify fakers and truth-
tellers, in 10-fold cross-validation and test set. The accuracy in training set, using a 10-fold cross-validation, is 
the average accuracy resulting from the 10 folds. The standard deviation (SD) of the 10 folds is also reported. 
Recall is the percentage of liars who are correctly identified and precision represents the fraction of correct liars 
among those identified as liars. 
About the rate of false positive and false negative, the confusion matrix showed that the number of 
liars and truth-tellers misclassified in cross-validation is not equal for all the algorithms, while in the 
test set all the classifiers failed in recognizing liars. Logistic regression failed in detecting three truth-
tellers and one liar in the training set, whereas in the test set it misclassified two liars. SVM and LMT 
were unbalanced toward the false negative, as they misclassified two liars both in training and in test 
set. Naïve Bayes misclassified two truth-tellers and two liars in cross-validation and one liar in the 
test set. Random forest failed the classification of one liar and three truth-tellers in training set and 
two liars in the test set.  
4.4.8 Analysis on normalized predictors 
Similarly to section 4.3.9, here we face the issue of using normalized predictors. In fact, there are a 
large a number of variables, such as age and cultural level, which may influence the subject’s task 
performance. The analysis reported above were conducted on raw data using two groups of subjects 
(liars and truth-tellers) that were similar in age and cultural level, and that were tested in the same 
environment. In order to render the results generalizable, it would be interesting to see whether similar 
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results hold not only for raw data but also for normalized predictors. Fr this reason, we run again the 
classification models using only normalized indexes, less influenced by inter-individual and environ-
mental variables. For example, raw RT for “yes” responses could be substituted by the ratio of the 
same data with the average RT of all subject responses. This ratio calibrates the result with the average 
speed of the participant, which, in turn, could depend on a number of factors. The complete list of the 
normalized predictors is provided in Annex 3. 
Using the same feature selection logic, we extracted the subset of predictors more correlated with the 
dependent variable and less intercorrelated. The predictors are the following: Control Yes RT/Total 
RT (rpb = 0.59, 2), Complex Tot RT/Total RT (rpb = 0.56, 3), Complex No RT/Total RT (rpb = 0.66), 
(Complex Yes RT – Complex No RT)/Total RT (rpb = 0.39), Raw Simple Tot errors/Raw Control Tot 
errors (rpb =  0.60).  
Running the five ML algorithms on the new set of normalized predictors, we obtained similar accu-
racies to those highlighted using raw predictors. Results are in Table 4.45. 
ML classifier 
Training set  
(10-fold cross-validation) 
Test set 
 Average accuracy (SD) Precision Recall Accuracy Precision Recall 
Logistic 85% (12.9) 0.850 0.850 90% 0.833 1.000 
SVM 87.5% (17.7) 0.800 1.000 80% 0.714 1.000 
Naïve Bayes 90% (12.9) 0.900 0.900 80% 0.714 1.000 
Random forest 90% (12.9) 0.900 0.900 90% 0.833 1.000 
LMT 85% (12.9) 0.850 0.850 90% 0.833 1.000 
Table 4.45: the table reports the accuracy obtained by five classifiers in correctly identify fakers and truth-
tellers, in 10-fold cross-validation and test set using normalized predictors. The accuracy in training set, using a 
10-fold cross-validation, is the average accuracy resulting from the 10 folds. The standard deviation (SD) of the 
10 folds is also reported. Recall is the percentage of liars who are correctly identified and precision represents 
the fraction of correct liars among those identified as liars. 
In short, when using normalized predictors, we observed similar results to those observed on raw 
data. The adoption of such normalized predictors instead of raw data renders, in theory, generalization 
more robust and less affected by the effects on reaction times of age, skill level, etc. 
4.4.9 Analysis by stimuli  
The results reported above were obtained with an analysis by subjects, and therefore, the accuracy of 
classifiers refers to the accuracy in classifying individual responders as liars or truth tellers. An inter-
esting issue is whether the subject may be classified based on his individual responses through a 
majority vote.  To investigate this issue we run an analysis by stimuli. 
Given that the responses to complex sentences which require a “no” response are those that showed 
a higher correlation with the experimental condition (see paragraphs 4.4.1 and 4.4.2), we carried out 
the classification by stimuli using only the responses to these questions. A total of 400 responses were 
collected (40 subjects who responded each to 10 sentences which required a “no” response, for a total 
of 400 sentences). The predictors were the reaction time to the presented sentence and a categorical 
variable indexing whether the response was correct or wrong. Classifications results are reported in 
Table 4.46.   
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ML classifier 
Training set  
(10-fold cross-validation) 
Test set 
 Average accuracy (SD) Precision Recall Accuracy Precision Recall 
Logistic 75.5% (3.9) 0.787 0.700 74% 0.853 0.580 
SVM 73% (4.5) 0.865 0.545 70% 0.885 0.460 
Naïve Bayes 73.5% (5.0) 0.856 0.565 69% 0.880 0.440 
Random forest 69.25% (6.9) 0.695 0.685 70% 0.750 0.600 
LMT 74.5% (4.7) 0.782 0.680 72% 0.844 0.540 
Table 4.46: the table reports the accuracy obtained by five classifiers in correctly identify a response as tue or 
false, in 10-fold cross-validation and test set. The models were developed taking into account only responses to 
complex “no” questions. The accuracy in training set, using a 10-fold cross-validation, is the average accuracy 
resulting from the 10 folds. The standard deviation (SD) of the 10 folds is also reported. Recall is the percentage 
of liars who are correctly identified and precision represents the fraction of correct liars among those identified 
as liars. 
This analysis showed that complex “no” sentences may be identified as originating from a truth-teller 
or a liar with an accuracy of 70%. Using the majority rule to classify a participant as a truth-teller or 
liar, the 10 participants of the validation sample were classified correctly 80% of the time (all truth-
tellers were correctly classified, whereas two liars were misclassified).  
To have an intuition on how responses are efficiently classified as belonging to a liar or a truth-teller, 
we run a J48 tree classification model (see section 3.4.3). This algorithm yielded an accuracy of 73% 
(DS = 5.6, precision = 0.719, recall = 0.755) in the 10-fold cross-validation and an accuracy of 72% 
(precision = 0.806, recall = 0.580) in the test.  
 
Figure 4.15: output of the J48 tree from the 10-fold cross-validation. The output describes the model on 
which is based the decision about the classification of the response to complex “no” questions as belonging to a 
liar or a truth-teller. 
The J48 works as follows (see Figure 4.15): 
 if RT ≤1870 ms and errors = 0, then the responder is a truth-teller (with accuracy = 75%). 
 if RT ≤ 1870 ms and errors = 1, the responder is a truth-teller (with accuracy = 70%). 
 if RT > 1870 ms, then the responder is a liar (with accuracy = 78%). 
In short, if RT is fast (below 1870 ms) and the response correct, then the responder is a truth-teller.  
If RT is slow (above 1870 ms), then the responder is a liar. Finally, if RT is fast but the response is 
an error, the truth-teller is classified with a slightly reduced accuracy. 
4.4.10 Discussion  
Through this experiment we demonstrated that people who declare a false identity can be detect ask-
ing complex questions and recording RT. The accuracy of this technique is slightly smaller compared 
to that obtained applying the technique of asking unexpected questions (see the experiment in section 
4.2.). In fact, although the two experiments showed similar accuracies in cross-validation, in the test 
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set the results obtained from the complex questions technique are approximately 10% lower than 
results from the unexpected questions technique. However, it should be noticed that the results ob-
tained by the application of complex questions are freer from errors and do not require the examiner 
to produce new information, as in the case of unexpected questions. For these reasons, as anticipated 
above, complex questions are more suitable for the application in those cases where details are un-
known and the investigators have no elements to build unexpected questions. 
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4.5 The Detection of Faked Identity with Complex Questions and Mouse 
Dynamics 
The general aim of this experiment is to replicate the paradigm of complex questions to spot people 
who declare false identity information analyzing mouse dynamics instead of RT 
Methods and results that are reported in this section are under review for publication. 
4.5.1 Participants 
Forty participants were recruited, 20 liars and 20 the truth-tellers. The sample consisted of 18 male 
and 22 female, with average age = 23 (SD= 2.1) and average education level = 17 (SD = 1.3).  
4.5.2 Experimental procedure 
The experimental procedure was the same described in section 4.1.2. Twenty participants were asked 
to perform the experimental task responding truthfully, while the other 20 were asked to lie about 
their identity according to the faked information learned from a false ID card. 
4.5.3 Stimuli 
Stimuli presented to participants were the same reported in section 4.4.3. To sum up, each participant 
responded to 60 questions, 20 control, 20 simple and 20 complex. Half questions required a “yes” 
response, and the other half required to respond “no”. The experimental questions were preceded by 
10 training questions (5 requiring a “yes” response and 5 requiring a “no” response) to allow the 
subject to familiarize with the task (data from training questions were not included in the analysis). 
For the complete list of questions and a definition of control, simple and complex question, see par-
agraph 4.4.3.  For more details about the modalities of presentation of the stimuli, see paragraph 3.3.2. 
4.5.4 Collected measures 
During the subjects’ response, mouse dynamics were recorded by MouseTracker software (see sec-
tion 3.3.2 for more details about data collection). In addition to the errors and the spatial-temporal 
features extracted by default by the MouseTracker software (IT, RT, MD, AUC, MD-time, x-flip, y-
flip, see paragraph 3.3.2), we also calculated the minimum, maximum and average velocity and ac-
celeration along the x and y-axis during the response. Finally, for each feature, we calculated the 
average value of the  stimuli, separately for control yes, control no, simple yes, simple no, complex 
yes and complex no sentences. In this way we obtained a final list of 120 predictors. 
4.5.5 Analysis of trajectories 
First, a comparison between liars and truth-tellers’ motor response has been made observing their 
averaged mouse trajectories in control, simple and complex questions (see figure 4.16). It can be 
noticed that the two experimental groups have mostly overlapping trajectories for control and simple 
questions, whereas they differ in complex questions. In such stimuli, truth-tellers show straight tra-
jectories from the origin to the response box. On the contrary, liars show wider trajectories, charac-
terized by a greater AUC and MD. This visual pattern is in line to that obtained by the observation of 
motor trajectories on unexpected questions.  
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Figure 4.16: mouse trajectories for control questions (left figure), expected questions (central figure), and unexpected 
questions (right figure). 
Focusing on complex stimuli, we split the trajectories of questions requiring a “yes” response from 
those requiring a “no” response (see Figure 4.17). The plot reveals that liars are more in trouble in 
responding complex questions requiring a “no” response compared to questions requiring a “yes” 
response. In fact, in the first response stage, they spend more time moving on y-axis, with a very 
erratic route. Then, they deviate toward the chosen response box with a wider curve respect to truth-
tellers (AUC: liars M=0.83, SD=0.71 and truth-tellers M=0.38, SD=0.73; MD: liars M=0.38, 
SD=0.28 and truth-tellers M=0.18, SD=0.29). These observations are in line with the results obtained 
by the experiment 4.4, where we highlighted that liars showed greater RT in responding to complex 
“no” questions compared to complex “yes” questions. 
 
Figure 4.17: mouse trajectories for complex “yes” (left figure) and complex “no” questions (right figure). 
Finally, taking into account only complex questions that required a “no” response, we analyzed the 
position of the mouse along the x and y-axis during the time, in search of time-points of maximum 
difference between truth-tellers and liars trajectories. As shown by Figure 4.18, the two groups had a 
maximum difference in the first half of the trajectory along the y-axis, and in the last part of the 
trajectory along the x-axis. We identified as representative points of maximum separation the time 
frames Y10, Y21 and X75, X80. 
X X X 
Y Y Y 
Y Y 
X X 
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Figure 4.18: the figure reports the points of maximum difference between trajectories of truth-tellers and liars on x and 
y-axis over the time for responses to complex “no” questions. 
In order to do not miss this information, we have considered the points of maximum deviation (Y10, 
Y21, X75, X80) as features for ML models. 
4.5.6 Feature selection 
According to the conclusions drawn from the analysis of trajectories, we decided to reduce the num-
ber of predictors to enter in the feature selection, considering only predictors related to complex “no” 
questions. 
Then, in order to remove redundant and irrelevant features and to select those that improved the 
models accuracy and generalization, a correlation based feature selection was run (for an explanation 
about CFS algorithm see section 3.4.1). A total number of 24 predictors were entered into the corre-
lation analysis. The following features were selected: errors (rpb = 0.43), X75 (rpb = 0.69), minimum 
velocity on x-axis (rpb = 0.36), minimum acceleration on y-axis (rpb = 0.39). In Table 4.47, the corre-
lation matrix between features is reported, as well as the correlation value between the dependent and 
independent variables (rpb). 
 Errors X75 Min v(x) Min a(y) Condition 
Errors 1.00 0.48 0.58 0.47 0.43 
X75 0.48 1.00 0.23 0.32 0.69 
Min v(x) 0.58 0.23 1.00 0.83 0.36 
Min a(y) 0.47 0.32 0.83 1.00 0.39 
Condition 0.43 0.69 0.36 0.39 1.00 
 Table 4.47: the table reports the correlation matrix for the four features that were selected and their correla-
tion value with the dependent variable. It should be remembered that these features are related to the responses to 
complex “no” questions. 
4.5.7 Descriptive statistics 
Feature selection isolated, from the original set of 24 predictors, four independent variables: errors, 
min v(x), min a(y), and X75. Table 4.48 reports the descriptive statistics for these features, as well as 
the analysis of the difference between truth-tellers and liars (t-test, Cohen’s d). 
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Feature Group M (SD) t-test (t, p-value) Cohen’s d 
Errors Liars 0.08 (0.09) 
2.98, < .01 0.94 
 Truth-tellers 0.01 (0.03) 
Min v(x) Liars -0.07 (0.06) 3.02, < .01 0.95 
 Truth-tellers -0.04 (0.04) 
Min a(y) Liars -0.14 (0.06) 2.59, < .05 0.82 
 Truth-tellers -0.09 (0.03) 
X75 Liars 0.35 (0.16) 
5.86, < .01 1.85 
 Truth-tellers 0.63 (0.15) 
Table 4.48: descriptive statistics for errors, min v(x), min a(y), and X75. Mean (M) and standard deviation 
(SD) are reported for the two experimental groups (liars and truth-tellers). The last three columns report statistics 
about the difference between the two groups. In particular, the table shows the results of the independent t-test (t-
value and p-value are reported) and effect-size (Cohen’s d). For the interpretation of Cohen’s d, see paragraph 
3.4.2. 
4.5.8 Machine learning models 
Five ML classifiers (logistic, SVM, Naïve Bayes, random forest and LMT) were trained using a 10-
fold cross-validation procedure(see section 3.4.3). Classification results are reported in Table 4.49. 
Accuracies range from 70% to 90%, with random forest reaching the maximum accuracy (92.5%) 
and Naïve Bayes the minimum performance (72.5%).  
ML classifier 10-fold cross-validation 
 Average accuracy (SD) Precision Recall 
Logistic 80% (19.7) 0.833 0.750 
SVM 85% (12.9) 0.938 0.750 
Naïve Bayes 72.5% (24.9) 0.765 0.650 
Random forest 92.5% (12.1) 0.905 0.950 
LMT 87.5% (13.2) 0.857 0.900 
Table 4.49: the table reports the accuracy obtained by five classifiers in correctly identify fakers and truth-
tellers, in 10-fold cross-validation. The accuracy in training set, using a 10-fold cross-validation, is the average 
accuracy resulting from the 10 folds. The standard deviation (SD) of the 10 folds is also reported. Recall is the 
percentage of liars who are correctly identified and precision represents the fraction of correct liars among those 
identified as liars. 
About the rate of false positive and false negative, the confusion matrix showed that the number of 
liars and truth-tellers misclassified in cross-validation is not equal for all the algorithms. Logistic 
regression failed in detecting three truth-tellers and five liars. SVM was unbalanced toward the false 
negative, as it misclassified five liars and only one truth-teller. Naïve Bayes misclassified four truth-
tellers and seven liars. Random forest failed the classification of one liar and two truth-tellers, whereas 
LMT misclassified two liars and three truth-tellers.  
4.5.9 Countermeasures and alternative efficient models 
As reported in section 4.1.11, mouse tracking permits to collect numerous indices, which a human 
being cannot keep simultaneously under control. Moreover, the broad range of predictors allows 
building alternative classification models. In other words, even if the subject knows in advance which 
indices will be recorded during the test, he cannot know which of them will be used to predict the 
outcome.  
We did not directly tested resistance to countermeasures of this technique, but we have developed 
alternative machine learning models entering subsets of predictors different from that used above. A 
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first new subset of predictors has been selected taking out the four features that are more correlated 
with the dependent variable. These are X75 (rpb = 0.69), X80 (rpb = 0.54), maximum acceleration on 
x-axis (rpb = 0.53) and RT (rpb = 0.49). A second subset of predictors has been chosen considering the 
features related to the amplitude of the trajectories: MD (rpb = 0.33), AUC (rpb = 0.30), MD-time (rpb 
= 0.41). In the third set, we entered only features related to X and Y time frames: X75 (rpb = 0.69), 
X80 (rpb = 0.54), Y10 (rpb = 0.23), Y21 (rpb = 0.27). 
Results obtained in the 10-fold cross-validation using this three new set of predictors are reported in 
Table 4.50. 
Predictors ML classifier 
Training set  
(10-fold cross-validation) 
  Average accuracy (SD) Precision Recall 
X75, X80, 
Max a(x), RT 
Logistic 82.5% (20.6) 0.842 0.800 
SVM 82.5% (20.6) 0.882 0.750 
Naïve Bayes 80% (19.7) 0.833 0.750 
Random forest 90% (12.9) 0.864 0.950 
LMT 85% (12.9) 0.850 0.850 
     
MD, AUC, 
MD-time 
Logistic 77.5% (21.9) 0.700 0.757 
 SVM 72.5% (24.9) 0.800 0.600 
 Naïve Bayes 77.5% (21.9) 0.824 0.700 
 Random forest 72.5% (14.2) 0.714 0.750 
 LMT 80% (15.8) 0.833 0.750 
     
X75, X80, 
Y10, Y21 
Logistic 82.5% (16.9) 0.882 0.750 
 SVM 77.5% (18.4) 0.867 0.650 
 Naïve Bayes 75% (20.4) 0.857 0.600 
 Random forest 90% (12.9) 0.864 0.950 
 LMT 80% (15.8) 0.833 0.750 
Table 4.50: the table reports the accuracy obtained by five classifiers in correctly identify liars and truth-tell-
ers, in 10-fold cross-validation, using different set of predictors. The accuracy in training set, using a 10-fold 
cross-validation, is the average accuracy resulting from the 10 folds. The standard deviation (SD) of the 10 folds 
is also reported. Recall is the percentage of liars who are correctly identified and precision represents the fraction 
of correct liars among those identified as liars. 
4.5.10 Discussion 
In this experiment, we replicated the experimental procedure reported in section 4.1, using complex 
questions instead of unexpected questions to increase liars’ cognitive load. Results indicated that 
complex questions are efficient in discriminating liars and truth-tellers, with a slightly lower accuracy 
comparing to unexpected questions. In fact, using an equal number of participants as training sample 
and running the same classification algorithms, we have obtained accuracies ranging from 90% to 
70% in the 10-fold cross-validation, whereas the accuracies that were reported in section 4.1.8 range 
from 90% to 95%. Although, an accuracy around 90% is not suitable for applications in the field of 
justice, it may be enough for screening applications (e.g., the detection of online deception). 
An interesting result concerns the evidence that liars and truth-tellers differ in mouse dynamics pa-
rameters only for complex questions that required a “no” response, or rather for complex questions 
that contain at least one information that is incoherent with the lie they told. In other words, liars need 
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greater cognitive resources to identify one or more discrepancies with the lie they told, whereas they 
are skilled like truth-tellers in confirming their lie. Probably, it may be because the verification pro-
cess [187] (the careful monitoring of the congruence between the various information provided during 
the production of the lie) is cognitively heavier for negative responses. This result has been confirmed 
also by the experiment reported in section 4.4, where liars showed higher RT than truth-tellers in 
complex “no” questions.  
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4.6 The Detection of False Autobiographical Events with Complex Ques-
tions and Mouse Dynamics 
The aim of this experiment is to verify whether the technique of complex questions and mouse dy-
namics is generalizable to other topic, different from deception about identity. In particular, in this 
experiment we have applied complex questions and mouse dynamics recording to detect people who 
reported false autobiographical events. To test subjects on comparable autobiographical events, we 
have chosen the last holiday of each participant as target event [109]. For a person, recalling a holiday 
is not so much different from telling his alibi during a criminal investigation or reviewing on Yelp 
his experience at the restaurant.  
When a subject decides to lie, he fabricates a completely invented experience or he inserts false details 
into a story with a kernel of truth. For this reason, we ran two different experiments collecting two 
different groups of liars. The first group was asked to learn a completely faked holiday, that was 
created by the experimenter for them and then, they were instructed to complete the experimental 
task pretending to have experienced this holiday. Liars in the second group were asked to narrate their 
last holiday, which was changed in some details (e.g., the name of the friends they were on vacation) 
by the experimenter and finally sent back to them. The subjects’ task was to learn their modified 
autobiographical experience as they would have been tested about it during the experimental task.  
4.6.1 Participants 
A first sample of sixty participants was recruited and data were used as training set to build ML 
models. Twenty participants were assigned to the truth-teller condition, twenty were liars with a to-
tally invented holiday (liars A) and the other twenty were liars telling an actual holiday with faked 
details (liars B). The demographic characteristics of the sample are reported in Table 4.51.  
Then, a second sample of 30 participants (10 truth-tellers, 10 liars A and 10 liars B) was collected 
and used as test set to assess the models generalization. Demographic information about participants 
are in Table 4.51.  
Sample Condition N Gender Age Education 
Training set Truth-tellers 20 M = 8, F= 12 M = 22, SD = 2.3 M = 16, SD = 1.8 
 Liars A 20 M = 7, F= 13 M = 22, SD = 1.6 M = 16, SD = 1.4 
 Liars B 20 M = 10, F= 10 M = 23, SD = 2.4 M = 17, SD = 1.8 
Test set Truth-tellers 10 M = 6, F= 4 M = 22, SD = 2.6 M = 16, SD = 1.9 
 Liars A 10 M = 2, F= 8 M = 20, SD = 2.1 M = 15, SD = 1.8 
 Liars B 10 M = 4, F= 6 M = 22, SD = 3.1 M = 16, SD = 2.2 
Table 4.31: demographic information about training and test set. In the second column (N) the number of participants 
for each sample is reported. The third column shows the number of male and female in each sample. The fourth and the 
fifth columns report mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) of participants’ age and education. 
4.6.2 Experimental procedure 
Participants assigned to truth-tellers’ group were contacted the day before the experiment and 
were asked to provide a holiday experience (min 2 days, maximum 7 days) happened in the last year, 
or a year and half at most. They received an outline that they had to fill with details regarding their 
vacation: where they went, how they travelled, when they left, how long they stayed there, with whom 
they went, how was the weather like and, like a travelogue, what they did on a daily basis. Figure 
Experiments 
92 
4.19 represents the outline that truth-tellers were asked to compile with the details of their vacation 
and provide to the experimenter. Participants were suggested to omit details if unable to remember 
them. Furthermore, they were suggested to help themselves with tools such as photographs, videos, 
real witnesses just to be sure that what they were saying was correct. According to the information 
that they provided, the experimenter created the stimuli for the computerized task. The day after, 
truth-teller participants were invited to the lab to complete the experiment. First, they were asked to 
recall twice their vacation. The examiner verified the correctness of the information and rectified any 
errors. All participants have recalled the holiday information correctly within the second recall. Be-
tween the two recalls, they were required to perform some mental arithmetic as distracting task. Fi-
nally, they were instructed to complete the experimental task, responding to any questions according 
to their vacation experience.  
Participants assigned to liar A condition were contacted the day before the experiment and were asked 
to learn a faked holiday experience created by the experimenter. We told them that the day after they 
would be tested about what they had learnt. The faked holiday consisted of the same details mentioned 
above for truth-tellers: where, how, when, how long, with whom, how was the weather like, daily 
activities (see Figure 4.19). An example of holiday created for the experiment and sent to liars A for 
learning is reported in Figure 4.20. The day after, participants were invited to the lab to complete the 
experiment. First, they were asked to repeat twice the assigned holiday experience, explaining it in 
first person and pretending it had really happened. The examiner verified the correctness of the infor-
mation and rectified any errors. All participants have recalled the holiday information correctly within 
the second recall. Between the two recalls, they were required to perform some mental arithmetic as 
distracting task. Finally, they were instructed to complete the experimental task, responding to any 
questions pretending to have done the vacation experience previously learned.  
Participants assigned to liar B group were contacted the day before the experiment and, similar to 
truth-tellers, were asked to provide a holiday experience (min 2 days, maximum 7 days) happened in 
the last year, or a year and half at most. They received the same outline of truth-tellers (see Figure 
4.19) that they had to fill with details regarding their vacation: where they went, how they travelled, 
when they left, how long they stayed there, with whom they went, how was the weather like and, like 
a travelogue, what they did on a daily basis. Once filled the form, all test takers had to send it back. 
According to the information that they provided, the experimenter created the stimuli for the comput-
erized task. In particular, starting from the real vacation experience of each participant, some holiday 
details were modified, following this scheme: 
 Keep the destination. 
 Alter the length of the stay. 
 Alter the place where they stayed. 
 Alter the names of companion/companions. 
 Alter the atmospheric conditions: main importance was given to the rain. In case it had really 
rained during the real holiday experience, the day it happened was switched. Otherwise, if it 
hadn’t rained at all, a rainy day was inserted in the program. 
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 Alter the order of activities: they were inverted, so if something had happened on day 2, this was 
changed to day 4 and vice versa. 
 Insert brand new activities and omit some that really happened. 
 
Figure 4.19: the Figure shows the outline table that truth-teller participants were asked to fill with the information 
related to their last holiday. It contains the following details about the holiday: where they went, how they trav-
elled, when they left, how long they stayed there, with whom they went, how was the weather like and what 
they did on a daily basis. 
After this procedure, the vacation outline with the modified information was sent back to the partici-
pant, who were requested to memorize the new faked details of his actual holiday. We told him that 
the day after he would be tested about what he had learnt. The day after, participants were invited to 
the lab to complete the experiment. First, they were asked to repeat twice the modified holiday expe-
rience, pretending that all details are true. The examiner verified the correctness of the information 
and rectified any errors. All participants have recalled the holiday information correctly within the 
second recall. Between the two recalls, they were required to perform some mental arithmetic as 
distracting task. Finally, they were instructed to complete the experimental task, responding to any 
questions pretending to have done the vacation experience as previously learned.  
Experiments 
94 
 
Figure 4.20: an example of faked holiday that liars were asked to learn. It contains the following details: where they 
went, how they travelled, when they left, how long they stayed there, with whom they went, how was the 
weather like and what they did on a daily basis. 
The experimental task was computerized and consisted in responding 60 yes/no questions clicking 
with the mouse on one of the two alternative response labels. For more details about the modalities 
of presentation of the stimuli, see paragraph 3.3.2. 
4.6.3 Stimuli 
A total number of 60 questions were presented to each subject. Thirty sentences required a “yes” 
response, and 30 required to respond “no”. Questions were the same for both liars (A and B) and 
truth-tellers. The 60 experimental questions were preceded by 6 training questions (3 requiring a 
“yes” response and 3 requiring a “no” response). Questions included in the experimental task be-
longed to the following categories: 
 20 control questions. Control questions were sentences to which both truth-tellers and liars had 
to respond truthfully. These sentences were unrelated to holiday and referred to the experimental 
condition. Half of the control sentences required a “yes” response (e.g., “I am sitting in front of a 
computer”) and half a “no” response (e.g., “I am climbing a mountain”). Both liars and truth 
tellers were required to respond truthfully to all control questions. 
 20 simple questions. Simple questions were related to the holiday. Truth-tellers responded were 
asked to respond according to their real holiday, whereas liars A and B responded according to 
the faked holiday previously learned. Half of the simple sentences required to respond “yes” (e.g., 
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“I was in France”) and the others required a “no” response (e.g., “I was in Japan”). For liars, a 
“yes” response corresponded to a lie.  
 20 complex questions. Complex questions were sentences that included two or three information 
about the holiday (e.g., “In October I was in France with my boyfriend”). Participants were in-
structed to respond “yes” when all of the information in the sentence was true according to the 
holiday, whereas they responded “no” when at least one of the information included in the sen-
tence was false. In other words, participants had to respond “yes” when the entire sentence was 
true, and “no” when there was one or more pieces of false information in the sentence. Complex 
sentences could be composed by two or three holiday information. The false information was 
always in the last place, to avoid that subjects would not complete to read the phrase. An example 
of questions is reported in Table 4.52. 
To sum up, both liars and truth-tellers responded to 30 control, simple and complex questions that 
required to respond “yes” and to 30 control, simple and complex questions that required “no” re-
sponses. Control, simple and complex questions were presented randomly and intermixed. For more 
details about the modalities of presentation of the stimuli, see paragraph 3.3.1. 
It should be noted that liars told lies only in the simple “yes” and complex “yes” responses. In fact, 
for the liars, the simple and complex questions regarding their faked holiday were actually “no” re-
sponses that, because they were lying, required “yes” responses. In all of other questions (control 
“yes”, control “no”, simple “no”, complex “no”), both liars and truth-tellers responded truthfully. 
4.6.4 Collected measures 
During the subjects’ response, mouse dynamics were recorded by MouseTracker software. For more 
details about data collection, see section 3.3.2.  
In addition to the errors and the spatial-temporal features extracted by default by the MouseTracker 
software (IT, RT, MD, AUC, MD-time, x-flip, y-flip, see paragraph 3.3.2), we calculated the mini-
mum, maximum and average velocity and acceleration along the x and y-axis during the response.  
For each feature, we calculated the average and the standard deviation value of all the stimuli and, 
then, separately for control, simple, complex sentences and control yes, control no, simple yes, simple 
no, complex yes and complex no sentences.  
We also analyzed the position of the mouse along the x and y-axis in search of points of maximum 
difference between the trajectories of liars and truth-tellers. Comparing truth-tellers and liars A, we 
identified X75 and Y30 as the points of maximum deviation, respectively on x and y-axis. On the 
other hand, comparing truth-tellers and liars B, the point of maximum deviation resulted to be X75 
and Y45. Finally, we computed the average value of these points for control, simple and complex 
questions. 
In this way, we obtained a final list of 326 predictors. The complete list of predictors is reported in 
Annex 4. 
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Type of question 
Question that requires “yes” response by 
both liars and truth-tellers 
Question that requires “no” response by 
both liars and truth-tellers 
Control I’m in front of a computer I’m climbing a mountain  
 I’m in front of a monitor I’m in the mountain to climb 
 I’m using a computer I’m on an airplane  
 I’m answering with the mouse I’m sitting on a plane 
 I’m sitting on a chair I’m on a beach 
 In this moment I’m sit I’m sunbathing 
 I’m doing a test of psychology I’m eating in a restaurant 
 I’m doing a test I’m having a lunch in a restaurant 
 I’m reading some sentences I’m playing football 
 I’m answering to some sentences I’m having a football play 
Simple I went to Antwerp I went to Frankfurt 
 In November I did an holiday In December I did an holiday 
 I went by airplane I went by train 
 I stayed in an hostel I stayed in an hotel 
 I saw the Aan de Stroom museum I saw the A plan de corones museum 
 I stayed there 3 days I stayed there 5 days 
 We left in four We left in six 
 The public transport were closed for attacks The public transport were closed for attacks 
 The first day it rained the second one no The second day it rained the first one no 
 I saw a really beautiful mosaic I saw an art contemporary museum 
Complex I went to Antwerp with three friends in Novem-
ber 
I stayed at Antwerp with two friends in No-
vember 
 At Antwerp I saw the Aan de Stroom museum In Brussels I saw the Aan de Stroom museum 
 The first day it rained and after eating we have 
a walk 
The first day we saw the Aan de Stroom mu-
seum 
 Sabrina and I went to sleep in an hostel far 
away from Francesca’s house 
Sabrina and Alessandra went to sleep to 
Francesca’s house in Brussels 
 The second day in Antwerp we saw the Aan de 
Stroom museum 
The first day in Brussels we saw the Aan de 
Stroom museum 
 In November I visited less Brussels for terrorist 
attacks 
In November I visited a few Antwerp for at-
tacks  
 With my friends the second day we saw the 
Saint Anne tunnel 
With plane we went 5 days to Brussels 
 By plane I stayed three days at Antwerp-Brus-
sels 
With a friend the third day we saw the Saint 
Anne tunnel 
 The first day we walked the second we saw a 
museum 
The first day we walked and the third we vis-
ited a museum 
 At Antwerp the second day we saw the Saint 
Anne tunnel 
In Brussels the first day I saw the Saint Anne      
tunnel 
Table 4.52: the table reports an example of the 60 control, simple and complex questions presented to participants and 
related to a truth or faked holiday. Information about holiday in complex questions are underlined. In bold the false hol-
iday information according to which participants had to respond “no”. 
4.6.5 Analysis of trajectories 
A visual analysis was conducted to compare the truth-tellers’ mouse trajectories with liars A and liars 
B motor response. Trajectories were plotted separately for control, simple and complex questions (see 
figure 4.21). Comparing truth-tellers and liars A, it can be seen that the two experimental groups have 
mostly overlapping trajectories for control questions, whereas they differ in simple and complex ques-
tions. In these questions, truth-tellers show straight trajectories from the origin to the response box, 
whereas liars show wider trajectories, characterized by a greater AUC and MD. The same observa-
tions can be drawn matching truth-tellers and liars B trajectories, though a little difference in curves 
of the two groups can be noticed in control questions as well.  
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Finally, we plotted separately questions that required “yes” responses and questions requiring “no” 
responses. Figures are reported in Annex 5. In brief, liars A show the same response pattern that we 
found in the previous experiment about identity deception: they are more in trouble in responding to 
“no” questions respect to “yes” questions. This effect is evident both in simple and complex questions. 
On the other hand, liars B show very wide trajectories in simple and complex questions requiring 
both “yes” and “no” responses. 
In conclusion, the visual pattern that we observed is in line to that obtained in the previous experiment 
(see sections 4.5), but the effect of deception on motor response seems to extend also to simple ques-
tions. Once again, it seems that liar participants had more difficulty in responding “no” to simple and 
complex questions respect to responding “yes”. 
 
Figure 4.21: mouse trajectories for control questions (left figure), simple questions (central figure), and complex ques-
tions (right figure). The first figure compares trajectory of truth-tellers (in green) and liars A (in red). The second figure 
compares trajectories of truth-tellers and liars B (in orange).  
4.6.6 Feature selection 
In order to remove redundant and irrelevant features and to select those that improved the models 
accuracy and generalization, a correlation based feature selection was run (for an explanation about 
CFS algorithm see section 3.4.1).  
We decided to enter in CFS algorithm all the predictors, as the visual analysis has highlighted differ-
ences between groups both in simple and complex questions, and also in control questions for truth-
tellers compare with liars B.  
Y 
Y Y Y 
Y Y 
X 
X X X 
X X 
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Two separate features selection were performed, the first one pairing truth-tellers and liars A, and the 
second pairing truth-tellers and liars B. Tables 4.53 and 4.54 report the list of the features selected 
and the correlation value with the dependent variable (rpb). 
Feature Group M (SD) rpb 
Simple_average_vel(x) Liars A 0.007 (0.001) 
0.70 
 Truth-tellers 0.008 (0.0003) 
Simple_NO_average_vel(x) Liars A 0.006 (0.001) 
0.69 
 Truth-tellers 0.008 (0.0005) 
All questions_average_vel(x) Liars A 0.007 (0.0003) 
0.65 
 Truth-tellers 0.008 (0.0003) 
Simple_X75 Liars A 0.495 (0.151) 
0.57 
 Truth-tellers 0.676 (0.102) 
Simple_NO_min_vel(x) Liars A -0.046 (0.039) 
0.49 
 Truth-tellers -0.013 (0.016) 
Complex_average_MD-time Liars A 2285.50 (424.92) 
0.46 
 Truth-tellers 1898.47 (308.22) 
Simple_min_vel(x) Liars A -0.020 (0.019) 
0.44 
 Truth-tellers -0.006 (0.006) 
Complex_NO_min_vel(x) Liars A -0.032 (0.026) 
0.44 
 Truth-tellers -0.014 (0.009) 
Complex_NO_average_RT Liars A 3486.20 (661.52) 
0.43 
 Truth-tellers 2888.57 (627.48) 
All questions_min_vel(x) Liars A -0.008 (0.006) 
0.42 
 Truth-tellers -0.003 (0.002) 
Complex_X75 Liars A 0.264 (0.202) 
0.42 
 Truth-tellers 0.431 (0.152) 
Simple_NO_average_RT Liars A 2696.61 (808.56) 
0.41 
 Truth-tellers 2107.32 (473.58) 
Simple_sd_acc(y) Liars A 0.006 (0.003) 
0.39 
 Truth-tellers 0.004 (0.001) 
Simple_average_MD-time Liars A 1457.95 (366.23) 
0.33 
 Truth-tellers 1240.20 (249.40) 
Table 4.53: the table reports the features that were selected and their correlation value (rpb) with the depend-
ent variable, taking into account truth-tellers and liars A. In addition, Mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) are 
reported for the two experimental groups (liars and truth-tellers). 
4.6.7 Descriptive statistics 
Tables 4.53 and 4.54 report average and the standard deviation of each selected feature, for the three 
experimental groups (truth-tellers, liars A and liars B). The correlation between each predictor and 
the dependent variable is reported as well. 
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Feature Group M (SD) rpb 
Simple_average_vel(x) Liars B 0.007 (0.0008) 
0.54 
 Truth-tellers 0.008 (0.0003) 
Complex_NO_average_MD Liars B 0.442 (0.228) 
0.52 
 Truth-tellers 0.208 (0.166) 
Simple_sd_vel(y) Liars B 0.014 (0.003) 
0.50 
 Truth-tellers 0.018 (0.004) 
Complex_NO_average_y-flip Liars B 7.51 (1.94) 
0.50 
 Truth-tellers 5.46 (1.65) 
All questions_average_vel(x) Liars B 0.007 (0.0004) 
0.49 
 Truth-tellers 0.008 (0.0003) 
All questions_min_vel(x) Liars B -0.007 (0.004) 
0.47 
 Truth-tellers -0.003 (0.002) 
All questions_sd_vel(x) Liars B 0.011 (0.001) 
0.46 
 Truth-tellers 0.013 (0.002) 
Simple_X75 Liars B 0.527 (0.175) 
0.46 
 Truth-tellers 0.676 (0.103) 
Complex_sd_AUC Liars B 1.070 (0.328) 
0.45 
 Truth-tellers 0.79 (0.453) 
Simple_NO_average_IT Liars B 337.37 (204.46) 
0.43 
 Truth-tellers 551.22 (234.38) 
Complex_average_MD-time Liars B 2267.04 (447.45) 
0.43 
 Truth-tellers 1902.25 (303.53) 
Complex_X75 Liars B 0.305 (0.126) 
0.42 
 Truth-tellers 0.431 (0.153) 
Control_YES_average_y-flip Liars B 7.45 1.66) 
0.41 
 Truth-tellers 6.21 (1.06) 
Complex_average_x-flip Liars B 8.67 (2.50) 
0.40 
 Truth-tellers 6.59 (2.28) 
Control_average_y-flip Liars B 7.31 (1.42) 
0.38 
 Truth-tellers 6.26 (1.09) 
Control_NO_average_RT Liars B 1947.31 (234.67) 
0.38 
 Truth-tellers 1739.57 (264.82) 
Simple_YES_average_y-flip Liars B 7.34 (1.88) 
0.38 
 Truth-tellers 6.16 (0.86) 
All questions_max_acc(x) Liars B 0.019 (0.013) 
0.37 
 Truth-tellers 0.011 (0.005) 
All questions_average_error Liars B 0.05 (0.04) 
0.37 
 Truth-tellers 0.02 (0.03) 
Simple_YES_max_vel(y) Liars B 0.06 (0.02) 
0.37 
 Truth-tellers 0.08 (0.01) 
Complex_YES_ds_AUC Liars B 0.944 (0.523) 
0.37 
 Truth-tellers 0.547 (0.49) 
Simple_NO_sd_MD Liars B 0.408 (0.14) 
0.34 
 Truth-tellers 0.289 (0.186) 
Simple_NO_sd_y-flip Liars B 3.54 (0.89) 
0.33 
 Truth-tellers 2.84 (1.06) 
Control_sd_vel(y) Liars B 0.016 (0.005) 
0.31 
 Truth-tellers 0.018 (0.003) 
All questions_sd_acc(y) Liars B 0.005 (0.005) 
0.24 
 Truth-tellers 0.003 (0.001) 
Table 4.54: the table reports the features that were selected and their correlation value (rpb) with the depend-
ent variable, taking into account truth-tellers and liars B. In addition, Mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) are 
reported for the two experimental groups (liars and truth-tellers). 
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4.6.8 Machine learning models 
The selected features were used to train different ML classifiers (logistic regression, SVM, LMT, 
random forest). We trained separate model for truth-tellers vs liars A and truth-tellers vs liars B. 
Models were evaluated following a 10-fold cross-validation procedure, as described in paragraph 
3.4.3. Then, we tested the generalization of the models performance on the new set of 20 participants 
(see section 4.1.1).  Results obtained are reported in Table 4.55 and Table 4.56. Comparing truth-
tellers with liars A, accuracies ranged from 75% to 87.5% in 10-fold cross-validation and from 65% 
to 85% in the test set. As regards the classification of liars B, classification accuracies ranged from 
80% to 87.5% in 10-fold cross-validation and from 75% to 80% in the test set..  
ML classifier 
Training set  - truth-tellers vs liars A 
(10-fold cross-validation) 
Test set - truth-tellers vs liars A 
 Average accuracy (SD) Precision Recall Accuracy Precision Recall 
Logistic 75% (15.8) 0.813 0.650 80% 0.750 0.900 
SVM 77.5% (17.5) 0.923 0.600 65% 0.667 0.600 
Naïve Bayes 87.5% (17.5) 0.895 0.850 75% 0.669 0.900 
Random forest 82.5% (12.1) 0.842 0.800 85% 0.889 0.800 
LMT 77.5% (12.1) 0.789 0.750 70% 0.833 0.500 
Table 4.55: the table reports the accuracy obtained by five classifiers in correctly identify liars A and truth-
tellers, in training and test set. The accuracy in training set, using a 10-fold cross-validation, is the average accu-
racy resulting from the 10 folds. The standard deviation (SD) of the 10 folds is also reported. Recall is the per-
centage of liars who are correctly identified and precision represents the fraction of correct liars among those 
identified as liars. 
ML classifier 
Training set  - truth-tellers vs liars B 
(10-fold cross-validation) 
Test set - truth-tellers vs liars B 
 Average accuracy (SD) Precision Recall Accuracy Precision Recall 
Logistic 82.5% (15.8) 0.783 0.900 75% 0.778 0.700 
SVM 85% (17.5) 0.850 0.850 80% 0.800 0.800 
Naïve Bayes 87.5% (17.5) 0.941 0.800 75% 0.778 0.700 
Random forest 87.5% (12.1) 0.857 0.900 80% 0.800 0.800 
LMT 80% (12.1) 0.800 0.800 75% 0.692 0.900 
Table 4.56: the table reports the accuracy obtained by five classifiers in correctly identify liars B and truth-
tellers, in training and test set. The accuracy in training set, using a 10-fold cross-validation, is the average accu-
racy resulting from the 10 folds. The standard deviation (SD) of the 10 folds is also reported. Recall is the per-
centage of liars who are correctly identified and precision represents the fraction of correct liars among those 
identified as liars. 
About the rate of false positive and false negative, the confusion matrix showed that the number of 
liars and truth-tellers misclassified in cross-validation and test set are not equal for all the algorithms. 
So, there is not a general unbalancement of the classification error to one or the other class, but each 
classifier has peculiar displacement. 
4.6.9 Discussion 
This experiment demonstrated that the technique of complex questions along with mouse dynamic 
recording is efficient in detecting liars not only on identity but also on autobiographical events. In 
other words, it has been shown that the use of this technique may be extended to different topic. 
Accuracies are very similar to those obtained in the previous experiment (see paragraph 4.5.8), which 
was aimed to detect deception about identity. This is true especially for the classification of truth-
tellers B, whereas liars A were identify with lower accuracy. 
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It is important to notice that liars B are better detectable than liars A. It means that it is simpler to 
recall a completely invented lie than a partial lie. I may be assumed that in the second case (liars B) 
the true elements of the memory interpose with the fabricated details and the subject need more cog-
nitive resources to monitor the coherence of the recall. 
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4.7 Can mouse dynamics and complex questions generalize from a topic 
to another? 
The final step of this work is to verify whether it is possible to build lie detection model based on 
mouse dynamics, which is independent from the topic of the deception. In other words, the aim of the 
following experiment is to prove that the models that we built, using data from complex questions 
and mouse dynamics, can generalize their performance from a topic to another. 
To argue this point, we re-run fine classification algorithms (logistic regression, SVM, Naïve Bayes, 
random forest and LMT) using the data of the experiment in section 4.5 as training set and the data 
of the experiment in section 4.6 as test set, and vice versa. In other words, we classified subjects lying 
on holidays using the model built by subjects lying on identity and, then we sorted subjects lying on 
identity using the model built by subjects lying on holidays. 
It is worth recalling that in the experiment that was described in section 4.5, twenty participants lied 
about their identity and twenty participants responded to questions according to their true identity. In 
the experiment that was reported in section 4.6, the training set consisted of twenty participant that 
told an actual holiday, twenty participants that responded to questions according to a totally faked 
holiday (liars A) and other 30 participants that lied only on some vacation details (liars B). We chose 
to focus our attention on liars B, which are the most detectable. 
To sum up, in the following experiment training and test sets consisted of 40 participants that lied 
about identity and 40 participants that lied about vacation details. Participants were asked to respond 
questions about their identity or about their last vacation clicking with the mouse on the response 
button. Questions were of three different type: control, simple and complex, and required to respond 
“yes” or “no”. Mouse dynamics were recorded. 
The key point of this step should be to identify the transverse indices of falsehood that remain constant 
in the different experiments. Summarizing the observation that emerged from the previous experi-
ments, we can state that: 
1) Generally, liars were more in trouble in responding to complex questions that required a “no” 
response. It was confirmed by experiments in section 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6. 
2) In both the experiments collecting mouse dynamics (section 4.5 and 4.6), visual analysis re-
vealed that in complex “no” questions liars draw with the mouse wider trajectories (greater 
MD and AUC) than truth-tellers. 
3) In both the experiments recording mouse dynamics (section 4.5 and 4.6), X75 was the point 
of maximum separation between liars and truth-tellers on x-axis during the response. 
4) Finally, experiment reported in section 4.4, as well as the experiments in sections 4.5 and 4.6, 
highlighted the importance of RT and errors in distinguishing the two groups. In fact, liars 
seems to be slower in their response and make more errors, especially in complex “no” ques-
tions. 
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In view of the above, we have identified a set of features that characterize the liar’s general trend of 
response: number of errors, RT, MD-time, average velocity on x-axis, MD, AUC, X75. Then, these 
features were entered in ML classifiers. 
4.7.1 Detection of liars about autobiographical events using a 
model about identity 
Here we predict the deception about an autobiographical event (holiday) using a model trained on 
participants who lied about identity. 
The models were trained feeding the features mentioned above as input to classifiers: number of 
errors (rpb = 0.44), RT (rpb = 0.49), MD-time (rpb = 0.41), average velocity on x-axis (rpb = 0.44), MD 
(rpb = 0.34), AUC (rpb = 0.30), X75 (rpb = 0.69). Then, models were tested on the same features 
extracted from the sample of participants lying about holidays. Results are reported in Table 4.57. 
ML classifier 
Training set – deception about identity 
(10-fold cross-validation) 
Test set – deception about holiday 
 
 Average accuracy (SD) Precision Recall Accuracy Precision Recall 
Logistic 75% (16.7) 0.727 0.800 62.5% 0.692 0.450 
SVM 77.5% (21.9) 0.730 0.850 70% 1.000 0.400 
Naïve Bayes 67.5% (12.1) 0.652 0.750 62.5% 0.7271 0.400 
Random forest 92.5% (16.9) 0.947 0.900 65% 0.875 0.350 
LMT 80% (15.9) 0.800 0.800 67.5% 0.818 0.450 
Table 4.57: the table reports the accuracy obtained by five classifiers in correctly identify liars and truth-tell-
ers, in 10-fold cross-validation and test set using. The training set consisted of 40 participants lying about iden-
tity and the test set consisted of 40 participants that lied about holiday. The accuracy in training set, using a 10-
fold cross-validation, is the average accuracy resulting from the 10 folds. The standard deviation (SD) of the 10 
folds is also reported. Recall is the percentage of liars who are correctly identified and precision represents the 
fraction of correct liars among those identified as liars. 
4.7.2 Detection of liars about identity using a model about auto-
biographical events 
Here we predict the deception about identity using a model trained on participants who lied about an 
autobiographical event (holiday). 
The models were trained feeding the features mentioned above as input to classifiers: number of 
errors (rpb = 0.30), RT (rpb = 0.43), MD-time (rpb = 0.43), average velocity on x-axis (rpb = 0.31), MD 
(rpb = 0.52), AUC (rpb = 0.46), X75 (rpb = 0.30). Then, models were tested on the same features 
extracted from the sample of participants lying about identity. Results are reported in Table 4.58. 
ML classifier 
Training set – deception about holiday 
(10-fold cross-validation) 
Test set – deception about identity 
 
 Average accuracy (SD) Precision Recall Accuracy Precision Recall 
Logistic 72.5% (27.5) 0.737 0.700 65% 0.600 0.900 
SVM 75% (23.6) 0.708 0.850 67.5% 0.621 0.900 
Naïve Bayes 70% (23.0) 0.667 0.800 75% 0.692 0.900 
Random forest 57.5% (26.5) 0.588 0.500 70% 0.643 0.900 
LMT 77.5% (18.4) 0.762 0.800 70% 0.643 0.900 
Table 4.58: the table reports the accuracy obtained by five classifiers in correctly identify liars and truth-tell-
ers, in 10-fold cross-validation and test set using. The training set consisted of 40 participants lying about holi-
day and the test set consisted of 40 participants that lied about identity. The accuracy in training set, using a 10-
fold cross-validation, is the average accuracy resulting from the 10 folds. The standard deviation (SD) of the 10 
Experiments 
104 
folds is also reported. Recall is the percentage of liars who are correctly identified and precision represents the 
fraction of correct liars among those identified as liars. 
4.7.3 Discussion 
This experiment was aimed to demonstrate whether a classification model, which was trained on a 
sample of liars who responded to complex questions using mouse, could generalized from a deception 
topic to another. Classification accuracies on test sets were higher than chance level (see paragraph 
4.7.1 and 4.7.2), even though they did not exceed the 75%. The models that we trained on participants 
who lied about the holiday seem to be slightly more accurate in generalization than the models that 
were trained on participants lying on identity. To conclude, results are not amazing but demonstrated 
that more effort should be placed on the study of the subject’s response when lying about different 
topic. One future direction should be the creation of a model that could be apply in a large number of 
cheating context, ranging from lies about identity in the real or online environment to security, foren-
sic, or commercial applications.  
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 Conclusion 
In this work, a series of proof of concept studies about lie detection via human-computer interaction 
have been presented. The experiments differ from each other for two main elements: the strategy that 
has been used to increase liars’ cognitive load and the tool through which the participant interacted 
with the computer during the task. In particular, we applied two cognitive load strategies to bring out 
the liars’ response distinctive features: the unexpected questions [146] and the complex questions 
[188]. Unexpected questions are questions to which participants were not explicitly trained to lie, 
whereas complex questions put together in the same sentence many information, each of which could 
be true or false. As regards the tools of user-pc interaction, three kind of measures were collected: RT 
on keyboard [151], keystroke dynamics [189] and mouse dynamics [121]. The experimental design 
was the same for all the experiment: we tested two independent groups, a group of liars and a group 
of truth-tellers, with the same experimental paradigm. Truth-tellers were asked to respond truthfully 
to all questions, whereas liars were instructed to lie on questions related to a specific topic according 
to some fake information previously learned. We have chosen to focus on identity as topic of decep-
tion for different reasons. First, the deception about identity is one of the most popular issue in the 
current historical and cultural frame, especially in the online environment [15]. Secondly, the use of 
one single topic has allowed to easily comparing the results obtained by different experimental para-
digms. Then, to investigate the generalization of the techniques, a second topic, that is the deception 
about an autobiographical events, has been tested. Finally, for each experiment, we analyzed the data 
collected and, through machine learning algorithms, we developed classification models, which were 
trained to distinguished liars from truth-tellers. Experiments led to interesting results, which are sum-
marized in the following section. 
5.1 Main Results 
The achieved results from the experiments can be summarized as follows: 
 on the same topic (identity) the three techniques (RT, keystroke dynamics, mouse dynamics) give 
similar results in terms of accuracy. In fact, they classified subjects as liars or truth-tellers with 
maximum accuracies ranging from 92.5% to 97.5% (see Table 4.59). Mouse dynamics is the 
technique that reached the lower accuracy (92.5%-95%), followed by RT (95%-97.5%) and key-
stroke dynamics (97%).  
 On the same topic (identity), unexpected questions are slightly more effective than complex ques-
tions to increase liars’ cognitive load and stand out the distinctive features of the deceptive re-
sponse (see Table 4.59). In fact, the maximum accuracies reached in the experiments using unex-
pected questions ranged from 97.5% to 95%, whereas using complex questions we reached max-
imum accuracies from 92.5% to 95%. 
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 The paradigm using complex questions together with mouse dynamics can be successfully gen-
eralize to other topic of deception, different from identity (e.g., autobiographical events, such as 
holidays), even if with a slightly weaker accuracy. In fact, maximum accuracy obtained by mouse 
dynamics and unexpected questions in spotting faked identities was of 92.5%, whereas faked 
holidays were detect with a maximum accuracy of 87.5%. 
In Table 4.59, an overview of the best results obtained in each experiment is reported. Further con-
siderations are the following: 
 there are not classifiers better then others. In fact, all the classifiers gave very similar results within 
each experiment, and the classifier leading the best accuracy changed from an experiment to an-
other. In other words, on these data all the algorithms are equivalent in terms of performance.   
 This means that there are different classification logic that may be apply to distinguish liars from 
truth-tellers, and our results are independent from the algorithm that we used to build the classi-
fication model. In other words, results are very stable. 
Deception topic  Identity Holidays 
Cognitive strategy  Unexpected Complex Complex 
Collected 
measures  
Mouse  
dynamics 
Best accuracy 
in 10-fold 
cross-validation 
 
95.00% 92.50% 87.50% 
Best classifier  Logistic Random forest Naïve Bayes 
RT 
Best accuracy 
in 10-fold 
cross-validation 
 
97.50% 95.00%   
Best classifier  Random forest SVM / LMT   
Keystroke 
dynamics 
Best accuracy 
in 10-fold 
cross-validation 
 
97.50%     
Best classifier  LMT     
Table 4.59: the table summarizes the best results obtained by the experiments in Chapter 4. Experiments are di-
vided according to the topic of the deception (identity or holidays) and the cognitive strategy that we used to in-
crease liars’ cognitive load (expected questions or complex questions). Moreover, they are grouped based on the 
measures that were recorded during the task (RT, mouse dynamics and keystroke dynamics). For each experiment, 
the table reports the best result in terms of accuracy obtained by in the 10-fold cross-validation. The classifier that 
reached the best accuracy is reported as well. 
5.2 General Conclusions 
In Chapter 2, we stated that the proposed paradigms fit in the spectrum of behavioral lie detection 
techniques, such as the aIAT and the CIT. However, the aim of our work was to build lie detection 
models that overcomes the limitations of the traditional RT-based techniques for the web application. 
With regard to the average classification accuracy CIT [114] and aIAT [111] have similar accuracies 
to those of the experiments reported here (around 90%). However, we have shown that deception can 
be spotted in the absence of any ground truth information as well. In other words, differently from 
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CIT and aIAT, the paradigms that we have proposed do not require any true memory as alternative 
to build the test. Finally, while in the RT-based traditional test for lie detection the topic of the false-
hood is predetermined, keystroke analysis could offer the possibility to investigate the deception in 
free text contents, or rather with open questions or analyzing spontaneous texts. 
Our experiments confirmed the literature results according to which the cognitive complexity of the 
task increase the possibility to detect deception. The strategy of asking unexpected questions seems 
to be more efficient to increase liars’ cognitive load than complex questions. However, unexpected 
questions are difficult to apply in some contexts (e.g., lie of omission), whereas complex questions 
are more adaptable to different situations, even when there are no elements to fabricate unexpected 
information.  
Another major step that we reached and that was anticipated by the works of Duran, Dale and 
McNamara [116] and Banerjee et al. [133], is to demonstrate that the cognitive processes that underlie 
the deception production can be described ongoing. In fact, a crucial advantage of mouse dynamics 
and keystroke dynamics compared to RT is that they provide more information about the cognitive 
process of deception production. RT is a static index that describe the cognitive process only through 
a final behavioral outcome. Conversely, keystroke dynamics and, above all, mouse dynamics are 
online measures, which trace the constant evolution of the cognitive process and describe it through 
a complex set of dynamic behaviors [118].  
Also concerning the resistance to countermeasures, the proposed paradigms seem to be encouraging. 
In general, mouse tracking is more resistant to countermeasures than keystroke dynamics and RT. In 
fact, mouse tracking collects a large number of dynamics indices, both spatial and temporal, which 
can be assemble in different way to produce alternative classification models. Moreover, the different 
nature of the indices makes it impossible for a human being to control the response features all to-
gether. On the contrary, RT and keystroke dynamics are based exclusively on temporal features, thus 
they are more easily beatable with countermeasures. 
Other advantages of the paradigms that we have proposed in this work are related to their usability. 
The collection of RT, mouse dynamic and keystroke dynamics is inexpensive and does not require 
any equipment in addition to that the subject is already using during the his interaction with the com-
puter. Again, these indices are very well adapted to the detection of lies in the context of web. They 
do not require the presence of an examiner and are suitable for large-scale applications. They can be 
collected automatically, quickly and anywhere.  
5.3 Covert Lie Detection 
In our opinion, the most innovative and important result of this work concern the use of keystroke 
dynamics as a tool for covert lie detection. This is the first time that a covert tool to detect liars has 
been proposed. In section 4.3, we demonstrated that keystroke dynamics is very promising in terms 
of covert lie detection and integration with the existing applications. Covert lie detection refers to the 
conditions under which the examinee is unaware that he is under scrutiny of a scientifically based lie 
detection technique. This condition permit to avoid that he puts in act countermeasure to beat the lie 
detector. Moreover, keystroke dynamics lie detectors may be implemented maintaining the current 
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user interfaces and without altering the user experience. User experience is a very important aspect 
in the use of a products, systems or services [190]. It includes the users’ perceptions of system aspects 
such as utility, ease of use and efficiency. The high risk to integrate lie detection systems in online 
services is that users start to experience the service itself as a limitation of freedom and as a mean of 
close control of their activities more than a mean of free expression. For this reason, future directions 
should be address to design covert lie detection tools, such as deception detection via keystroke dy-
namics. By covert lie detection, deception is spotted without the risk that the examinee can alter the 
data collection, and the user experience is not affected by the purpose of the instrument. 
5.4 Limitations 
A first limitation of this work concern the experimental environment. Although the main goal of the 
research was to propose new lie detection paradigms for the online application, all the experiment 
were run in the lab under the supervision of an experimenter. In other words, data were collected in 
the laboratory and not online. Our choice to run the experiment in the laboratory was guided by pre-
vious experiences. In a preceding experiment [189] we collected online data, recruiting 244 subjects. 
204 subjects completed the experiment, 31 had quit it before the end and nine had stop after registra-
tion form. After an observational data analysis, we discovered that too many participants showed a 
clear intention to compromise the test (e.g., to a question about the name the answer was “Goofy”). 
Examining the participants’ responses one by one, we left out who seemed joking the test. The final 
sample counted 190 participants. However we cannot be sure that all the responses given by these 
last 190 subjects are genuine and, as consequence, that the data are closed to reality. Moreover, it was 
very difficult to instruct participants to lie with online instruction, risking that they did not understand 
the task. 
Another issue that is often raised in lie detection research is the use of the instructed lies. Lie detection 
experimental paradigms explicitly asked participant to lie, whereas in the real situations the deception 
is spontaneous. In lab studies, the motivation to lie is generally low, as it does not lead to any gain or 
loss. However, there are good reasons to think that the cognitive mechanisms of the deception pro-
duction are the same both in the experimental and real environment [71]. Rather, what is different 
from the lab to the daily reality is the amount of external stimuli, which may interfere with the task 
and which can lead to wrong conclusions. For example, a user could create a new Facebook account 
while he cooking and speaking with friends. For this reason, it should be appropriate to test the accu-
racy of the lie detectors in real situations. 
Finally, we mention the need to align the lie detection paradigms to the continuous technological 
development. For example, a fake review or a false social network profile may be created using touch 
screen devices, which are without mouse and keyboard. Thus, the human-computer interaction during 
the act of lie should be investigate considering touch screen technologies as well. 
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5.5 Future Directions 
As anticipated above, the main future direction consists in the integration of the lie detection para-
digms within the existing online services, such as the social networks. This work has laid the ground-
work for the development of covert lie detection tools and preserving the user experience. In these 
terms, the deception detection via keystroke dynamics seems to be the more promising technique. 
Future directions should be oriented to solve the current limitations (see paragraph 5.3) and to test 
the generalization of the techniques to a broad range of deception topics. The main objective should 
be the creation of a unique model that could be apply in a large number of cheating context, ranging 
from lies about identity in the real or online environment to security, forensic, or commercial appli-
cations. In fact, in the introduction we have seen how the problem of the online deception is a current 
and very urgent issue. A large number of social network profiles are faked. Anybody may post fake 
information, fake news or fake reviews. Online financial services are every day at risk as well. User 
identification is clearly one of the most important point to deepen, in order to have a solid banking 
systems and genuine social interaction between real people.  
Another context in which the techniques that we have proposed may fit well is the immigration office. 
Often, officers have to validate the immigrants’ identities without any warranty about their real bio-
graphical data. Even in this situation, it is crucial to provide a powerful tool for detecting whether a 
person is telling the truth or a lie about himself. 
Finally, our lie detection systems may be apply in the forensic context as well. In most cases, the 
defendant is called to confirm his version of the facts. In this situation, may be useful to have a tool 
that make an evaluation about his credibility. In addition, leaving aside homicides and similar situa-
tions, another possible application may be found in insurance issues, such as cases of malingering. 
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Annex 1 
Complete list of the 62 attributes extracted from keystroke dynamics tasks. 
 
Number of errors 
Prompted-firstdigit 
Prompted-firstdigit adjusted GULPEASE 
Prompted-enter 
Firstdigit-enter 
Time before enter key down 
Time before enter key flight 
Answer length 
Writing time  
Di-graph down time average 
Di-graph down time maximum 
Di-graph down time minimum 
Di-graph down time median 
Di-graph down time standard deviation 
Di-graph down time variance 
Di-graph up time average 
Di-graph up time maximum 
Di-graph up time minimum 
Di-graph up time median 
Di-graph up time standard deviation 
Di-graph up time variance 
Di-graph up and down time average 
Di-graph up and down time maximum 
Di-graph up and down time minimum 
Di-graph up and down time median 
Di-graph up and down time standard deviation 
Di-graph up and down time variance 
Di-graph press time average 
Di-graph press time maximum 
Di-graph press time minimum 
Di-graph press time median 
Di-graph press time standard deviation 
Di-graph press time variance 
Di-graph flight time average 
Di-graph flight time maximum 
Di-graph flight time minimum 
Di-graph flight time median 
Di-graph flight time standard deviation 
Di-graph flight time variance 
Tri-graph down time average 
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Tri -graph down time maximum 
Tri -graph down time minimum 
Tri -graph down time median 
Tri -graph down time standard deviation 
Tri -graph down time variance 
Tri -graph up time average 
Tri -graph up time maximum 
Tri -graph up time minimum 
Tri -graph up time median 
Tri -graph up time standard deviation 
Tri -graph up time variance 
Tri -graph up and down time average 
Tri -graph up and down time maximum 
Tri -graph up and down time minimum 
Tri -graph up and down time median 
Tri -graph up and down time standard deviation 
Tri -graph up and down time variance 
Number of Shift 
Number of Del 
Number of Canc 
Number of Space 
Number of Arrows 
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Annex 2 
Details on ML classifiers parameters 
Random Forest:  
weka.classifiers.trees.RandomForest -P 100 -I 100 -num-slots 1 -K 0 -M 1.0 -V 0.001 -S 1 
- seed -- The random number seed to be used. = 1 
- storeOutOfBagPredictions -- Whether to store the out-of-bag predictions. = FALSE 
- numExecutionSlots -- The number of execution slots (threads) to use for constructing the en-
semble. = 1 
- bagSizePercent -- Size of each bag, as a percentage of the training set size. = 100 
- numDecimalPlaces -- The number of decimal places to be used for the output of numbers in 
the model. = 2 
- batchSize -- The preferred number of instances to process if batch prediction is being per-
formed. More or fewer instances may be provided, but this gives implementations a chance 
to specify a preferred batch size. = 100 
- printClassifiers -- Print the individual classifiers in the output. = FALSE 
- numIterations -- The number of iterations to be performed. = 100 
- debug -- If set to true, classifier may output additional info to the console. = FALSE 
- outputOutOfBagComplexityStatistics -- Whether to output complexity-based statistics when 
out-of-bag evaluation is performed. = FALSE 
- breakTiesRandomly -- Break ties randomly when several attributes look equally good. = 
FALSE 
- doNotCheckCapabilities -- If set, classifier capabilities are not checked before classifier is 
built (Use with caution to reduce runtime). = FALSE 
- maxDepth -- The maximum depth of the tree, 0 for unlimited. = 0 
- calcOutOfBag -- Whether the out-of-bag error is calculated. = FALSE 
- numFeatures -- Sets the number of randomly chosen attributes. If 0, int(log_2(#predictors) + 
1) is used. = 0 
Logistic:  
weka.classifiers.functions.Logistic -R 1.0E-8 -M -1 -num-decimal-places 4 
- numDecimalPlaces -- The number of decimal places to be used for the output of numbers in 
the model. = 4 
- batchSize -- The preferred number of instances to process if batch prediction is being per-
formed. More or fewer instances may be provided, but this gives implementations a chance 
to specify a preferred batch size. = 100 
- debug -- Output debug information to the console. = FALSE 
- ridge -- Set the Ridge value in the log-likelihood. = 1.0E-8 
- useConjugateGradientDescent -- Use conjugate gradient descent rather than BFGS updates; 
faster for problems with many parameters. = FALSE 
- maxIts -- Maximum number of iterations to perform. = -1 
- doNotCheckCapabilities -- If set, classifier capabilities are not checked before classifier is 
built (Use with caution to reduce runtime). = FALSE 
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SMO:  
weka.classifiers.functions.SMO -C 1.0 -L 0.001 -P 1.0E-12 -N 0 -V -1 -W 1 -K "weka.classifi-
ers.functions.supportVector.PolyKernel -E 1.0 -C 250007" -calibrator "weka.classifiers.func-
tions.Logistic -R 1.0E-8 -M -1 -num-decimal-places 4" 
- buildCalibrationModels -- Whether to fit calibration models to the SVM's outputs (for proper 
probability estimates). = FALSE 
- numFolds -- The number of folds for cross-validation used to generate training data for cali-
bration models (-1 means use training data). = -1 
- randomSeed -- Random number seed for the cross-validation. = 1 
- c -- The complexity parameter C. = 1.0 
- numDecimalPlaces -- The number of decimal places to be used for the output of numbers in 
the model. = 2 
- batchSize -- The preferred number of instances to process if batch prediction is being per-
formed. More or fewer instances may be provided, but this gives implementations a chance 
to specify a preferred batch size. = 100 
- kernel -- The kernel to use. Polykernel –C 250007 -E 1.0 
- checksTurnedOff -- Turns time-consuming checks off - use with caution. = FALSE 
- debug -- If set to true, classifier may output additional info to the console. = FALSE 
- filterType -- Determines how/if the data will be transformed. = Normalized training data 
- toleranceParameter -- The tolerance parameter (shouldn't be changed). = 0.001 
- calibrator -- The calibration method to use. = Logistic 
- doNotCheckCapabilities -- If set, classifier capabilities are not checked before classifier is 
built (Use with caution to reduce runtime). = FALSE 
- epsilon -- The epsilon for round-off error (shouldn't be changed). 1.0E-12 
LMT:  
weka.classifiers.trees.LMT -I -1 -M 15 -W 0.0 
- splitOnResiduals -- Set splitting criterion based on the residuals of LogitBoost. There are two 
possible splitting criteria for LMT: the default is to use the C4.5 splitting criterion that uses 
information gain on the class variable. The other splitting criterion tries to improve the purity 
in the residuals produces when fitting the logistic regression functions. The choice of the split-
ting criterion does not usually affect classification accuracy much, but can produce different 
trees. = FALSE 
- useAIC -- The AIC is used to determine when to stop LogitBoost iterations. The default is not 
to use AIC. = FALSE 
- numDecimalPlaces -- The number of decimal places to be used for the output of coefficients. 
= 2 
- batchSize -- The preferred number of instances to process if batch prediction is being per-
formed. More or fewer instances may be provided, but this gives implementations a chance 
to specify a preferred batch size. = 100 
- weightTrimBeta -- Set the beta value used for weight trimming in LogitBoost. Only instances 
carrying (1 - beta)% of the weight from previous iteration are used in the next iteration. Set to 
0 for no weight trimming. The default value is 0. = 0.0 
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- doNotMakeSplitPointActualValue -- If true, the split point is not relocated to an actual data 
value. This can yield substantial speed-ups for large datasets with numeric attributes. = 
FALSE 
- debug -- If set to true, classifier may output additional info to the console. = FALSE 
- numBoostingIterations -- Set a fixed number of iterations for LogitBoost. If >= 0, this sets a 
fixed number of LogitBoost iterations that is used everywhere in the tree. If < 0, the number 
is cross-validated. = -1 
- fastRegression -- Use heuristic that avoids cross-validating the number of Logit-Boost itera-
tions at every node. When fitting the logistic regression functions at a node, LMT has to de-
termine the number of LogitBoost iterations to run. Originally, this number was cross-vali-
dated at every node in the tree. To save time, this heuristic cross-validates the number only 
once and then uses that number at every node in the tree. Usually this does not decrease ac-
curacy but improves runtime considerably. = TRUE 
- minNumInstances -- Set the minimum number of instances at which a node is considered for 
splitting. The default value is 15. = 15 
- doNotCheckCapabilities -- If set, classifier capabilities are not checked before classifier is 
built (Use with caution to reduce runtime). = FALSE 
- errorOnProbabilities -- Minimize error on probabilities instead of misclassification error when 
cross-validating the number of LogitBoost iterations. When set, the number of LogitBoost 
iterations is chosen that minimizes the root mean squared error instead of the misclassification 
error. = FALSE 
- convertNominal -- Convert all nominal attributes to binary ones before building the tree. This 
means that all splits in the final tree will be binary. = FALSE 
Naïve Bayes:  
weka.classifiers.bayes.NaiveBayes 
- useKernelEstimator -- Use a kernel estimator for numeric attributes rather than a normal dis-
tribution. = FALSE 
- numDecimalPlaces -- The number of decimal places to be used for the output of numbers in 
the model. = 2 
- batchSize -- The preferred number of instances to process if batch prediction is being per-
formed. More or fewer instances may be provided, but this gives implementations a chance 
to specify a preferred batch size. = 100 
- debug -- If set to true, classifier may output additional info to the console. = FALSE 
- displayModelInOldFormat -- Use old format for model output. The old format is better when 
there are many class values. The new format is better when there are fewer classes and many 
attributes. = FALSE 
- doNotCheckCapabilities -- If set, classifier capabilities are not checked before classifier is 
built (Use with caution to reduce runtime). = FALSE 
- useSupervisedDiscretization -- Use supervised discretization to convert numeric attributes to 
nominal ones. = FALSE 
J48:  
weka.classifiers.trees.J48 
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- batchSize -- The preferred number of instances to process if batch prediction is being per-
formed. More or fewer instances may be provided, but this gives implementations a chance 
to specify a preferred batch size. = 100 
- binarySplits -- Whether to use binary splits on nominal attributes when building the trees. = 
FALSE 
- collapseTree -- Whether parts are removed that do not reduce training error. = TRUE 
- confidenceFactor -- The confidence factor used for pruning (smaller values incur more prun-
ing). = 0.25 
- debug -- If set to true, classifier may output additional info to the console. = FALSE 
- doNotCheckCapabilities -- If set, classifier capabilities are not checked before classifier is 
built (Use with caution to reduce runtime). = FALSE 
- doNotMakeSplitPointActualValue -- If true, the split point is not relocated to an actual data 
value. This can yield substantial speed-ups for large datasets with numeric attributes. = 
FALSE 
- minNumObj -- The minimum number of instances per leaf. = 2 
- numDecimalPlaces -- The number of decimal places to be used for the output of numbers in 
the model. = 2 
- numFolds -- Determines the amount of data used for reduced-error pruning.  One fold is used 
for pruning, the rest for growing the tree. = 3 
- reducedErrorPruning -- Whether reduced-error pruning is used instead of C.4.5 pruning. = 
FALSE 
- saveInstanceData -- Whether to save the training data for visualization. = FALSE 
- seed -- The seed used for randomizing the data when reduced-error pruning is used. = 1 
- subtreeRaising -- Whether to consider the subtree raising operation when pruning. = TRUE 
- unpruned -- Whether pruning is performed. = FALSE 
- useLaplace -- Whether counts at leaves are smoothed based on Laplace. = FALSE 
- useMDLcorrection -- Whether MDL correction is used when finding splits on numeric attrib-
utes. = TRUE 
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Annex 3 
Complete list of the 23 raw attributes and 18 normalized predictors extracted from RT and 
complex questions task. 
 
Raw predictors 
Total RT Mean Reaction Time on all test questions 
Total Yes RT Mean Reaction Time on all test questions that required a YES response 
Total No RT  Mean Reaction Time on all test questions that required a NO response 
Control Tot RT  Mean Reaction Time on all control questions  
Control Yes RT  Mean Reaction Time on control questions that required a YES response 
Control No RT  Mean Reaction Time on control questions that required a NO response 
Simple Tot RT  Mean Reaction Time on all simple questions  
Simple Yes RT  Mean Reaction Time on simple questions that required a YES response 
Simple No RT  Mean Reaction Time on simple questions that required a NO response 
Complex Tot RT  Mean Reaction Time on all complex questions  
Complex Yes RT  Mean Reaction Time on complex questions that required a YES response 
Complex No RT  Mean Reaction Time on complex questions that required a NO response 
Mean Total errors Mean number of errors on all test questions (number of errors on all test questions di-
vided by total number of stimuli on entire test) 
Mean Control Tot errors Mean number of errors on all control questions (number of errors on all control ques-
tions divided by total number of control stimuli) 
Mean Simple Tot errors Mean number of errors on all simple questions (number of errors on all simple questions 
divided by total number of simple stimuli) 
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Mean Complex Tot er-
rors 
Mean number of errors on all complex questions (number of errors on all complex ques-
tions divided by total number of complex stimuli) 
Raw Total errors Total number of errors on all test questions 
Raw Control Tot errors Number of errors  on all control questions 
Raw Simple Tot errors Number of errors  on all simple questions 
Raw Complex Tot errors Number of errors  on all complex questions 
IES Control Inverse Efficiency Score calculated for RT and errors of control questions 
IES Simple Inverse Efficiency Score calculated for RT and errors of simple questions 
IES Complex Inverse Efficiency Score calculated for RT and errors of complex questions 
Normalized predictors 
Total Yes RT/Total RT Ratio between RT on all test questions that required a YES response and RT on all test 
questions 
Total No RT/Total RT Ratio between RT on all test questions that required a NO response and RT on all test 
questions 
Control Tot RT/Total RT Ratio between RT on all control questions and RT on all test questions 
Control Yes RT/Total RT Ratio between RT on control questions that required a YES response and RT on all test 
questions   
Control No RT/Total RT Ratio between RT on control questions that required a NO response and RT on all test 
questions  
Simple Tot RT/Total RT Ratio between RT on all simple questions  and RT on all test questions 
Simple Yes RT/Total RT Ratio between RT on simple questions that required a YES response and RT on all test 
questions   
Simple No RT/Total RT 
 
Ratio between RT on simple questions that required a NO response and RT on all test 
questions  
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Complex Tot RT/Total 
RT 
 
Ratio between RT on all complex questions  and RT on all test questions 
Complex Yes RT/Total 
RT 
 
Ratio between RT on complex questions that required a YES response and RT on all 
test questions   
Complex No RT/Total 
RT 
 
Ratio between RT on complex questions that required a NO response and RT on all test 
questions  
(Total Yes RT-Total No 
RT)/Total RT 
 
Ratio of the difference between the RT on all test questions that required a YES re-
sponse and the RT on all test questions that required a NO response with the RT on all 
test questions  
(Control Yes RT - Con-
trol No RT)/Total RT 
Ratio of the difference between the RT on control questions that required a YES re-
sponse and the RT on control questions that required a NO response with the RT on all 
test questions  
(Simple Yes RT - Simple 
No RT)/Total RT 
Ratio of the difference between the RT on simple questions that required a YES re-
sponse and the RT on simple questions that required a NO response with the RT on all 
test questions  
(Complex Yes RT - Com-
plex No RT)/Total RT 
Ratio of the difference between the RT on complex questions that required a YES re-
sponse and the RT on complex questions that required a NO response with the RT on 
all test questions  
Raw Simple Tot er-
rors/Raw Control Tot er-
rors 
Ratio between the number of errors on all simple questions and the number of errors on 
all control questions 
Raw Complex Tot er-
rors/Raw Control Tot er-
rors 
Ratio between the number of errors on all complex questions and the number of errors 
on all control questions 
Raw Complex Tot er-
rors/Raw Simple Tot er-
rors 
Ratio between the number of errors on all complex questions and the number of errors 
on all simple questions 
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Annex 4 
Complete list of the 326 raw attributes predictors extracted from mouse dynamics and complex 
questions task related to deception about holidays. 
control_average_error simple_sd_MD-time complex_average_vel(y) 
control_average_IT simple_sd_x-flip complex_average_acc(y) 
control_average_RT simple_sd_y-flip complex_sd_vel(x) 
control_average_MD simple_min_vel(x) complex_sd_acc(x) 
control_average_AUC simple_max_vel(x) complex_sd_vel(y) 
control_average_MD-time simple_min_vel(y) complesd_acc(x)(y) 
control_average_x-flip simple_max_vel(y) complex_YES_average_error 
control_average_y-flip simple_min_acc(x) complex_YES_average_IT 
control_sd_error simple_max_acc(x) complex_YES_average_RT 
control_sd_IT simple_min_acc(y) complex_YES_average_MD 
control_sd_RT simple_max_acc(y) complex_YES_average_AUC 
control_sd_MD simple_average_vel(x) complex_YES_average_MD-time 
control_sd_AUC simple_average_acc(x) complex_YES_average_x-flip 
control_sd_MD-time simple_average_vel(y) complex_YES_average_y-flip 
control_sd_x-flip simple_average_acc(y) complex_YES_sd_error 
control_sd_y-flip simple_sd_vel(x) complex_YES_sd_IT 
control_min_vel(x) simple_sd_acc(x) complex_YES_sd_RT 
control_max_vel(x) simple_sd_vel(y) complex_YES_sd_MD 
control_min_vel(y) simple_sd_acc(y) complex_YES_sd_AUC 
control_max_vel(y) simple_YES_average_error complex_YES_sd_MD-time 
control_min_acc(x) simple_YES_average_IT complex_YES_sd_x-flip 
control_max_acc(x) simple_YES_average_RT complex_YES_sd_y-flip 
control_min_acc(y) simple_YES_average_MD complex_YES_min_vel(x) 
control_max_acc(y) simple_YES_average_AUC complex_YES_max_vel(x) 
control_average_vel(x) simple_YES_average_MD-time complex_YES_min_vel(y) 
control_average_acc(x) simple_YES_average_x-flip complex_YES_max_vel(y) 
control_average_vel(y) simple_YES_average_y-flip complex_YES_min_acc(x) 
control_average_acc(y) simple_YES_sd_error complex_YES_max_acc(x) 
control_sd_vel(x) simple_YES_sd_IT complex_YES_min_acc(y) 
control_sd_acc(x) simple_YES_sd_RT complex_YES_max_acc(y) 
control_sd_vel(y) simple_YES_sd_MD complex_YES_average_vel(x) 
control_sd_acc(y) simple_YES_sd_AUC complex_YES_average_acc(x) 
control_YES_average_error simple_YES_sd_MD-time complex_YES_average_vel(y) 
control_YES_average_IT simple_YES_sd_x-flip complex_YES_average_acc(y) 
control_YES_average_RT simple_YES_sd_y-flip complex_YES_sd_vel(x) 
control_YES_average_MD simple_YES_min_vel(x) complex_YES_sd_acc(x) 
control_YES_average_AUC simple_YES_max_vel(x) complex_YES_sd_vel(y) 
control_YES_average_MD-time simple_YES_min_vel(y) complex_YES_sd_acc(y) 
control_YES_average_x-flip simple_YES_max_vel(y) complex_NO_average_error 
control_YES_average_y-flip simple_YES_min_acc(x) complex_NO_average_IT 
control_YES_sd_error simple_YES_max_acc(x) complex_NO_average_RT 
control_YES_sd_IT simple_YES_min_acc(y) complex_NO_average_MD 
control_YES_sd_RT simple_YES_max_acc(y) complex_NO_average_AUC 
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control_YES_sd_MD simple_YES_average_vel(x) complex_NO_average_MD-time 
control_YES_sd_AUC simple_YES_average_acc(x) complex_NO_average_x-flip 
control_YES_sd_MD-time simple_YES_average_vel(y) complex_NO_average_y-flip 
control_YES_sd_x-flip simple_YES_average_acc(y) complex_NO_sd_error 
control_YES_sd_y-flip simple_YES_sd_vel(x) complex_NO_sd_IT 
control_YES_min_vel(x) simple_YES_sd_acc(x) complex_NO_sd_RT 
control_YES_max_vel(x) simple_YES_sd_vel(y) complex_NO_sd_MD 
control_YES_min_vel(y) simple_YES_sd_acc(y) complex_NO_sd_AUC 
control_YES_max_vel(y) simple_NO_average_error complex_NO_sd_MD-time 
control_YES_min_acc(x) simple_NO_average_IT complex_NO_sd_x-flip 
control_YES_max_acc(x) simple_NO_average_RT complex_NO_sd_y-flip 
control_YES_min_acc(y) simple_NO_average_MD complex_NO_min_vel(x) 
control_YES_max_acc(y) simple_NO_average_AUC complex_NO_max_vel(x) 
control_YES_average_vel(x) simple_NO_average_MD-time complex_NO_min_vel(y) 
control_YES_average_acc(x) simple_NO_average_x-flip complex_NO_max_vel(y) 
control_YES_average_vel(y) simple_NO_average_y-flip complex_NO_min_acc(x) 
control_YES_average_acc(y) simple_NO_sd_error complex_NO_max_acc(x) 
control_YES_sd_vel(x) simple_NO_sd_IT complex_NO_min_acc(y) 
control_YES_sd_acc(x) simple_NO_sd_RT complex_NO_max_acc(y) 
control_YES_sd_vel(y) simple_NO_sd_MD complex_NO_average_vel(x) 
control_YES_sd_acc(y) simple_NO_sd_AUC complex_NO_average_acc(x) 
control_NO_average_error simple_NO_sd_MD-time complex_NO_average_vel(y) 
control_NO_average_IT simple_NO_sd_x-flip complex_NO_average_acc(y) 
control_NO_average_RT simple_NO_sd_y-flip complex_NO_sd_vel(x) 
control_NO_average_MD simple_NO_min_vel(x) complex_NO_sd_acc(x) 
control_NO_average_AUC simple_NO_max_vel(x) complex_NO_sd_vel(y) 
control_NO_average_MD-time simple_NO_min_vel(y) complex_NO_sd_acc(y) 
control_NO_average_x-flip simple_NO_max_vel(y) all questions_average_error 
control_NO_average_y-flip simple_NO_min_acc(x) all questions_average_IT 
control_NO_sd_error simple_NO_max_acc(x) all questions_average_RT 
control_NO_sd_IT simple_NO_min_acc(y) all questions_average_MD 
control_NO_sd_RT simple_NO_max_acc(y) all questions_average_AUC 
control_NO_sd_MD simple_NO_average_vel(x) all questions_average_MD-time 
control_NO_sd_AUC simple_NO_average_acc(x) all questions_average_x-flip 
control_NO_sd_MD-time simple_NO_average_vel(y) all questions_average_y-flip 
control_NO_sd_x-flip simple_NO_average_acc(y) all questions_sd_error 
control_NO_sd_y-flip simple_NO_sd_vel(x) all questions_sd_IT 
control_NO_min_vel(x) simple_NO_sd_acc(x) all questions_sd_RT 
control_NO_max_vel(x) simple_NO_sd_vel(y) all questions_sd_MD 
control_NO_min_vel(y) simple_NO_sd_acc(y) all questions_sd_AUC 
control_NO_max_vel(y) complex_average_error all questions_sd_MD-time 
control_NO_min_acc(x) complex_average_IT all questions_sd_x-flip 
control_NO_max_acc(x) complex_average_RT all questions_sd_y-flip 
control_NO_min_acc(y) complex_average_MD all questions_min_vel(x) 
control_NO_max_acc(y) complex_average_AUC all questions_max_vel(x) 
control_NO_average_vel(x) complex_average_MD-time all questions_min_vel(y) 
control_NO_average_acc(x) complex_average_x-flip all questions_max_vel(y) 
control_NO_average_vel(y) complex_average_y-flip all questions_min_acc(x) 
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control_NO_average_acc(y) complex_sd_error all questions_max_acc(x) 
control_NO_sd_vel(x) complex_sd_IT all questions_min_acc(y) 
control_NO_sd_acc(x) complex_sd_RT all questions_max_acc(y) 
control_NO_sd_vel(y) complex_sd_MD all questions_average_vel(x) 
control_NO_sd_acc(y) complex_sd_AUC all questions_average_acc(x) 
simple_average_error complex_sd_MD-time all questions_average_vel(y) 
simple_average_IT complex_sd_x-flip all questions_average_acc(y) 
simple_average_RT complex_sd_y-flip all questions_sd_vel(x) 
simple_average_MD complex_min_vel(x) all questions_sd_acc(x) 
simple_average_AUC complex_max_vel(x) all questions_sd_vel(y) 
simple_average_MD-time complex_min_vel(y) all questions_sd_acc(y) 
simple_average_x-flip complex_max_vel(y) control_X75 
simple_average_y-flip complex_min_acc(x) control_Y30 
simple_sd_error complex_max_acc(x) simple_X75 
simple_sd_IT complex_min_acc(y) simple_Y30 
simple_sd_RT complex_max_acc(y) complex_X75 
simple_sd_MD complex_average_vel(x) complex_Y30 
simple_sd_AUC complex_average_acc(x)  
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Annex 5 
Average trajectories of truth-tellers (in green), liars A (in red) and liars B (in orange), sepa-
rately for control, simple and complex questions requiring a “yes” or “no” response. Data refer 
to mouse dynamics and complex questions task related to deception about holidays. 
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